Statutory Mandates and FEMA

FEMA in 2011 definitely staffed up but quality and competence yet to be established by the acid test of events. Still a start made on the decline in staffing from January 20, 2001 to August 29, 2005 {Hurricane Katrina]!

But it should be noted that extensive HUMAN CAPITAL mandates were included in PKEMRA 2006 largely effective on March 31, 2007.

It would be helpful if FEMA published more about its demographics and the cohorts involved as to length of service. That latter number is not outcome determinative as to competence and skills but it certainly is a marker.

And since in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king, FEMA with its administration of the DRF makes some other agencies much less significant when it comes to actual numbers.

Again a year in which certain disasters such as radiological releases and terrorism not specifically included in the events subject to disaster declarations. This should happen.

A compilation of FEMA legislative proposals sent to OMB and Congress and outcome would be of interest. NFIP reform also died on the vine.

But hey thanks to those who offered reform legislation in both the Executive Branch and the Congress.

Happy New Year and welcome to the 2nd Session of the 112th Congress.

The End is Near! 2011 that is!

I had long speculated that President Obama would break the century mark for declarations this year. He may just be short of that figure for major disasters. Still quite a year. With 10 billion dollar disasters a good warm up year for FEMA and the big one or ones to come.

I find the most interesting story of the year the FUKISHIMA tragedy. It now appears that event alone may well knock Japan out of the top ten leading countries of the world this century. This should motivate USA Emergency Management and Homeland Security to understand the importance of their efforts to improve the disaster paradigm of preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. Note that "prevention" added by Congress in PKEMRA 2006 but undefined. Now defined in part by PPD-8 issued on March 31, 2011 and partially implemented.

Political and economic consolidation of the Eurasian heartland and extremes suffered some large blows this year but eventually perhaps 2 centuries down the road its history will have shaped a new dominant force in world history. One that if it can manage environmental issues and change that may last a long long time.

Despite a half-century of independence it now looks more and more like Africa will again undergo domination by foreign powers including those with resource shortages and the economic muscle to exploit Africa's richest.

And the USA and DHS and FEMA seem content to remain ignorant of policy impacts of new scientific developments and technology.

The most important development in the last decade has been social media and web 2.0 but few have really captured its potential or dangers to EM and HS.

Whatever the outcome of the 2012 elections it is apparent that self-delusion about American exceptionalism and ourselves will continue to be the dominating factors in American politics. It is never fun to watch people, cultures, or civilizations commit suicide so hoping none of that in 2012, but I may just be averting my eyes not escaping reality.

In two years the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 will be 40!

Well the 13th short term extension until September 30, 2012 is now law. Congrats to Congress for failing to understand what it has wrought.

As 2011 winds up the real question is what did the dramatic changes wrought by that 1973 legislative enactment accomplish for mitigation and the closely related mandatory "mitigation" placed in the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public Law 93-288? Both laws were designed in tandem to hopefully reduce disaster outlays over time and use a quasi-insurance mechanism to make the communities with flood plains bear the full costs of that occupancy, in particular for placing houses in the flood plain.

I think it is plain that after almost 40 years part of the problem is that FEMA did not get the message when it was formed that it real job was preventing disasters and doing mitigation not creating a moral hazard with "free" disaster relief as was the worry of Senator William Proxmire and others in not opposing the creation of FEMA. There were no ATMs at the time in 1978 and 1979 but many worried that FEMA would just become another focus of federal largesse largely creating even more problems.

So as the year winds up announcing that the year 2012 will be the year flood insurance and federal disaster relief are reformed. How will be explained in a series of posts although much has already been laid out for the last few years here in this blog.

So here is the new FEMA mantra: Prevent Disasters Don't Promote them!

And as a subset further analysis will be made on how FEMA has in fact through its policies and bureacratic dishonesty undermined the STATES and their local governments in their preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts.

Hoping Congressional hearings will delve into these concerns this spring even as the spring runoff occurs.

A compliment to FIMA

The Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration should really be more honest and be named the Flood Insurance and Natural Hazards Mitigation Directorate. This may well be its last year in FEMA. However, I do have to compliment that FEMA Directorate for its helpful webpage on FEMA.gov!

The webpage gives some history and lists current guidance in a quite helpful manner.

So thanks and happy holidays in that directorate. Wish all of mitigation in FEMA was housed with you. But hey I fought and lost that issue with a former GC of FEMA who did accomplish expansion of OGC FEMA DAE lawyers but little else.

Happy Holiday to all my friends and enemies in FEMA. 12 years and marking at this point since I left you behind.

The Budget Cycle and FEMA

While the rest of US enjoy the holidays the budget nomes at OMB are doing their thing having given the departments and agencies pass backs on their budget requests for Fiscal Year 2013 that begins October 1st of 2012. This could be the last budget submission of any Obama Administration ever and if the Republicans win or lose it probably is dead on arrival when transmitted with the State of the Union Address or shortly thereafter in early February. So why is in even being submitted? Well for one thing required by law. For another serves as a marker for all the debates and appropriations efforts to follow. And finally it does to some degree reflect how the Administration sees the world and its own role in world and US history.

Most of FEMA budget is in the 045 category of fiscal codes--meaning state and local support. Most of the rest of DHS is in other fiscal codes. For example, General Government is fiscal code 800. It is hard to get ahold of how these assignments are made but they often foreshadow problems to come. For example, when Civil Defense left the 050 national security budget and became part of 045 it ended its role as being of any interest at all to the Armed Services Committees or the Armed Services Appropriators. Until 1995 FEMA always had one or two Associate Directors whose Senate confirmation ran through the Armed Services Committee. Once that stopped with repeal of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress, DoD pretty well shrugged its shoulders on FEMA issues, and did learn from the 1992 LA riots not to federalize the NG for riots and civil disorders. In another blog I have recently argued that the real state role of the NG is in law enforcement for the Governors in riots and civil disorders and that the current lack of training of the NG for that role is dangerous. Others disagreed. See blog Sic Semper Tyrannis.

In recent blog posts here and elsewhere I have argued that in fact the EM community is small and growing smaller. Even the rest of the PUBLIC SAFETY budgets are in danger of full scale erosion with over 500,000 State and Local workers laid off many in the Public Safety arena. Now FEMA has take a huge hit, over $2 billion IMO, to its support for the STATES and their local governments first response community. This is enough to make it almost certain that some capability will not be just lost now but forever.

With over 100 declarations in CY 2012 by the President for disasters, an all-time high, is part of this reflection of diminished STATES and their local government capability? DoD really does not care what happens to STATES and their local governments just hoping to be kept out of their problems. That is why on base housing and schools is such a big issue. Isolation from the General Public is a conscience DoD strategy for both force protection and ensuring that the Armed Forces are not burdened with the problems of STATES and their local governments.

In the meantime, I understand the OMB passback on the FEMA budget was devastating reflecting a definite change in policy by the President with respect to FEMA. Not the least the Presidential deferrment of construction money for FEMA at St. Elizabeths. So far only the US Coast Guard and the DHS support staff locked in for that location.

The bottom line--stand by for an absolutely amazing State of the Union address as the President sallies forth to meet the voters in the fall. None seem happy with current disaster policy or the NFIP either in FEMA or Congress or the Administration. The result could be dramatic in 2012.

FEMA and Climate Change

Would it not be interesting to know what FEMA's official position is on Climate Change and whether that comports with what most of its officials and employees believe? FEMA of course can only rely on second hand reports and analysis since no PhD Climate Scientists is now or ever has been on its payroll. In fact it is not exactly clear whether FEMA has ever held a conference or other public meeting wherein it gathered information on Climate Change and its actual or potential impact on its programs, functions, or activities.

Why? Well for one thing the culture in FEMA is not a scientific one, or a social service agency, or in fact anything that involves much intellectual curiosity about the natural world even though its business is largely natural disaster response and recovery. This is because it key Congressional Committee is Transportation and Infrastructure in the HOUSE the home of PORK.

Merely transferring the Stafford Act jurisdiction to almost any other committee would change how FEMA does business overnight.

And surprise surprise, all of the Republican candidates have quite unusual positions with respect to FEMA, disaster relief, and the role of FEMA in the federal system. Standby for some big surprises.

And did you know the President himself postponed efforts to house FEMA in the new DHS HQs building in S.E. Washington? Wondering why? Perhaps Climate Change?

The SNRA Synopsed!

A seven page document unclassified has been released by DHS discussing the Classified Strategic National Risk Assessment. Don't worry though because neither the released document or the SNRA appear to have been designed to accomplish much.

From the shorter document see this disclaimer:

"Impacts and Future Uses
The SNRA was executed in support of PPD-8 implementation and has served as an integral part of the development of the National Preparedness Goal, assisting in integrating and coordinating identification of the core capabilities and establishing a risk-informed foundation for the National Preparedness System. Participants mapped the core capabilities identified in the Goal to the events assessed in the SNRA to identify any additional core capabilities that may need to be included. In addition, the SNRA can be used to inform discussions on priorities for capability investment decisions. Finally, the SNRA results will be used to drive other preparedness priorities at the national level.

In addition, conducting a Strategic National Risk Assessment will support the National Preparedness System by providing a consolidated list of ―national level events for consideration and augmentation for Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment processes at multiple jurisdiction levels.

Conclusion
Although the development of the SNRA is an important first step, further analysis through the execution of regional- and community-level risk assessments will help communities better understand their risks and form a foundation for their own security and resilience. The Nation’s preparedness is dependent on a whole-of-community understanding of risk and comprehensive consequences at and across all levels of government. In conjunction with Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, the SNRA will be expanded and enhanced and will ultimately serve as a unifying national risk profile to facilitate preparedness efforts"!

So you can see most the work to be done not really yet completed and that was the statutory mandate. Well DHS will be gone before most of its key assignments will have been accomplished.

For some discussion of the SNRA see the posts of yesterday December 12th on the blog HLSWATCH.com

GAO on NG WMD Preparedness and Response

Odd that I posted on November 29th on FEMA and DHS have almost no identified role in WMD preparedness and response. I also listed recently to an EMForum presentation on the Radiologically Resilient Community. Now GAO [not in so many words but in substance] concludes that the NG is not prepared or able to respond to a WMD incident/event. Perhaps it won't happen but who knows. The GAO report can be accessed on my other blog at http://www.vacationlanegrp.wordpress.com!

It was in winter of 1995 that then Senator Sam Nunn panicked over the Executive Branch's failure to be able to explain either WMD response systems or terrorism response systems. Remember the Oklahoma City Bombing had been earlier that year and President William Jefferson Clinton has issued PD-39 attempting to delineate a crisis management role and a consequences management role for DOJ and FEMA. In driving on an answer before the Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, Nunn had led enactment of a statute that mandated Executive Branch preparedness and response to both terrorism and WMD incident/events. FEMA begged off the state and local training role and so the President acceded to the statutory assignment to DoD of that mission for a three year period. Then the President was allowed to transfer it from DoD to some other Department or Agency. Again FEMA begged off and so DOJ took the role and created the NDPO [National Domestic Preparedness Office]supplementing the Office of Domestic Preparedness established in DOJ to administer the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. That Act had pass through monies to FEMA's USFA [US Fire Administration] to assist in training the FIRE SERVICE on terrorism exclusive of WMD.

And in DoD the NG created civil response teams that were to be the lead on WMD and terrorism preparedness and response.

Well given the GAO report you can obviously tell no one is in charge and few even understand the problems. Perhaps the terrorists will take advantage of this major error.

And did I mention that DHS was formed in part with the primary Executive Branch mission of WMD preparedness and response yet I can still not identify budget or staff devoted to anything but detection. And of course detection is good but does not really encompass preparedness and response.

FEMA Delegated Authority prior to DHS (March 1, 2003)

Presidential Executive Orders Specifically Delegating Program, Function, or Activity Legal Authority to the Independent Executive Branch FEMA
Prior to Incorporation Into DHS on March 1, 2003
[Note some of these EOs listed also delegate to
other Executive Branch Organizations]





Carter Administration:

1. Executive Order 11988 of May 24, 1977, as amended, Floodplain Management, 3 CFR, 1977 Comp., p. 117, 42 U.S.C. §4321 note p.191. (See 44 CFR Part 9)

2. Executive Order 12127 of March 31, 1979, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 376. (Implements Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1978)

3. Executive Order 12148 of July 20, 1979, as amended, Federal emergency management, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 412. (Implements Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1978)

4. Executive Order 12241 of September 29, 1980, National Contingency Plan [Radiological Emergencies], 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 282. (Note-Source of FRERP).

Reagan Administration:

1. Executive Order 12472 of April 3, 1984, Assignment of national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications functions, 3 CFR, 1984 Comp., p.193. (See 47 CFR Part 201)

2. Executive Order 12580 of January 23, 1987, as amended, Superfund Implementation, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 193 (Note: Amended by E.O. 12777 of October 18, 1991, and further amended by E.O. 13016 of August 28, 1996). (See 40 CFR Part 300, currently under revision).

3. Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 3 CFR, 1988 Comp., p. 585. (See also 47 CFR Part 201)

4. Executive Order 12657 of November 18, 1988, Federal Emergency Management Agency Assistance in Emergency Preparedness Planning at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 3 CFR, 1988 Comp., p. 611. (See 44 CFR Part 352)

Bush Administration:

1. Executive Order 12673 of March 23, 1989, Delegation of Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Functions, 3 CFR, 1989 Comp., p. 309. (See 44 CFR Part 206)

2. Executive Order 12699 of January 5, 1990, Seismic Safety of Federal and Federally Assisted or Regulated New Building Construction, 3 CFR, 1990 Comp., p. 269.

3. Executive Order 12742 of January 8, 1991, National Security Industrial Responsiveness, 3 CFR, 1991 Comp., p. 309.

Clinton Administration:

1. Executive Order 12919 of June 3, 1994, National Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 901. (See 15 CFR Part 700, 44 CFR Parts 321- 336)

2. Executive Order 12941 of December 1, 1994, Seismic Safety of Existing Federally Owned or Leased Building, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp. , p. 955.



[Executive Orders serve to delegate legal authority, provide legal interpretation, and provide policy guidance. When issued specifically pursuant to express statutory authority Executive Orders have the force and effect of federal law.]

FEMA and WMD PREPAREDNESS and RESPONSE

Try as hard as I can and I cannot identify the specifics of how FEMA prepares for and responds to a large scale HAZMAT incident or event and in particular a WMD threatened or actual event. The problem with that conclusion is how in fact and in law does DHS prepare for and respond to such an event? That was the key assignment to DHS in its creation. Others were CIP/cyber security including line drawing on privacy and civil rights and civil liberties issues and policies. A third key reason the department was established was to process domestic INTEL, and its collection, analysis and dissemination. The FUSION CENTERS seem to be the key entity in that activity also including line drawing on privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Also DHS participation in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center which morphed by statute into the organization doing the same job and reporting to the DNI and housed at the CIA. Hey DHS has not won many bureaucratic battles.

Some of the runup to 9/11/01 did involve the issues raised by intentional use of WMD.

That background is of enough use that I have decided to repost it here and specifically because some of the statutes and Committee prints did in fact discuss FEMA in the context of WMD preparedness and response. Always remember that in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [P.L.100-707] there is no specific reference either to terrorism or WMD!

This is a long one but here goes:

QUICK AND DIRTY Pre-9/11/01
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF WMD LEGAL AUTHORITIES





INDEX


Page
Public Law 105-261 (Title XIV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Public Law 105-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Public Law 104-201 (Title XIV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Extract From House Report 105-724 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Extract From Senate Report 105-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Brief FEMA WMD History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
WMD Reports to Congress and GAO Reports . . . . . . . 42

Extract From
Strom Thurmond National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999

Public Law 105-261
October 17,1998

TITLE XIV--DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Sec. 1401. Short title
Sec. 1402. Domestic preparedness for response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 1403. Report on domestic emergency preparedness.
Sec. 1404. Threat and risk assessments.
Sec. 1405. Advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.

Sec. 1401. SHORT TITLE

This title may be cited as the "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998".

Sec. 1402. DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE TO THREATS OF TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) ENHANCED RESPONSE CAPABILITY. --In light of the continuing potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States and the need to develop a more fully coordinated response to that threat on the part of Federal, State, and local agencies, the President shall act to increase the effectiveness at the Federal, State, and local level of the domestic emergency preparedness program for response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction by utilizing the President's existing authorities to develop an integrated program that builds upon the program established under title XIV [Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996] of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2714; 50 U.S. C. §§2301 et seq.).
(b) REPORT. --Not later than January 31, 1999, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing information on the actions taken at the Federal, State, and local level to develop an integrated program to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

Sec. 1403. REPORT ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.

Section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1889) is amended by adding at the following new subsection:
"(c) ANNEX ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM. ---
As part of the report submitted to Congress under subsection (b), the President shall include an annex which provides the following information on the domestic emergency preparedness program for response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (as established under section 1402 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998):
"(1) information on program responsibilities for each participating Federal department, agency, and bureau;
"(2) a summary of program activities performed during the preceding fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, bureau;
"(3) a summary of program obligations and expenditures during the preceding fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, bureau;
"(4) a summary of the program plan and budget for the current fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, and bureau;
"(5) the program budget request for the following fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, and bureau;
"(6) Recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction that have been made by the advisory panel to assess the capabilities of domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (as established under section 1405 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998), and actions taken as a result of such recommendations; and
"(7) Additional program measures and legislative authority for which congressional action may be recommended."

Sec. 1404. THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS.

(a) REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP METHODOLOGIES. --The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and representatives of appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, shall develop and test methodologies for assessing the threat and risk of terrorist employment of weapons of mass destruction against cities and other local areas. The results of the tests may be used to determine the training and equipment requirements under the program developed under section 1402. The methodologies required by this subsection shall be developed using cities or local areas selected by the Attorney General, acting in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appropriate representatives of Federal, State, and local agencies.

(b) REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE. ---The requirements in subsection (a) shall be completed not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act [October 17, 1998].


Sec. 1405. ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PANEL. ---The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center to establish a panel to assess the capabilities for domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.
(b) COMPOSITION OF PANEL; SELECTION.---

(1) The panel shall be composed of members who shall be private citizens of the United States with knowledge and expertise in emergency response matters.

(2) Members of the panel shall be selected by the federally funded research and development center in accordance with the terms of the contract established pursuant to subsection (a).

(c) PROCEDURES FOR PANEL. ---The federally funded research and development center shall be responsible for establishing appropriate procedures for the panel, including procedures for selection of a panel chairman.
(d) DUTIES OF PANEL.--The Panel shall---
(1) assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
(2) assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
(3) assess deficiencies in training programs for responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions.
(4) recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; and
(5) Assess the appropriate role of State and local governments in funding effective local response capabilities.

(e) DEADLINE TO ENTER INTO CONTRACT. --The Secretary of Defense shall enter into the contract required under subsection (a) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [October 17, 1998].

(f) DEADLINE FOR SECLECTION OF PANEL MEMBERS. --Selection of panel members shall be made not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary enters into the contract required by subsection (a).

(g) INITIAL MEETING OF THE PANEL. --The panel shall conduct its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date that all selections to the panel have been made.
(h) REPORTS. --

(1) Not later than 6 months after the date of the first meeting of the panel, the panel shall submit to the President and to Congress an initial report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
(2) Not later than December 15 of each year, beginning in 1999 and ending in 2001, the panel shall submit to the President and to the Congress a report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

(i) COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES. ----

(1) The panel may secure directly from the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or any other Federal department or agency information that the panel considers necessary for the panel to carry out its duties.
(2) The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and any other official of the United States shall provide the panel with full and timely cooperation in carrying out its duties under this section.

(j) FUNDING. --The Secretary of Defense shall provide the funds necessary for the panel to carry out its duties from the funds available to the Department of Defense for weapons of mass destruction preparedness initiatives.
(k) COMPENSATION OF PANEL MEMBERS. --

(1) Members of the panel shall serve without pay by reason of their work on the panel.
(2) Members of the panel shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular place of business in performance of services for the panel.

(l) TERMINATION OF THE PANEL. --The panel shall terminate three years after the date of the appointment of the member selected as chairman of the panel.
(m) DEFINITION. --In this section, the term "weapon of mass destruction" has the meaning given that term in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1).


NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1998 (Pub. Law 105-85, November 18, 1997)

Sec. 234. ANNUAL REPORT ON THREAT POSED TO THE UNITED STATES BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND CRUISE MISSLES

(A) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress by January 30 of each year a report on the threats posed to the United States and allies of the United States—
(1) by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles; and
(2) by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

(B) CONSULTATION.-- Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

(C) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that possesses weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(2) A description of the means by which any foreign country and non-State organization that has achieved capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles has achieved that capability, including a description of the international network of foreign countries and private entities that provide assistance to foreign countries and non-State organizations in achieving that capability.
(3) An examination of the doctrines that guide the use of weapons of mass destruction en each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(4) An examination of the existence and implementation of the control mechanisms that exist with respect to nuclear weapons in each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(5) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that seeks to acquire or develop (indigenously or with foreign assistance) weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(6) An assessment of various possible timelines for the achievement by foreign countries and non-State organizations of capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, taking into account the probability of whether the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China will comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, the potential availability of assistance from foreign technical specialists, and the potential for independent sales by foreign private entities without authorization from their national governments.
(7) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target the United States or its territories with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign or non-State organization achieves that capability.
(8) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target members of the United States Armed Forces deployed abroad with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of the enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability.

(D) CLASSIFICATION.—Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.


OGC/FEMA version of Codification in the United States Code of Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Title XIV of
Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996)

FEMA referenced in the following sections:
§ 2312
§ 2314
§ 2315
§ 2317
§2352

[Reference to FEMA by underlining not in original and note that no formal internal delegation by the Director, FEMA, of his authority or responsibility under these sections of the United States Code is in effect as of 12/1/98. Informal internal FEMA assignments were made by the Director in a memorandum dated November 19, 1996, subject: Nunn-Lugar/NSC Program Agenda Counterterrorism Responsibilities.]


Historical Footnote

This statute has been informally referred to as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act after its principal Senate sponsors. The original intention of the Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff was to designate FEMA as the lead agency for substantial portions of the legislation. This intention was principally due to the understanding of the Senate professional staff as to the import of PDD-39 issued in April 1995 by the President and its various agency assignments. FEMA was invited to testify before the Committee and that testimony was delivered by Clay Hollister, now Acting Chief Information Officer in FEMA and at that point (March 1996) the Deputy Associate Director for Response in the Response and Recovery Directorate. Based on Mr. Hollister's testimony and answers to questions for the record supplied by FEMA, the Staff recommended to the Committee that it was inappropriate to name FEMA as the lead agency. Due to the accidental intervention of a former FEMA employee (a FEMA employee at the time) the Staff reconsidered in part and developed the transition provision that now appears at §2312(a) requiring a Presidential determination of lead agency status by September 1999. The Executive Branch relies on PDD-39 and PDD-62 (May 1998) as being the Presidential determination required by the Act. Congressional staff involved in the passage and enactment of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998, an entirely new statute, does not agree and has recommended close oversight and review of the lead agency selection process and the absence of any formal Presidential determination beyond the two PDDs.


TITLE 50 UNITED STATES CODE
WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

CHAPTER 40--DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Sec.
2301. Findings
2302. Definitions

SUBCHAPTER I--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

2311. Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

(a) Enhanced response capability.
(b) Report required.

2312. Emergency response assistance program.

(a) Program required.
(b) Coordination.
(c) Eligible participants.
(d) Involvement of other Federal agencies.
(e) Available assistance.
(f) Limitations on Department of Defense assistance to law enforcement agencies.
(g) Administration of Department of Defense assistance.
(h) Funding.

2313. Nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency response.

(a) Department of Defense.
(b) Department of Energy.
(c) Funding.

2314. Chemical-biological emergency response team.

(a) Department of Defense rapid response team.
(b) Addition to Federal response plan.



2315. Testing of preparedness for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons.

(a) Emergencies involving chemical or biological weapon [sic].
(b) Emergencies involving nuclear and radiological weapons.
(c) Annual revisions of programs.
(d) Option to transfer responsibility.
(e) Funding.

2316. Military assistance to civilian law enforcement officials.

(a) Civilian expertise.
(b) Reports.

2317. Rapid response information system.

(a) Inventory of rapid response assets.
(b) Master inventory.
(c) Addition to Federal response plan.
(d) Database on chemical and biological materials.
(e) Access to inventory and database.

SUBCHAPTER II--INTERDICTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS

2331. Procurement of detection equipment [for] United States border security.
2332. Sense of Congress concerning criminal penalties.

(a) Sense of Congress concerning inadequacy of sentencing guidelines.
(b) Urging revision to guidelines.

2333. International border security.

(a) Secretary of Defense responsibility.
(b) Funding.
(c) Assistance to states of the former Soviet Union.





SUBCHAPTER III---CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS THREATENING THE UNITED STATES

2341. Elimination of plutonium production.

(a) Replacement program.
(b) Program requirements.
(c) Submission of program plan to Congress.

SUBCHAPTER IV--COORDINATION OF POLICY AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

2351. National Coordinator on Nonproliferation.

(a) Designation of position.
(b) Duties.
(c) Allocation of funds.

2352. National Security Council Committee on Nonproliferation.

(a) Establishment.
(b) Membership.
(c) Responsibilities.

2353. Comprehensive preparedness program.

(a) Program required.
(b) Content of program.
(c) Report.

SUBCHAPTER V--MISCELLANEOUS

2361. Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy.
2362. Transfers of allocations among Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
2363. Sense of Congress concerning assistance to states of former Soviet Union.
2364. Purchase of low-enriched uranium derived from Russian highly enriched uranium.

(a) Sense of Congress.
(b) Actions by the Secretary of State.

2365. Sense of Congress concerning purchase, packaging, and transportation of fissile materials at risk of theft.
2366. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.

(a) Reports.
(b) Form of reports.

2367. Annual report on threat posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

(a) Annual Report.
(b) Consultation.
(c) Matters to be Included.
(d) Classification.


§ 2301. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies are increasingly available from worldwide sources. Technical information relating to such weapons is readily available on the Internet, and raw materials for chemical, biological, and radiological weapons are widely available for legitimate commercial purposes.
(2) The former Soviet Union produced and maintained a vast array of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
(3) Many of the states of the former Soviet Union retain the facilities, materials, and technologies capable of producing additional quantities of weapons of mass destruction.
(4) The disintegration of the former Soviet Union was accompanied by disruptions of command and control systems, deficiencies in accountability for weapons, weapons-related materials and technologies, economic hardships, and significant gaps in border control among the states of the former Soviet Union. The problems of organized crime and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union increase the potential for proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials.
(5) The conditions described in paragraph (4) have substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies from within the states of the former Soviet Union and from unemployed scientists who worked on those programs.
(6) As a result of such conditions, the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history.
(7) The President has identified North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya as hostile states which already possess some weapons of mass destruction and are developing others.
(8) The acquisition or the development and use of weapons of mass destruction is well within the capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, acting independently or as proxies for foreign states.
(9) Foreign states can transfer weapons to or otherwise aid extremist and terrorist movements indirectly and with plausible deniability.
(10) Terrorist groups have already conducted chemical attacks against civilian targets in the United States and Japan, and a radiological attack in Russia.
(11) The potential for the national security of the United States to be threatened by nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological terrorism must be taken seriously.
(12) There is a significant and growing threat of attack by weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not military targets in the usual sense of the term.
(13) Concomitantly, the threat posed to the citizens of the United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing.
(14) Mass terror may result from terrorist incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials.
(15) Facilities required for production of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are much smaller and harder to detect than nuclear weapons facilities, and biological and chemical weapons can be deployed by alternative delivery means other than long-range ballistic missiles.
(16) Covert or unconventional means of delivery of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons include cargo ships, passenger aircraft, commercial and private vehicles and vessels, and commercial cargo shipments routed through multiple destinations.
(17) Traditional arms control efforts assume large state efforts with detectable manufacturing programs and weapons production programs, but are ineffective in monitoring and controlling smaller, though potentially more dangerous, unconventional proliferation efforts.
(18) Conventional counter-proliferation efforts would do little to detect or prevent the rapid development of a capability to suddenly manufacture several hundred chemical or biological weapons with nothing but commercial supplies and equipment.
(19) The United States lacks adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism.
(20) The Department of Energy has established a Nuclear Emergency Response Team which is available in case of nuclear or radiological emergencies, but no comparable units exist to deal with emergencies involving biological or chemical weapons or related materials.
(21) State and local emergency response personnel are not adequately prepared or trained for incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials.
(22) Exercises of the Federal, State, and local response to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism have revealed serious deficiencies in preparedness and severe problems of coordination.
(23) The development of, and allocation of responsibilities for, effective countermeasures to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism in the United States requires well-coordinated participation of many Federal agencies, and careful planning by the Federal Government and State and local governments.
(24) Training and exercises can significantly improve the preparedness of State and local emergency response personnel for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials.
(25) Sharing of the expertise and capabilities of the Department of Defense, which traditionally has provided assistance to Federal State, and local officials in neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of explosive ordnance, as well as radiological, biological, and chemical materials, can be a vital contribution to the development and deployment of countermeasures against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
(26) The United States lacks effective policy coordination regarding the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

§2302. Definitions

In this chapter:

(1) The term "weapons of mass destruction" means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of---

(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;
(B) a disease organism; or
(C) radiation or radioactivity

(2) The term "independent states of the former Soviet Union" has the meaning given that term in section 5801 of Title 22.
(3) The term "highly enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235.


SUBCHAPTER I--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

§2311. Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction

(a) Enhanced response capability

In light of the potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, the President shall take immediate action--
(1) to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; and
(2) to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents at both the national and the local level.

(b) Report required

Not later than January 31, 1997, the President shall transmit to Congress a report containing---
(1) an assessment of the capabilities of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local prevention and response efforts;
(2) requirements for improvements in those capabilities; and
(3) the measures that should be taken to achieve such improvements, including additional resources and legislative authorities that would be required.

[A list of reports to Congress and GAO reports
on WMD issues is an attachment to this document]

§2312. Emergency response assistance program

(a) Program required

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a program to provide civilian personnel of Federal, State, and local agencies with training and expert advice regarding emergency responses to a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or related materials.
(2) The President may designate the head of an agency other than the Department of Defense to assume the responsibility for carrying out the program on or after October 1, 1999, and relieve the Secretary of Defense of that responsibility upon the assumption of the responsibility by the designated official.
(3) In this section, the official responsible for carrying out the program is referred to as the "lead official".

(b) Coordination

In carrying out the program, the lead official shall coordinate with each of the following officials who is not serving as the lead official:

(1) The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(2) The Secretary of Energy.
(3) The Secretary of Defense.
(4) The heads of any other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have an expertise or responsibilities relevant to emergency responses described in subsection (a)(1) of this section.

(c) Eligible participants

The civilian personnel eligible to receive assistance under the program are civilian personnel of Federal, State, and local agencies who have emergency preparedness responsibilities.

(d) Involvement of other Federal agencies

(1) The lead official may use personnel and capabilities of Federal agencies outside the agency of the lead official to provide training and expert advice under the program.
(2) (A) Personnel used under paragraph (1) shall be personnel who have special skills relevant to the particular assistance that the personnel are to provide.

(B) Capabilities used under paragraph (1) shall be capabilities that are especially relevant to the particular assistance for which the capabilities are used.

(3) If the lead official is not the Secretary of Defense, and requests assistance from the Department of Defense that, in the judgement of the Secretary of Defense would affect military readiness or adversely affect national security, the Secretary of Defense may appeal the request for Department of Defense assistance by the lead official to the President.





(e) Available assistance

Assistance available under this program shall include the following:
(1) Training in the use, operation, and maintenance of equipment for--

(A) detecting a chemical or biological agent or nuclear radiation;
(B) monitoring the presence of such an agent or radiation;
(C) protecting emergency personnel and the public; and
(D) decontamination.

(2) Establishment of a designated telephonic link (commonly referred to as a "hot line") to a designated source of relevant data and expert advice for the use of State or local officials responding to emergencies involving a weapon of mass destruction or related materials.
(3) Use of the National Guard and other reserve components for purposes authorized under this section that are specified by the lead official (with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense if the Secretary is not the lead official).
(4) Loan of appropriate equipment.

(f) Limitations on Department of Defense assistance to law enforcement agencies

Assistance provided by the Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies under this section shall be provided under the authority of, and subject to the restrictions provided in, chapter 18 of Title 10.

(g) Administration of Department of Defense assistance

The Secretary of Defense shall designate an official within the Department of Defense to serve as the executive agent of the Secretary for the coordination of the provision of Department of Defense assistance under this title.

(h) Funding

(1) Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $35,000,000 is available for the program required under this section.
(2) Of the amount available for the program pursuant to paragraph (1), $10,500,000 is available for use by the Secretary of Defense to assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the establishment of metropolitan emergency medical response teams (commonly referred to as "Metropolitan Medical Strike Force Teams") to provide medical services that are necessary or potentially necessary by reason of a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction.


(3) The amount available for the program under paragraph (1) is in addition to any amounts authorized to be appropriated for the program under section 301.

§2313. Nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency response

(a) Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense shall designate an official within the Department of Defense as the executive agent for---
(1) the coordination of Department of Defense assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to threats involving biological or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of biological and chemical weapons and related materials and technologies; and
(2) the coordination of Department of Defense assistance to the Department of Energy in carrying out that department's responsibilities under subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Department of Energy

The Secretary of Energy shall designate an official within the Department of Energy as the executive agent for--
(1) the coordination of Department of Energy assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to threats involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of nuclear weapons and related materials and technologies; and
(2) the coordination of Department of Energy assistance to the Department of Defense in carrying out that department's responsibilities under subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Funding

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $15,000,000 is available for providing assistance described in subsection (a) of this section.




§2314. Chem-biological emergency response team

(a) Department of Defense rapid response team

The Secretary of Defense shall develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of the Department of Defense who are capable of aiding Federal, state, and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological or related materials.

(b) Addition to Federal response plan

Not later than December 31, 1997, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall develop and incorporate into existing Federal emergency response plans and programs prepared under section 5196(b) of Title 42 [Robert T. Stafford Act] guidance on the use and deployment of the rapid response teams established under this section to respond to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction. The Director shall carry out this subsection in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other Federal agencies involved with the emergency response plans.

§2315. Testing of preparedness for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons

(a) Emergencies involving chemical or biological weapons

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop and carry out a program for testing and improving the responses of Federal, State and local agencies to emergencies involving biological weapons and related materials and emergencies involving chemical weapons and related materials.
(2) The program shall include exercises to be carried out during each of the five successive years beginning with fiscal year 1997.
(3) In developing and carrying out the program, the Secretary shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of any other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have an expertise or responsibilities relevant to emergencies described in paragraph (1).

(b) Emergencies involving nuclear and radiological weapons

(1) The Secretary of Energy shall develop and carry out a program for testing and improving the responses of Federal, State, and local agencies to emergencies involving nuclear and radiological weapons and related materials.
(2) The program shall include exercises to be carried out during each of five successive fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997.
(3) In developing and carrying out the program, the Secretary shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of any other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have an expertise or responsibilities relevant to emergencies described in paragraph (1).

(c) Annual revisions of programs

The official responsible for carrying out a program developed under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall revise the program not later than June 1 in each fiscal year covered by the program. The revisions shall include adjustments that the official determines necessary or appropriate on the basis of the lessons learned from the exercise or exercises carried out under the program in the fiscal year, including lessons learned regarding coordination problems and equipment deficiencies.

(d) Option to transfer responsibility

(1) The President may designate the head of an agency outside the Department of Defense to assume the responsibility for carrying out the program developed under subsection (a) of this section beginning on or after October 1, 1999, and relieve the Secretary of Defense of that responsibility upon the assumption of the responsibility by the designated official.
(2) The President may designate the head of an agency outside the Department of Energy to assume the responsibility for carrying out the program developed under subsection (b) of this section beginning on or after October 1, 1999, and relieve the Secretary of Energy of that responsibility upon the assumption of the responsibility by the designated official.

(e) Funding

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $15,000,000 is available for the development and execution of the programs required by this section, including the participation of State and local agencies in exercises carried out under the programs.


§2316. Military assistance to civilian law enforcement officials

(a) Civilian expertise

The President shall take reasonable measures to reduce the reliance of civilian law enforcement officials on Department of Defense resources to counter the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States. The measures shall include---
(1) actions to increase civilian law enforcement expertise to counter such as threat; and
(2) actions to improve coordination between civilian law enforcement officials and other civilian sources of expertise, within and outside the Federal Government, to counter such a threat.

(b) Reports

The President shall submit to Congress the following reports:
(1) Not later than 90 days after September 23, 1996, a report describing the respective policy functions and operational roles of Federal agencies in countering the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States.
(2) Not later than one year after September 23, 1996, a report describing---

(A) the actions planned to be taken to carry out subsection (a) of this section; and
(B) the costs of such actions.

(3) Not later than three years after September 23, 1996, a report updating the information provided in the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), including the measures taken pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.

§2317. Rapid response information system

(a) Inventory of rapid response assets

(1) The head of each Federal Response Plan agency shall develop and maintain an inventory of physical equipment and assets under the jurisdiction of that agency that could be made available to aid State and local officials in search and rescue and other disaster management and mitigation efforts associated with an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction. The agency head shall submit a copy of the inventory, and any updates of the inventory, to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency for inclusion in the master inventory required under subsection (b) of this section.


(2) Each inventory shall include a separate listing of any equipment that is excess to the needs of that agency and could be considered for disposal as excess or surplus property for use for response and training with regard to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

(b) Master inventory

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall compile and maintain a comprehensive listing of all inventories prepared under subsection (a) of this section. The first such master list shall be completed not later than December 31, 1997, and shall be updated annually thereafter.

(c) Addition to Federal response plan

Not later than December 31, 1997, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall develop and incorporate into existing Federal emergency response plans and programs prepared under section 5196(b) of Title 42 [Robert T. Stafford Act] guidance on accessing and using the physical equipment and assets included in the master list developed under subsection (b) of this section to respond to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

(d) Database on chemical and biological materials

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall prepare a database on chemical and biological agents and munitions characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use. The initial design and compilation of the database shall be completed not later than December 31, 1997.

(e) Access to inventory and database

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall design and maintain a system to give Federal, State, and local officials access to the inventory listing and database maintained under this section in the event of an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction or to prepare and train to respond to such an emergency. The system shall include a secure but accessible emergency response hotline to access information and request assistance.

SUBCHAPTER II---INTERDICTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS

§2331. Procurement of detection equipment for United States border security

Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301, $15,000,000 is available for the procurement of---

(1) equipment capable of detecting the movement of weapons of mass destruction and related materials into the United States;
(2) equipment capable of interdicting the movement of weapons of mass destruction and related materials into the United States; and
(3) materials and technologies related to use of equipment described in paragraph (1) or (2).

§2332. Sense of Congress concerning criminal penalties

(a) Sense of Congress concerning inadequacy of sentencing guidelines

It is the sense of Congress that the sentencing guidelines prescribed by the United States Sentencing Commission for the offenses of importation, attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials constitute inadequate punishment for such offenses.

(b) Urging of revision to guidelines

Congress urges the United States Sentencing Commission to revise the relevant sentencing guidelines to provide for increased penalties for offenses relating to importation, attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies under the following provisions of law:
(1) Section 11 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410).
(2) Sections 38 and 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2780).
(3) The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(4) Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 2156a(c)) [42 U.S.C.A. §2139a(c)].



§2333. International border security

(a) Secretary of Defense responsibility

The Secretary of Defense, in consultation and cooperation with the Commissioner of Customs, shall carry out programs for assisting customs officials and border guard officials in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic state, and other countries of Eastern Europe in preventing unauthorized transfer and transportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials. Training, expert advice, maintenance of equipment, loan of equipment, and audits may be provided under or in connection with the programs.

(b) Funding

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301, $15,000,000 is available for carrying out the programs referred to in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Assistance to states of the former Soviet Union

Assistance under programs referred to in subsection (a) of this section may (notwithstanding any provision of law prohibiting the extension of foreign assistance to any of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union) be extended to include an independent state of the former Soviet Union if the President certifies to Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to extend assistance under this section to that state.

SUBCHAPTER III---CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS THREATENING THE UNITED STATES

§2341. Elimination of plutonium production

(a) Replacement program

The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a cooperative program with the Government of Russia to eliminate the production of weapons grade plutonium by modifying or replacing the reactor cores at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 with reactor cores that are less suitable for the production of weapons grade plutonium.


(b) Program requirements

(1) The program shall be designed to achieve completion of the modifications or replacements of the reactor cores within three years after the modification or replacement activities under the program are begun.
(2) The plan for the program shall--

(A) specify--
(i) successive steps for the modification or replacement of the reactor cores; and
(ii) clearly defined milestones to be achieved; and

(B) include estimates of the costs of the program.

(c) Submission of program plan to Congress

Not later than 180 days after September 23, 1996, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress---
(1) a plan for the program under subsection (a) of this section;
(2) an estimate of the United States funding that is necessary for carrying out the activities under the program for each fiscal year covered by the program; and
(3) a comparison of the benefits of the program with the benefits of other nonproliferation programs.


SUBCHAPTER IV--COORDINATION OF POLICY AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

§2351. National Coordinator on Nonproliferation

(a) Designation of position

The President shall designate an individual to serve in the Executive Office of the President as the National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters.

(b) Duties

The Coordinator, under the direction of the National Security Council, shall advise and assist the President by---
(1) advising the President on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including issues related to terrorism, arms control, and international organized crime;
(2) chairing the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title [United States Code Title 50-War and National Defense]; and
(3) taking such actions as are necessary to ensure that there is appropriate emphasis in, cooperation on, an coordination of, non-proliferation research efforts of the United States, including activities of Federal agencies as well as activities of contractors funded by the Federal Government.

(c) Allocation of funds

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $2,000,000 is available to the Department of Defense for carrying out research referred to in subsection (b)(3) of this section.

§2352. National Security Council Committee on Nonproliferation

(a) Establishment

The Committee on Nonproliferation (in this section referred to as the "Committee") is established as a committee of the National Security Council.
(b) Membership

(1) The Committee shall be composed of representatives of the following:

(A) The Secretary of State.
(B) The Secretary of Defense.
(C) The Director of Central Intelligence.
(D) The Attorney General.
(E) The Secretary of Energy.
(F) The Administrator [sic] (Director) of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(G) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(H) The Secretary of Commerce.
(I) Such other members as the President may designate.

(2) The National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters shall chair the Committee on Nonproliferation.


(c) Responsibilities

The Committee has the following responsibilities:

(1) To review and coordinate Federal programs, policies, and directives relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies, including matters relating to terrorism and international organized crime.
(2) To make recommendations through the National Security Council to the President regarding the following:

(A) Integrated national policies for countering the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.
(B) Options for integrating Federal agency budgets for countering such threats.
(C) Means to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments have adequate capabilities to manage crises involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies, and to manage the consequences of a use of such weapon or related materials or technologies, and that use of those capabilities is coordinated.
(D) Means to ensure appropriate cooperation on, and coordination of, the following:
(i) Preventing the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(ii) Promoting domestic and international law enforcement efforts against proliferation-related efforts.
(iii) Countering the involvement of organized crime groups in proliferation-related activities.
(iv) Safeguarding weapons of mass destruction materials and related technologies.
(v) Improving coordination and cooperation among intelligence activities, law enforcement, and the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy in support of nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts.
(vi) Improving export controls over materials and technologies that can contribute to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
(vii) Reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.

§2353. Comprehensive preparedness program

(a) Program required

The President, acting through the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title [United States Code Title 50--War and National Defense], shall develop a comprehensive program for carrying out this chapter [United States Code Chapter 40-DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION].

(b) Content of program

The program set forth in the report shall include specific as follows:

(1) Plans for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(2) Plans for training and equipping Federal, State, and local officials for managing a crisis involving a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction, including the consequences of the use of such a weapon.
(3) Plans for providing for regular sharing of information among intelligence, law enforcement, and customs agencies.
(4) Plans for training and equipping law enforcement units, customs services, and border security personnel to counter the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(5) Plans for establishing appropriate centers for analyzing seized nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, and related materials and technologies.
(6) Plans for establishing in the United States appropriate legal controls and authorities relating to the exporting of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, and related materials and technologies.
(7) Plans for encouraging and assisting governments of foreign countries to implement and enforce laws that set forth appropriate penalties for offenses regarding the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(8) Plans for building the confidence of the United States and Russia in each other's controls over United States and Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials, including plans for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
(9) Plans for reducing United States and Russian stockpiles of excess plutonium, reflecting---

(A) consideration of the desirability and feasibility of a United States-Russian agreement governing fissile material disposition of excess plutonium; and
(B) an assessment of the options for United States cooperation with Russia in the disposition of Russian plutonium.
(10) Plans for studying the merits and costs of establishing a global network of means for detecting and responding to terroristic or other criminal use of biological agents against people or other forms of life in the United States or any foreign country.

(c) Report

(1) At the same time that the President submits the budget for fiscal year 1998 to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of Title 31, the President shall submit to Congress a report that sets forth the comprehensive program developed under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The report shall include the following:

(A) The specific plans for the program that are required under subsection (b) of this section.
(B) Estimates of the funds necessary, by agency or department, for carrying out such plans in fiscal year 1998 and the following five fiscal years.

(3) The report shall be in an unclassified form. If there is a classified version of the report, the President shall submit the classified version at the same time.

§2354. Termination

After September 30, 1999, the President---

(1) is not required to maintain a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters under section 2351 of this title; and
(2) may terminate the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title.


SUBCHAPTER V---MISCELLANEOUS

§2361. Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State, to the extent authorized by law, should---
(1) contract directly with suppliers in independent states of the former Soviet Union when such action would--

(A) result in significant savings of the programs referred to in subchapter III of this chapter; and
(B) substantially expedite completion of the programs referred to in subchapter III of this chapter; and
(2) seek means to use innovating contracting approaches to avoid delay and increase the effectiveness of such programs and of the exerciser of such authorities.

§2362. Transfers of allocations among Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
Congress finds that---
(1) the various Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are being carried out at different rates in the various countries covered by such programs; and
(2) it is necessary to authorize transfers of funding allocations among the various programs in order to maximize the effectiveness of United States efforts under such programs.

§2363. Sense of Congress concerning assistance to states of former Soviet Union

It is the sense of Congress that---
(1) The Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other United States programs authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994 should be expanded by offering assistance under those programs to other independent states of the former Soviet Union in addition to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and
(2) The President should offer assistance to additional independent states of the former Soviet Union in each case in which the participation of such states would benefit national security interest of the United States by improving border controls and safeguards over materials and technology associated with weapons of mass destruction.

§2364. Purchase of low-enriched uranium derived from Russian highly enriched uranium

(a) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that the allies of the United States and other nations should participate in efforts to ensure that stockpiles of weapons-grade nuclear material are reduced.

(b) Actions by the Secretary of State

Congress urges the Secretary of State to encourage, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, other countries to purchase low-enriched uranium that is derived from highly enriched uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons.

§2365. Sense of Congress concerning purchase, packaging, and transportation of fissile materials at risk of theft

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) The Secretary of defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State should purchase, package, and transport to secure locations weapons-grade nuclear materials from a stockpile of such materials if such officials determine that---

(A) there is a significant risk of theft of such materials; and
(B) there is no reasonable and economically feasible alternative for securing such materials; and

(2) if it is necessary to do so in order to secure the materials, the materials should be imported into the United States, subject to the laws and regulations that are applicable to the importation of such materials into the United States.

§2366. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions


(a) Reports

Not later than 6 months after October 11, 1996, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on---
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.

(b) Form of reports

The reports submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

§2367. Annual report on threat posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles

(a) ANNUAL REPORT. —The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress by January 30 of each year a report on the threats posed to the United States and allies of the United States—
(3) by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles; and
(4) by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

(b) CONSULTATION. -- Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED. —Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(9) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that possesses weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(10) A description of the means by which any foreign country and non-State organization that has achieved capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles has achieved that capability, including a description of the international network of foreign countries and private entities that provide assistance to foreign countries and non-State organizations in achieving that capability.
(11) An examination of the doctrines that guide the use of weapons of mass destruction en each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(12) An examination of the existence and implementation of the control mechanisms that exist with respect to nuclear weapons in each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(13) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that seeks to acquire or develop (indigenously or with foreign assistance) weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(14) An assessment of various possible timelines for the achievement by foreign countries and non-State organizations of capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, taking into account the probability of whether the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China will comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, the potential availability of assistance from foreign technical specialists, and the potential for independent sales by foreign private entities without authorization from their national governments.
(15) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target the United States or its territories with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign or non-State organization achieves that capability.
(16) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target members of the United States Armed Forces deployed abroad with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of the enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability.

(d) CLASSIFICATION. —Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.






PUBLIC LAW 104-201

TITLE XIV---DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Extract from House Conference Report No. 104-724

Domestic Preparedness

Enhancing the nation’s ability to prevent, and, if necessary, to respond to a terrorist incident involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons or materials is the cornerstone of this program. The conferees note that an interagency group, composed of the Federal Response Plan signatory agencies led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) completed and forwarded to the President on July 1, 1996, a report titled ”Consequences Management for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Terrorism.” The report documents the inadequacy of the Federal Response Plan to deal with NBC terrorist incidents and makes specific recommendations regarding capability enhancements. The conferees agree to a provision (§1411) that would require the President to take immediate action to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to respond to such incidents and to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response and law enforcement agencies to respond to such incidents. The provision would further require the President to provide to the Congress by January 31, 1997, [published in the Congressional Record on February 26, 1997] a report containing an assessment of such capabilities, improvements required, and measures that should be taken to achieve such improvements, including additional resources and legislative authority that might be necessary.

The conferees agree to recommend $50.0 million for the establishment of a domestic emergency assistance program for the Department of Defense to immediately begin sharing its unique expertise, experience, and equipment in dealing with chemical and biological weapons and materials with local emergency first respondents (firemen, policemen, and medical workers).

The conferees expect that the Secretary of Defense will work expeditiously with the Secretary of Health and Human Services in providing DOD resources and expertise to the Office of Emergency Preparedness for the formation of emergency medical teams that are trained and equipped to handle incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

The conferees agree to provide $15.0 million for DOD to conduct interagency exercises that will focus on testing and improving the U.S. Government’s ability to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
The conferees have agreed to an additional provision (§1414) that would require DOD to establish at least one Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Team for rapid response to domestic terrorism. The conferees expect that such teams would be similar in concept to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Accident Response Groups that are maintained by DOE for response to a nuclear incident. The conferees note in the joint DOD/DOE report [prepared in consultation with FEMA] to the Congress, “Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, or Chemical Terrorist Attack,” dated June 13, 1996, that the DOD is attempting to establish such a capability. The conferees note that many of the capabilities sought for such teams are already present in the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, and Chemical Defense and Infectious Disease Medical Research Institutes. The conferees also note the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee’s “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation’, dated May 1996, which states that the U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic was scheduled to activate a Department of the Navy/Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force on June 1, 1996, to respond to chemical and biological incidents (terrorist or otherwise) occurring on naval installations and Department of State legations worldwide. The conferees understand that the unit has been activated and is now in training.
In §1416, the conferees agree to provide authority, very narrowly defined and carefully constructed, for the President and the Attorney General to request military support to local authorities in incidents involving chemical and biological weapons. This authority is in addition to the authorities otherwise provided in Chapter 18 of title 10, U.S. Code. The conferees agree that the use of the military in any emergency situation involving biological or chemical weapons or materials should be limited both in time and scope to dealing with the specific chemical or biological weapons-related incident.
Finally, the conferees have included a provision (§1417) that would require Federal Response Plan agencies to develop and maintain an inventory of equipment and other assets that could be made available to aid State and local officials in search and rescue and other disaster management and mitigation efforts associated with an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction, and would require FEMA to maintain a comprehensive master list of the inventory. The provision would also require FEMA to establish a data base on chemical and biological agent and munitions characteristics and safety precautions and to develop a system to provide federal, State, and local officials access to the data base and to the master inventory.








EXTRACT FROM SENATE REPORT 105-24
JUNE 9, 1997

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

From page 6 of the report:

In his unclassified confirmation testimony before the Committee, the Acting DCI committed to prepare annual National Intelligence Estimates or comparable reports on (1) the ballistic and cruise missile threats to the United States, and (2) the threat to the United States of “non-traditional” attacks using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons delivered by means other than by ballistic or cruise missiles. The Committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence] welcomes the ADCI’s commitment in this regard, and looks forward to reviewing these products. These estimates should be provided to the Congressional Intelligence Committees annually, on or before February 15, with the first report to be submitted on or before February 15, 1998.

The annual estimate on the ‘non-traditional’ WMD threat to the United States shall include, at a minimum:

(1) The current threat of an attack against the United States using a weapon of mass destruction, including the ability of terrorist groups or hostile governments to produce and deliver to the United States a WMD, or the components thereof;

(2) The degree to which the threat will increase by the year 2010;

(3) The sources of the threat;

(4) The potential delivery means of carrying out a WMD attack against the United States;

(5) The relative feasibility of different means of delivery and the probability that such an attack against the United States would use ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or any other means of delivery; and

(6) The vulnerability of the United States to such an attack, including, but not limited to, the ability of terrorist groups or hostile governments to clandestinely transport into the United States a WMD or the components necessary to construct a WMD, and the capability of the United States to detect and intercept the importation of such a weapon.

Not later than March 15, 1998, the President shall submit to the Congressional Intelligence Committees a report that identifies the funds appropriated in Fiscal Year 1998 and requested in the fiscal Year 1999 budget to defend the United States against a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons attack using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or any other means of delivery.

. . . . . . ..

BRIEF HISTORY OF FEMA INVOLVEMENT WITH WMD PREPAREDNESS

From September 1981 until November 1993, a National Preparedness Directorate existed in FEMA. E.O. 12148, in its §2-103 has assigned FEMA the consequences of major terrorist events role. That role was assigned to the State and Local Support Directorate during the period September 1981 to November 1983, since it was viewed as primarily a civil defense function or a disaster response function. FEMA was reorganized in November 1993 but it wasn't until the establishment of a Director of National Security and the drafting and issuance of PDD-39 in April 1995 that FEMA again focused on the terrorism assignment. The Director in a memorandum dated September 9, 1997 created a Terrorism Coordination Unit independent of the Director of National Security function when he issued a memorandum dated October 1, 1997, subject: FEMA's Role in Terrorism and Consequence Management. The new unit had a scheduled life of six months and on June 21, 1998 was subsumed in a new organizational the Office of National Security Affairs reporting to the Director, that also combined the Director of National Security function. This organization now has principal jurisdiction over three new PDDs [62, 63, and 67] signed by the President in May and October 1998. The Acting Chief Information Officer of FEMA has been delegated responsibilities under PDD-63 as the Chief Information Assurance Officer and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer.

A relatively comprehensive Office of General Counsel opinion issued February 21, 1991, subject Application of Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act, addressed the issues raised by the language of the Act “that an emergency exists for which the primary responsibility for response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority . . .” See GCM 91-2-21.

Since the date of that memorandum, it has also been made clear by President Clinton’s issuance of PDD-39 and PDD-62 that any terrorist event or involvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be considered automatically to involve the Federal government’s “preeminent responsibility and authority.” In GCM-96-11-21, a legal opinion issued to staff of the National Security Counsel, the General Counsel of FEMA concluded that the Attorney General should be included on decisions to use the Stafford Act emergency authority with respect to findings as to areas of Federal preeminent responsibility and authority.

Note this technical note prepared before FEMA incorporated into DHS on March 1, 2003




For a Listing of early reports on Federal capability
to respond to an WMD attack see the following reports

• June 1996, Joint Report to Congress, Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, or Chemical Attack, prepared by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy in consultation with FEMA.

• House Document 105-29, January 21, 1997, Policy Functions/Operational Roles of Federal Agencies in Countering the Domestic Chemical/Biological Threat, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting A Report Describing the Respective Policy Functions and Operational Roles of Federal Agencies In Countering The Threat Posed By the Use or Potential Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Within the United States, Pursuant to Pub. L. 104-201, §1416(e) (110 Stat. 2724).

• House Document 105-79, May 5, 1997, COMPREHENSIVE READINESS PROGRAM FOR COUNTERING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting A Report That Describes The United States Comprehensive Readiness Program For Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Pursuant to Public Law 104-201, §1443(c (110 STAT 2729).

• Department of Defense, Report to Congress, DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, May 1, 1997.

• General Accounting Office, NSIAD-97-254, September 26, 1997, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy.

• General Accounting Office, NSIAD-98-39, December 1, 1997, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination.

• House Document 105-224, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE, Communication 7735 from the President of the United States, March 5, 1998.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-74, April 9, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, April 23, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues, Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, October 16, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency.