The Vacation Lane Blog

Quick Update on Current Events and this blog!

2012-01-27T09:31:00.001-05:00

It has been over 20 days since I last posted on this blog. It will however continue because a bunch of FEMA policy and organizational issues will be hitting the proverbial fan this spring. Why? FEMA performance in a record 14 billion dollar disasters in 2011 will be looked at closely. Also the President's reorganization efforts may have fall out for FEMA. And the NFIP expires again this summer and many on the HILL are vowing reforms. I have seen few reforms actually suggested as most would do nothing but continue defective policies in place. The NFIP should only provide flood insurance in the mapped and enforced 100 year flood plain actually the 1% annual excedence interval flood plain.

So here is my take on other current events.
And by the way my FACEBOOK page--William R. Cumming--is now my third blog. Try it and you may like it.

And my main blog is still found at http://www.vacationlanegrp.wordpress.com

CURRENT EVENTS:
The STATE of the UNION message flopped.

The ARAB SPRING flopped.

The ECONOMY continues to flop!

The military efforts in Afghanistan continue to flop!

The EUROZONE financial crisis continues and rescue efforts for Greece have flopped.

CAIN, PERRY, BACHEMAN, PALIN, HUNTSMAN, PAWLENTY, and others flopped bigtime in 2011. All current candidates will stay in through Supertuesday.

Joe Biden is a flop even as VP and will be replaced by Obama on the ticket.

Wall Street has flopped.

The Japanese response to the FUKISHIMA event has flopped.

PUTIN has flopped!

The theory that the climate has not entered a long term warming period has flopped.

Your questions answered, perhaps incorrectly, at vlg338@yahoo.com

Still 9 weeks of "winter" whatever that means for the weather!

FEMA as safety net!

2012-01-06T10:07:00.000-05:00

No FEMA director or administrator has ever resigned or departed from the job voluntarily. But suppose a crisis of conscience did occur with that result. W. Craig Fugate has pretty much had a successful tenure as Administrator of FEMA since May of 2009 but he might be a candidate.

Why?

FEW anywhere understand that FEMA is not the federal safety net for either domestic crisis management, prevention, response, recovery and mitigation. It is still even with expansion of numbers a relatively small underfunded federal agencies whose major partners, the OFAs [other federal agencies] are experiencing rapid decline in their preparedness capability and this will accelerate over the next calendar year. The same holds true for FEMA's state and their local government partners. And now Administrator Fugate advocates FEMA policy and the Stafford Act being brought into alignment with SCOTUS rulings and USA history and treating the Federally Recognized Native American Tribes as being direct recipients of FEMA grants and agreements. I support this effort by the way. The problem of course is that the 500+ federally recognized tribes have almost no Emergency Management or HS capability and won't have it until built over at least a decade. So the complex administration of FEMA's efforts to have full fledged partners to help out is still a long way off and promises to recede even further into the future.

So perhaps W. Craig Fugate needs to get the Administration and Congress to address the issues raised by FEMA not being the safety net, and merely a small cooperative and collaborative agency that does not do that particularly well either.

Time runs out on Fugate whether because of a catastrophic event or whatever! Hope he survives and can address the issues underlying this post in a successful manner. Otherwise by by like all others who held his position before him.

Welcome to 2012

2012-01-05T09:19:00.000-05:00

Well 2012 is finally here. And guess what at least 10 countries that may well impact this century in good and bad ways have Presidential elections including the USA.
My take on Iowa is pretty meaningless as New Hampshire and S. Carolina will soon demonstrate.

Barring a catastrophe and poor FEMA response W. Craig Fugate is very likely to be a holdover whomever is the next President. Longest serving FEMA Director or Administrator is still James Lee Witt, arriving early in 1993 and departing in January 2001. His greatest contribution to FEMA policy was a management decision to implement the recommendations of the Trefry Report issued in 1992 that recommended a reduction of cleared personnel in FEMA and he did that by 45%. Thus, information sharing was encouraged not discouraged by the "need-to-know" doctrine often utilized by bureaucrats to prevent discovery of waste, fraud, and abuse.

Two greatest financial problems in FEMA history. Alleged defalcation by a Senior Accounting Official of $21 million and some change. And the immediate disposal post exercise of a communications system that cost about $70 million to create and was totally inadequate for the job.

Well the future is now for FEMA. By the way PKEMRA 2006 had lots of HUMAN CAPITAL mandates for FEMA and wonder when GAO or OIG/DHS will investigate current compliance?

Here is to a year without CAT 5 storms, no major dam or levee failures, no earthquakes, and no tornadoes. Unlikely I know.

Statutory Mandates and FEMA

2011-12-31T00:45:00.001-05:00

FEMA in 2011 definitely staffed up but quality and competence yet to be established by the acid test of events. Still a start made on the decline in staffing from January 20, 2001 to August 29, 2005 {Hurricane Katrina]!

But it should be noted that extensive HUMAN CAPITAL mandates were included in PKEMRA 2006 largely effective on March 31, 2007.

It would be helpful if FEMA published more about its demographics and the cohorts involved as to length of service. That latter number is not outcome determinative as to competence and skills but it certainly is a marker.

And since in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king, FEMA with its administration of the DRF makes some other agencies much less significant when it comes to actual numbers.

Again a year in which certain disasters such as radiological releases and terrorism not specifically included in the events subject to disaster declarations. This should happen.

A compilation of FEMA legislative proposals sent to OMB and Congress and outcome would be of interest. NFIP reform also died on the vine.

But hey thanks to those who offered reform legislation in both the Executive Branch and the Congress.

Happy New Year and welcome to the 2nd Session of the 112th Congress.

The End is Near! 2011 that is!

2011-12-29T07:01:00.000-05:00

I had long speculated that President Obama would break the century mark for declarations this year. He may just be short of that figure for major disasters. Still quite a year. With 10 billion dollar disasters a good warm up year for FEMA and the big one or ones to come.

I find the most interesting story of the year the FUKISHIMA tragedy. It now appears that event alone may well knock Japan out of the top ten leading countries of the world this century. This should motivate USA Emergency Management and Homeland Security to understand the importance of their efforts to improve the disaster paradigm of preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. Note that "prevention" added by Congress in PKEMRA 2006 but undefined. Now defined in part by PPD-8 issued on March 31, 2011 and partially implemented.

Political and economic consolidation of the Eurasian heartland and extremes suffered some large blows this year but eventually perhaps 2 centuries down the road its history will have shaped a new dominant force in world history. One that if it can manage environmental issues and change that may last a long long time.

Despite a half-century of independence it now looks more and more like Africa will again undergo domination by foreign powers including those with resource shortages and the economic muscle to exploit Africa's richest.

And the USA and DHS and FEMA seem content to remain ignorant of policy impacts of new scientific developments and technology.

The most important development in the last decade has been social media and web 2.0 but few have really captured its potential or dangers to EM and HS.

Whatever the outcome of the 2012 elections it is apparent that self-delusion about American exceptionalism and ourselves will continue to be the dominating factors in American politics. It is never fun to watch people, cultures, or civilizations commit suicide so hoping none of that in 2012, but I may just be averting my eyes not escaping reality.

In two years the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 will be 40!

2011-12-20T10:21:00.000-05:00

Well the 13th short term extension until September 30, 2012 is now law. Congrats to Congress for failing to understand what it has wrought.

As 2011 winds up the real question is what did the dramatic changes wrought by that 1973 legislative enactment accomplish for mitigation and the closely related mandatory "mitigation" placed in the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public Law 93-288? Both laws were designed in tandem to hopefully reduce disaster outlays over time and use a quasi-insurance mechanism to make the communities with flood plains bear the full costs of that occupancy, in particular for placing houses in the flood plain.

I think it is plain that after almost 40 years part of the problem is that FEMA did not get the message when it was formed that it real job was preventing disasters and doing mitigation not creating a moral hazard with "free" disaster relief as was the worry of Senator William Proxmire and others in not opposing the creation of FEMA. There were no ATMs at the time in 1978 and 1979 but many worried that FEMA would just become another focus of federal largesse largely creating even more problems.

So as the year winds up announcing that the year 2012 will be the year flood insurance and federal disaster relief are reformed. How will be explained in a series of posts although much has already been laid out for the last few years here in this blog.

So here is the new FEMA mantra: Prevent Disasters Don't Promote them!

And as a subset further analysis will be made on how FEMA has in fact through its policies and bureacratic dishonesty undermined the STATES and their local governments in their preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts.

Hoping Congressional hearings will delve into these concerns this spring even as the spring runoff occurs.

A compliment to FIMA

2011-12-20T10:09:00.001-05:00

The Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration should really be more honest and be named the Flood Insurance and Natural Hazards Mitigation Directorate. This may well be its last year in FEMA. However, I do have to compliment that FEMA Directorate for its helpful webpage on FEMA.gov!

The webpage gives some history and lists current guidance in a quite helpful manner.

So thanks and happy holidays in that directorate. Wish all of mitigation in FEMA was housed with you. But hey I fought and lost that issue with a former GC of FEMA who did accomplish expansion of OGC FEMA DAE lawyers but little else.

Happy Holiday to all my friends and enemies in FEMA. 12 years and marking at this point since I left you behind.

The Budget Cycle and FEMA

2011-12-19T03:12:00.000-05:00

While the rest of US enjoy the holidays the budget nomes at OMB are doing their thing having given the departments and agencies pass backs on their budget requests for Fiscal Year 2013 that begins October 1st of 2012. This could be the last budget submission of any Obama Administration ever and if the Republicans win or lose it probably is dead on arrival when transmitted with the State of the Union Address or shortly thereafter in early February. So why is in even being submitted? Well for one thing required by law. For another serves as a marker for all the debates and appropriations efforts to follow. And finally it does to some degree reflect how the Administration sees the world and its own role in world and US history.

Most of FEMA budget is in the 045 category of fiscal codes--meaning state and local support. Most of the rest of DHS is in other fiscal codes. For example, General Government is fiscal code 800. It is hard to get ahold of how these assignments are made but they often foreshadow problems to come. For example, when Civil Defense left the 050 national security budget and became part of 045 it ended its role as being of any interest at all to the Armed Services Committees or the Armed Services Appropriators. Until 1995 FEMA always had one or two Associate Directors whose Senate confirmation ran through the Armed Services Committee. Once that stopped with repeal of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress, DoD pretty well shrugged its shoulders on FEMA issues, and did learn from the 1992 LA riots not to federalize the NG for riots and civil disorders. In another blog I have recently argued that the real state role of the NG is in law enforcement for the Governors in riots and civil disorders and that the current lack of training of the NG for that role is dangerous. Others disagreed. See blog Sic Semper Tyrannis.

In recent blog posts here and elsewhere I have argued that in fact the EM community is small and growing smaller. Even the rest of the PUBLIC SAFETY budgets are in danger of full scale erosion with over 500,000 State and Local workers laid off many in the Public Safety arena. Now FEMA has take a huge hit, over $2 billion IMO, to its support for the STATES and their local governments first response community. This is enough to make it almost certain that some capability will not be just lost now but forever.

With over 100 declarations in CY 2012 by the President for disasters, an all-time high, is part of this reflection of diminished STATES and their local government capability? DoD really does not care what happens to STATES and their local governments just hoping to be kept out of their problems. That is why on base housing and schools is such a big issue. Isolation from the General Public is a conscience DoD strategy for both force protection and ensuring that the Armed Forces are not burdened with the problems of STATES and their local governments.

In the meantime, I understand the OMB passback on the FEMA budget was devastating reflecting a definite change in policy by the President with respect to FEMA. Not the least the Presidential deferrment of construction money for FEMA at St. Elizabeths. So far only the US Coast Guard and the DHS support staff locked in for that location.

The bottom line--stand by for an absolutely amazing State of the Union address as the President sallies forth to meet the voters in the fall. None seem happy with current disaster policy or the NFIP either in FEMA or Congress or the Administration. The result could be dramatic in 2012.

FEMA and Climate Change

2011-12-14T03:25:00.000-05:00

Would it not be interesting to know what FEMA's official position is on Climate Change and whether that comports with what most of its officials and employees believe? FEMA of course can only rely on second hand reports and analysis since no PhD Climate Scientists is now or ever has been on its payroll. In fact it is not exactly clear whether FEMA has ever held a conference or other public meeting wherein it gathered information on Climate Change and its actual or potential impact on its programs, functions, or activities.

Why? Well for one thing the culture in FEMA is not a scientific one, or a social service agency, or in fact anything that involves much intellectual curiosity about the natural world even though its business is largely natural disaster response and recovery. This is because it key Congressional Committee is Transportation and Infrastructure in the HOUSE the home of PORK.

Merely transferring the Stafford Act jurisdiction to almost any other committee would change how FEMA does business overnight.

And surprise surprise, all of the Republican candidates have quite unusual positions with respect to FEMA, disaster relief, and the role of FEMA in the federal system. Standby for some big surprises.

And did you know the President himself postponed efforts to house FEMA in the new DHS HQs building in S.E. Washington? Wondering why? Perhaps Climate Change?

The SNRA Synopsed!

2011-12-13T05:38:00.001-05:00

A seven page document unclassified has been released by DHS discussing the Classified Strategic National Risk Assessment. Don't worry though because neither the released document or the SNRA appear to have been designed to accomplish much.

From the shorter document see this disclaimer:

"Impacts and Future Uses
The SNRA was executed in support of PPD-8 implementation and has served as an integral part of the development of the National Preparedness Goal, assisting in integrating and coordinating identification of the core capabilities and establishing a risk-informed foundation for the National Preparedness System. Participants mapped the core capabilities identified in the Goal to the events assessed in the SNRA to identify any additional core capabilities that may need to be included. In addition, the SNRA can be used to inform discussions on priorities for capability investment decisions. Finally, the SNRA results will be used to drive other preparedness priorities at the national level.

In addition, conducting a Strategic National Risk Assessment will support the National Preparedness System by providing a consolidated list of ―national level events for consideration and augmentation for Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment processes at multiple jurisdiction levels.

Conclusion
Although the development of the SNRA is an important first step, further analysis through the execution of regional- and community-level risk assessments will help communities better understand their risks and form a foundation for their own security and resilience. The Nation’s preparedness is dependent on a whole-of-community understanding of risk and comprehensive consequences at and across all levels of government. In conjunction with Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, the SNRA will be expanded and enhanced and will ultimately serve as a unifying national risk profile to facilitate preparedness efforts"!

So you can see most the work to be done not really yet completed and that was the statutory mandate. Well DHS will be gone before most of its key assignments will have been accomplished.

For some discussion of the SNRA see the posts of yesterday December 12th on the blog HLSWATCH.com

GAO on NG WMD Preparedness and Response

2011-12-07T17:23:00.001-05:00

Odd that I posted on November 29th on FEMA and DHS have almost no identified role in WMD preparedness and response. I also listed recently to an EMForum presentation on the Radiologically Resilient Community. Now GAO [not in so many words but in substance] concludes that the NG is not prepared or able to respond to a WMD incident/event. Perhaps it won't happen but who knows. The GAO report can be accessed on my other blog at http://www.vacationlanegrp.wordpress.com!

It was in winter of 1995 that then Senator Sam Nunn panicked over the Executive Branch's failure to be able to explain either WMD response systems or terrorism response systems. Remember the Oklahoma City Bombing had been earlier that year and President William Jefferson Clinton has issued PD-39 attempting to delineate a crisis management role and a consequences management role for DOJ and FEMA. In driving on an answer before the Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, Nunn had led enactment of a statute that mandated Executive Branch preparedness and response to both terrorism and WMD incident/events. FEMA begged off the state and local training role and so the President acceded to the statutory assignment to DoD of that mission for a three year period. Then the President was allowed to transfer it from DoD to some other Department or Agency. Again FEMA begged off and so DOJ took the role and created the NDPO [National Domestic Preparedness Office]supplementing the Office of Domestic Preparedness established in DOJ to administer the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. That Act had pass through monies to FEMA's USFA [US Fire Administration] to assist in training the FIRE SERVICE on terrorism exclusive of WMD.

And in DoD the NG created civil response teams that were to be the lead on WMD and terrorism preparedness and response.

Well given the GAO report you can obviously tell no one is in charge and few even understand the problems. Perhaps the terrorists will take advantage of this major error.

And did I mention that DHS was formed in part with the primary Executive Branch mission of WMD preparedness and response yet I can still not identify budget or staff devoted to anything but detection. And of course detection is good but does not really encompass preparedness and response.

FEMA Delegated Authority prior to DHS (March 1, 2003)

2011-11-30T14:09:00.000-05:00

Presidential Executive Orders Specifically Delegating Program, Function, or Activity Legal Authority to the Independent Executive Branch FEMA
Prior to Incorporation Into DHS on March 1, 2003
[Note some of these EOs listed also delegate to
other Executive Branch Organizations]

Carter Administration:

1. Executive Order 11988 of May 24, 1977, as amended, Floodplain Management, 3 CFR, 1977 Comp., p. 117, 42 U.S.C. §4321 note p.191. (See 44 CFR Part 9)

2. Executive Order 12127 of March 31, 1979, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 376. (Implements Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1978)

3. Executive Order 12148 of July 20, 1979, as amended, Federal emergency management, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 412. (Implements Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1978)

4. Executive Order 12241 of September 29, 1980, National Contingency Plan [Radiological Emergencies], 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 282. (Note-Source of FRERP).

Reagan Administration:

1. Executive Order 12472 of April 3, 1984, Assignment of national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications functions, 3 CFR, 1984 Comp., p.193. (See 47 CFR Part 201)

2. Executive Order 12580 of January 23, 1987, as amended, Superfund Implementation, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 193 (Note: Amended by E.O. 12777 of October 18, 1991, and further amended by E.O. 13016 of August 28, 1996). (See 40 CFR Part 300, currently under revision).

3. Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 3 CFR, 1988 Comp., p. 585. (See also 47 CFR Part 201)

4. Executive Order 12657 of November 18, 1988, Federal Emergency Management Agency Assistance in Emergency Preparedness Planning at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 3 CFR, 1988 Comp., p. 611. (See 44 CFR Part 352)

Bush Administration:

1. Executive Order 12673 of March 23, 1989, Delegation of Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Functions, 3 CFR, 1989 Comp., p. 309. (See 44 CFR Part 206)

2. Executive Order 12699 of January 5, 1990, Seismic Safety of Federal and Federally Assisted or Regulated New Building Construction, 3 CFR, 1990 Comp., p. 269.

3. Executive Order 12742 of January 8, 1991, National Security Industrial Responsiveness, 3 CFR, 1991 Comp., p. 309.

Clinton Administration:

1. Executive Order 12919 of June 3, 1994, National Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 901. (See 15 CFR Part 700, 44 CFR Parts 321- 336)

2. Executive Order 12941 of December 1, 1994, Seismic Safety of Existing Federally Owned or Leased Building, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp. , p. 955.

[Executive Orders serve to delegate legal authority, provide legal interpretation, and provide policy guidance. When issued specifically pursuant to express statutory authority Executive Orders have the force and effect of federal law.]

FEMA and WMD PREPAREDNESS and RESPONSE

2011-11-29T11:45:00.000-05:00

Try as hard as I can and I cannot identify the specifics of how FEMA prepares for and responds to a large scale HAZMAT incident or event and in particular a WMD threatened or actual event. The problem with that conclusion is how in fact and in law does DHS prepare for and respond to such an event? That was the key assignment to DHS in its creation. Others were CIP/cyber security including line drawing on privacy and civil rights and civil liberties issues and policies. A third key reason the department was established was to process domestic INTEL, and its collection, analysis and dissemination. The FUSION CENTERS seem to be the key entity in that activity also including line drawing on privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Also DHS participation in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center which morphed by statute into the organization doing the same job and reporting to the DNI and housed at the CIA. Hey DHS has not won many bureaucratic battles.

Some of the runup to 9/11/01 did involve the issues raised by intentional use of WMD.

That background is of enough use that I have decided to repost it here and specifically because some of the statutes and Committee prints did in fact discuss FEMA in the context of WMD preparedness and response. Always remember that in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [P.L.100-707] there is no specific reference either to terrorism or WMD!

This is a long one but here goes:

QUICK AND DIRTY Pre-9/11/01
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF WMD LEGAL AUTHORITIES

INDEX

Page
Public Law 105-261 (Title XIV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Public Law 105-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Public Law 104-201 (Title XIV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Extract From House Report 105-724 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Extract From Senate Report 105-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Brief FEMA WMD History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
WMD Reports to Congress and GAO Reports . . . . . . . 42

Extract From
Strom Thurmond National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999

Public Law 105-261
October 17,1998

TITLE XIV--DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Sec. 1401. Short title
Sec. 1402. Domestic preparedness for response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 1403. Report on domestic emergency preparedness.
Sec. 1404. Threat and risk assessments.
Sec. 1405. Advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.

Sec. 1401. SHORT TITLE

This title may be cited as the "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998".

Sec. 1402. DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE TO THREATS OF TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) ENHANCED RESPONSE CAPABILITY. --In light of the continuing potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States and the need to develop a more fully coordinated response to that threat on the part of Federal, State, and local agencies, the President shall act to increase the effectiveness at the Federal, State, and local level of the domestic emergency preparedness program for response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction by utilizing the President's existing authorities to develop an integrated program that builds upon the program established under title XIV [Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996] of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2714; 50 U.S. C. §§2301 et seq.).
(b) REPORT. --Not later than January 31, 1999, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing information on the actions taken at the Federal, State, and local level to develop an integrated program to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

Sec. 1403. REPORT ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.

Section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1889) is amended by adding at the following new subsection:
"(c) ANNEX ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM. ---
As part of the report submitted to Congress under subsection (b), the President shall include an annex which provides the following information on the domestic emergency preparedness program for response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (as established under section 1402 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998):
"(1) information on program responsibilities for each participating Federal department, agency, and bureau;
"(2) a summary of program activities performed during the preceding fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, bureau;
"(3) a summary of program obligations and expenditures during the preceding fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, bureau;
"(4) a summary of the program plan and budget for the current fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, and bureau;
"(5) the program budget request for the following fiscal year for each participating Federal department, agency, and bureau;
"(6) Recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction that have been made by the advisory panel to assess the capabilities of domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (as established under section 1405 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998), and actions taken as a result of such recommendations; and
"(7) Additional program measures and legislative authority for which congressional action may be recommended."

Sec. 1404. THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS.

(a) REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP METHODOLOGIES. --The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and representatives of appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, shall develop and test methodologies for assessing the threat and risk of terrorist employment of weapons of mass destruction against cities and other local areas. The results of the tests may be used to determine the training and equipment requirements under the program developed under section 1402. The methodologies required by this subsection shall be developed using cities or local areas selected by the Attorney General, acting in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appropriate representatives of Federal, State, and local agencies.

(b) REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE. ---The requirements in subsection (a) shall be completed not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act [October 17, 1998].

Sec. 1405. ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PANEL. ---The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center to establish a panel to assess the capabilities for domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.
(b) COMPOSITION OF PANEL; SELECTION.---

(1) The panel shall be composed of members who shall be private citizens of the United States with knowledge and expertise in emergency response matters.

(2) Members of the panel shall be selected by the federally funded research and development center in accordance with the terms of the contract established pursuant to subsection (a).

(c) PROCEDURES FOR PANEL. ---The federally funded research and development center shall be responsible for establishing appropriate procedures for the panel, including procedures for selection of a panel chairman.
(d) DUTIES OF PANEL.--The Panel shall---
(1) assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
(2) assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
(3) assess deficiencies in training programs for responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions.
(4) recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; and
(5) Assess the appropriate role of State and local governments in funding effective local response capabilities.

(e) DEADLINE TO ENTER INTO CONTRACT. --The Secretary of Defense shall enter into the contract required under subsection (a) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [October 17, 1998].

(f) DEADLINE FOR SECLECTION OF PANEL MEMBERS. --Selection of panel members shall be made not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary enters into the contract required by subsection (a).

(g) INITIAL MEETING OF THE PANEL. --The panel shall conduct its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date that all selections to the panel have been made.
(h) REPORTS. --

(1) Not later than 6 months after the date of the first meeting of the panel, the panel shall submit to the President and to Congress an initial report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
(2) Not later than December 15 of each year, beginning in 1999 and ending in 2001, the panel shall submit to the President and to the Congress a report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

(i) COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES. ----

(1) The panel may secure directly from the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or any other Federal department or agency information that the panel considers necessary for the panel to carry out its duties.
(2) The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and any other official of the United States shall provide the panel with full and timely cooperation in carrying out its duties under this section.

(j) FUNDING. --The Secretary of Defense shall provide the funds necessary for the panel to carry out its duties from the funds available to the Department of Defense for weapons of mass destruction preparedness initiatives.
(k) COMPENSATION OF PANEL MEMBERS. --

(1) Members of the panel shall serve without pay by reason of their work on the panel.
(2) Members of the panel shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular place of business in performance of services for the panel.

(l) TERMINATION OF THE PANEL. --The panel shall terminate three years after the date of the appointment of the member selected as chairman of the panel.
(m) DEFINITION. --In this section, the term "weapon of mass destruction" has the meaning given that term in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1).

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1998 (Pub. Law 105-85, November 18, 1997)

Sec. 234. ANNUAL REPORT ON THREAT POSED TO THE UNITED STATES BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND CRUISE MISSLES

(A) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress by January 30 of each year a report on the threats posed to the United States and allies of the United States—
(1) by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles; and
(2) by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

(B) CONSULTATION.-- Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

(C) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that possesses weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(2) A description of the means by which any foreign country and non-State organization that has achieved capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles has achieved that capability, including a description of the international network of foreign countries and private entities that provide assistance to foreign countries and non-State organizations in achieving that capability.
(3) An examination of the doctrines that guide the use of weapons of mass destruction en each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(4) An examination of the existence and implementation of the control mechanisms that exist with respect to nuclear weapons in each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(5) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that seeks to acquire or develop (indigenously or with foreign assistance) weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(6) An assessment of various possible timelines for the achievement by foreign countries and non-State organizations of capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, taking into account the probability of whether the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China will comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, the potential availability of assistance from foreign technical specialists, and the potential for independent sales by foreign private entities without authorization from their national governments.
(7) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target the United States or its territories with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign or non-State organization achieves that capability.
(8) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target members of the United States Armed Forces deployed abroad with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of the enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability.

(D) CLASSIFICATION.—Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.

OGC/FEMA version of Codification in the United States Code of Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Title XIV of
Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996)

FEMA referenced in the following sections:
§ 2312
§ 2314
§ 2315
§ 2317
§2352

[Reference to FEMA by underlining not in original and note that no formal internal delegation by the Director, FEMA, of his authority or responsibility under these sections of the United States Code is in effect as of 12/1/98. Informal internal FEMA assignments were made by the Director in a memorandum dated November 19, 1996, subject: Nunn-Lugar/NSC Program Agenda Counterterrorism Responsibilities.]

Historical Footnote

This statute has been informally referred to as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act after its principal Senate sponsors. The original intention of the Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff was to designate FEMA as the lead agency for substantial portions of the legislation. This intention was principally due to the understanding of the Senate professional staff as to the import of PDD-39 issued in April 1995 by the President and its various agency assignments. FEMA was invited to testify before the Committee and that testimony was delivered by Clay Hollister, now Acting Chief Information Officer in FEMA and at that point (March 1996) the Deputy Associate Director for Response in the Response and Recovery Directorate. Based on Mr. Hollister's testimony and answers to questions for the record supplied by FEMA, the Staff recommended to the Committee that it was inappropriate to name FEMA as the lead agency. Due to the accidental intervention of a former FEMA employee (a FEMA employee at the time) the Staff reconsidered in part and developed the transition provision that now appears at §2312(a) requiring a Presidential determination of lead agency status by September 1999. The Executive Branch relies on PDD-39 and PDD-62 (May 1998) as being the Presidential determination required by the Act. Congressional staff involved in the passage and enactment of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998, an entirely new statute, does not agree and has recommended close oversight and review of the lead agency selection process and the absence of any formal Presidential determination beyond the two PDDs.

TITLE 50 UNITED STATES CODE
WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

CHAPTER 40--DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Sec.
2301. Findings
2302. Definitions

SUBCHAPTER I--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

2311. Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

(a) Enhanced response capability.
(b) Report required.

2312. Emergency response assistance program.

(a) Program required.
(b) Coordination.
(c) Eligible participants.
(d) Involvement of other Federal agencies.
(e) Available assistance.
(f) Limitations on Department of Defense assistance to law enforcement agencies.
(g) Administration of Department of Defense assistance.
(h) Funding.

2313. Nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency response.

(a) Department of Defense.
(b) Department of Energy.
(c) Funding.

2314. Chemical-biological emergency response team.

(a) Department of Defense rapid response team.
(b) Addition to Federal response plan.

2315. Testing of preparedness for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons.

(a) Emergencies involving chemical or biological weapon [sic].
(b) Emergencies involving nuclear and radiological weapons.
(c) Annual revisions of programs.
(d) Option to transfer responsibility.
(e) Funding.

2316. Military assistance to civilian law enforcement officials.

(a) Civilian expertise.
(b) Reports.

2317. Rapid response information system.

(a) Inventory of rapid response assets.
(b) Master inventory.
(c) Addition to Federal response plan.
(d) Database on chemical and biological materials.
(e) Access to inventory and database.

SUBCHAPTER II--INTERDICTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS

2331. Procurement of detection equipment [for] United States border security.
2332. Sense of Congress concerning criminal penalties.

(a) Sense of Congress concerning inadequacy of sentencing guidelines.
(b) Urging revision to guidelines.

2333. International border security.

(a) Secretary of Defense responsibility.
(b) Funding.
(c) Assistance to states of the former Soviet Union.

SUBCHAPTER III---CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS THREATENING THE UNITED STATES

2341. Elimination of plutonium production.

(a) Replacement program.
(b) Program requirements.
(c) Submission of program plan to Congress.

SUBCHAPTER IV--COORDINATION OF POLICY AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

2351. National Coordinator on Nonproliferation.

(a) Designation of position.
(b) Duties.
(c) Allocation of funds.

2352. National Security Council Committee on Nonproliferation.

(a) Establishment.
(b) Membership.
(c) Responsibilities.

2353. Comprehensive preparedness program.

(a) Program required.
(b) Content of program.
(c) Report.

SUBCHAPTER V--MISCELLANEOUS

2361. Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy.
2362. Transfers of allocations among Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
2363. Sense of Congress concerning assistance to states of former Soviet Union.
2364. Purchase of low-enriched uranium derived from Russian highly enriched uranium.

(a) Sense of Congress.
(b) Actions by the Secretary of State.

2365. Sense of Congress concerning purchase, packaging, and transportation of fissile materials at risk of theft.
2366. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.

(a) Reports.
(b) Form of reports.

2367. Annual report on threat posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

(a) Annual Report.
(b) Consultation.
(c) Matters to be Included.
(d) Classification.

§ 2301. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies are increasingly available from worldwide sources. Technical information relating to such weapons is readily available on the Internet, and raw materials for chemical, biological, and radiological weapons are widely available for legitimate commercial purposes.
(2) The former Soviet Union produced and maintained a vast array of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
(3) Many of the states of the former Soviet Union retain the facilities, materials, and technologies capable of producing additional quantities of weapons of mass destruction.
(4) The disintegration of the former Soviet Union was accompanied by disruptions of command and control systems, deficiencies in accountability for weapons, weapons-related materials and technologies, economic hardships, and significant gaps in border control among the states of the former Soviet Union. The problems of organized crime and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union increase the potential for proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials.
(5) The conditions described in paragraph (4) have substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies from within the states of the former Soviet Union and from unemployed scientists who worked on those programs.
(6) As a result of such conditions, the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history.
(7) The President has identified North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya as hostile states which already possess some weapons of mass destruction and are developing others.
(8) The acquisition or the development and use of weapons of mass destruction is well within the capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, acting independently or as proxies for foreign states.
(9) Foreign states can transfer weapons to or otherwise aid extremist and terrorist movements indirectly and with plausible deniability.
(10) Terrorist groups have already conducted chemical attacks against civilian targets in the United States and Japan, and a radiological attack in Russia.
(11) The potential for the national security of the United States to be threatened by nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological terrorism must be taken seriously.
(12) There is a significant and growing threat of attack by weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not military targets in the usual sense of the term.
(13) Concomitantly, the threat posed to the citizens of the United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing.
(14) Mass terror may result from terrorist incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials.
(15) Facilities required for production of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are much smaller and harder to detect than nuclear weapons facilities, and biological and chemical weapons can be deployed by alternative delivery means other than long-range ballistic missiles.
(16) Covert or unconventional means of delivery of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons include cargo ships, passenger aircraft, commercial and private vehicles and vessels, and commercial cargo shipments routed through multiple destinations.
(17) Traditional arms control efforts assume large state efforts with detectable manufacturing programs and weapons production programs, but are ineffective in monitoring and controlling smaller, though potentially more dangerous, unconventional proliferation efforts.
(18) Conventional counter-proliferation efforts would do little to detect or prevent the rapid development of a capability to suddenly manufacture several hundred chemical or biological weapons with nothing but commercial supplies and equipment.
(19) The United States lacks adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism.
(20) The Department of Energy has established a Nuclear Emergency Response Team which is available in case of nuclear or radiological emergencies, but no comparable units exist to deal with emergencies involving biological or chemical weapons or related materials.
(21) State and local emergency response personnel are not adequately prepared or trained for incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials.
(22) Exercises of the Federal, State, and local response to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism have revealed serious deficiencies in preparedness and severe problems of coordination.
(23) The development of, and allocation of responsibilities for, effective countermeasures to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism in the United States requires well-coordinated participation of many Federal agencies, and careful planning by the Federal Government and State and local governments.
(24) Training and exercises can significantly improve the preparedness of State and local emergency response personnel for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials.
(25) Sharing of the expertise and capabilities of the Department of Defense, which traditionally has provided assistance to Federal State, and local officials in neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of explosive ordnance, as well as radiological, biological, and chemical materials, can be a vital contribution to the development and deployment of countermeasures against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
(26) The United States lacks effective policy coordination regarding the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

§2302. Definitions

In this chapter:

(1) The term "weapons of mass destruction" means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of---

(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;
(B) a disease organism; or
(C) radiation or radioactivity

(2) The term "independent states of the former Soviet Union" has the meaning given that term in section 5801 of Title 22.
(3) The term "highly enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235.

SUBCHAPTER I--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

§2311. Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction

(a) Enhanced response capability

In light of the potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, the President shall take immediate action--
(1) to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; and
(2) to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents at both the national and the local level.

(b) Report required

Not later than January 31, 1997, the President shall transmit to Congress a report containing---
(1) an assessment of the capabilities of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local prevention and response efforts;
(2) requirements for improvements in those capabilities; and
(3) the measures that should be taken to achieve such improvements, including additional resources and legislative authorities that would be required.

[A list of reports to Congress and GAO reports
on WMD issues is an attachment to this document]

§2312. Emergency response assistance program

(a) Program required

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a program to provide civilian personnel of Federal, State, and local agencies with training and expert advice regarding emergency responses to a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or related materials.
(2) The President may designate the head of an agency other than the Department of Defense to assume the responsibility for carrying out the program on or after October 1, 1999, and relieve the Secretary of Defense of that responsibility upon the assumption of the responsibility by the designated official.
(3) In this section, the official responsible for carrying out the program is referred to as the "lead official".

(b) Coordination

In carrying out the program, the lead official shall coordinate with each of the following officials who is not serving as the lead official:

(1) The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(2) The Secretary of Energy.
(3) The Secretary of Defense.
(4) The heads of any other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have an expertise or responsibilities relevant to emergency responses described in subsection (a)(1) of this section.

(c) Eligible participants

The civilian personnel eligible to receive assistance under the program are civilian personnel of Federal, State, and local agencies who have emergency preparedness responsibilities.

(d) Involvement of other Federal agencies

(1) The lead official may use personnel and capabilities of Federal agencies outside the agency of the lead official to provide training and expert advice under the program.
(2) (A) Personnel used under paragraph (1) shall be personnel who have special skills relevant to the particular assistance that the personnel are to provide.

(B) Capabilities used under paragraph (1) shall be capabilities that are especially relevant to the particular assistance for which the capabilities are used.

(3) If the lead official is not the Secretary of Defense, and requests assistance from the Department of Defense that, in the judgement of the Secretary of Defense would affect military readiness or adversely affect national security, the Secretary of Defense may appeal the request for Department of Defense assistance by the lead official to the President.

(e) Available assistance

Assistance available under this program shall include the following:
(1) Training in the use, operation, and maintenance of equipment for--

(A) detecting a chemical or biological agent or nuclear radiation;
(B) monitoring the presence of such an agent or radiation;
(C) protecting emergency personnel and the public; and
(D) decontamination.

(2) Establishment of a designated telephonic link (commonly referred to as a "hot line") to a designated source of relevant data and expert advice for the use of State or local officials responding to emergencies involving a weapon of mass destruction or related materials.
(3) Use of the National Guard and other reserve components for purposes authorized under this section that are specified by the lead official (with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense if the Secretary is not the lead official).
(4) Loan of appropriate equipment.

(f) Limitations on Department of Defense assistance to law enforcement agencies

Assistance provided by the Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies under this section shall be provided under the authority of, and subject to the restrictions provided in, chapter 18 of Title 10.

(g) Administration of Department of Defense assistance

The Secretary of Defense shall designate an official within the Department of Defense to serve as the executive agent of the Secretary for the coordination of the provision of Department of Defense assistance under this title.

(h) Funding

(1) Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $35,000,000 is available for the program required under this section.
(2) Of the amount available for the program pursuant to paragraph (1), $10,500,000 is available for use by the Secretary of Defense to assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the establishment of metropolitan emergency medical response teams (commonly referred to as "Metropolitan Medical Strike Force Teams") to provide medical services that are necessary or potentially necessary by reason of a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction.

(3) The amount available for the program under paragraph (1) is in addition to any amounts authorized to be appropriated for the program under section 301.

§2313. Nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency response

(a) Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense shall designate an official within the Department of Defense as the executive agent for---
(1) the coordination of Department of Defense assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to threats involving biological or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of biological and chemical weapons and related materials and technologies; and
(2) the coordination of Department of Defense assistance to the Department of Energy in carrying out that department's responsibilities under subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Department of Energy

The Secretary of Energy shall designate an official within the Department of Energy as the executive agent for--
(1) the coordination of Department of Energy assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to threats involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of nuclear weapons and related materials and technologies; and
(2) the coordination of Department of Energy assistance to the Department of Defense in carrying out that department's responsibilities under subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Funding

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $15,000,000 is available for providing assistance described in subsection (a) of this section.

§2314. Chem-biological emergency response team

(a) Department of Defense rapid response team

The Secretary of Defense shall develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of the Department of Defense who are capable of aiding Federal, state, and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological or related materials.

(b) Addition to Federal response plan

Not later than December 31, 1997, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall develop and incorporate into existing Federal emergency response plans and programs prepared under section 5196(b) of Title 42 [Robert T. Stafford Act] guidance on the use and deployment of the rapid response teams established under this section to respond to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction. The Director shall carry out this subsection in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other Federal agencies involved with the emergency response plans.

§2315. Testing of preparedness for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons

(a) Emergencies involving chemical or biological weapons

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop and carry out a program for testing and improving the responses of Federal, State and local agencies to emergencies involving biological weapons and related materials and emergencies involving chemical weapons and related materials.
(2) The program shall include exercises to be carried out during each of the five successive years beginning with fiscal year 1997.
(3) In developing and carrying out the program, the Secretary shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of any other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have an expertise or responsibilities relevant to emergencies described in paragraph (1).

(b) Emergencies involving nuclear and radiological weapons

(1) The Secretary of Energy shall develop and carry out a program for testing and improving the responses of Federal, State, and local agencies to emergencies involving nuclear and radiological weapons and related materials.
(2) The program shall include exercises to be carried out during each of five successive fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997.
(3) In developing and carrying out the program, the Secretary shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of any other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have an expertise or responsibilities relevant to emergencies described in paragraph (1).

(c) Annual revisions of programs

The official responsible for carrying out a program developed under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall revise the program not later than June 1 in each fiscal year covered by the program. The revisions shall include adjustments that the official determines necessary or appropriate on the basis of the lessons learned from the exercise or exercises carried out under the program in the fiscal year, including lessons learned regarding coordination problems and equipment deficiencies.

(d) Option to transfer responsibility

(1) The President may designate the head of an agency outside the Department of Defense to assume the responsibility for carrying out the program developed under subsection (a) of this section beginning on or after October 1, 1999, and relieve the Secretary of Defense of that responsibility upon the assumption of the responsibility by the designated official.
(2) The President may designate the head of an agency outside the Department of Energy to assume the responsibility for carrying out the program developed under subsection (b) of this section beginning on or after October 1, 1999, and relieve the Secretary of Energy of that responsibility upon the assumption of the responsibility by the designated official.

(e) Funding

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $15,000,000 is available for the development and execution of the programs required by this section, including the participation of State and local agencies in exercises carried out under the programs.

§2316. Military assistance to civilian law enforcement officials

(a) Civilian expertise

The President shall take reasonable measures to reduce the reliance of civilian law enforcement officials on Department of Defense resources to counter the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States. The measures shall include---
(1) actions to increase civilian law enforcement expertise to counter such as threat; and
(2) actions to improve coordination between civilian law enforcement officials and other civilian sources of expertise, within and outside the Federal Government, to counter such a threat.

(b) Reports

The President shall submit to Congress the following reports:
(1) Not later than 90 days after September 23, 1996, a report describing the respective policy functions and operational roles of Federal agencies in countering the threat posed by the use or potential use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction within the United States.
(2) Not later than one year after September 23, 1996, a report describing---

(A) the actions planned to be taken to carry out subsection (a) of this section; and
(B) the costs of such actions.

(3) Not later than three years after September 23, 1996, a report updating the information provided in the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), including the measures taken pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.

§2317. Rapid response information system

(a) Inventory of rapid response assets

(1) The head of each Federal Response Plan agency shall develop and maintain an inventory of physical equipment and assets under the jurisdiction of that agency that could be made available to aid State and local officials in search and rescue and other disaster management and mitigation efforts associated with an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction. The agency head shall submit a copy of the inventory, and any updates of the inventory, to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency for inclusion in the master inventory required under subsection (b) of this section.

(2) Each inventory shall include a separate listing of any equipment that is excess to the needs of that agency and could be considered for disposal as excess or surplus property for use for response and training with regard to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

(b) Master inventory

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall compile and maintain a comprehensive listing of all inventories prepared under subsection (a) of this section. The first such master list shall be completed not later than December 31, 1997, and shall be updated annually thereafter.

(c) Addition to Federal response plan

Not later than December 31, 1997, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall develop and incorporate into existing Federal emergency response plans and programs prepared under section 5196(b) of Title 42 [Robert T. Stafford Act] guidance on accessing and using the physical equipment and assets included in the master list developed under subsection (b) of this section to respond to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

(d) Database on chemical and biological materials

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall prepare a database on chemical and biological agents and munitions characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use. The initial design and compilation of the database shall be completed not later than December 31, 1997.

(e) Access to inventory and database

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall design and maintain a system to give Federal, State, and local officials access to the inventory listing and database maintained under this section in the event of an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction or to prepare and train to respond to such an emergency. The system shall include a secure but accessible emergency response hotline to access information and request assistance.

SUBCHAPTER II---INTERDICTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS

§2331. Procurement of detection equipment for United States border security

Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301, $15,000,000 is available for the procurement of---

(1) equipment capable of detecting the movement of weapons of mass destruction and related materials into the United States;
(2) equipment capable of interdicting the movement of weapons of mass destruction and related materials into the United States; and
(3) materials and technologies related to use of equipment described in paragraph (1) or (2).

§2332. Sense of Congress concerning criminal penalties

(a) Sense of Congress concerning inadequacy of sentencing guidelines

It is the sense of Congress that the sentencing guidelines prescribed by the United States Sentencing Commission for the offenses of importation, attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials constitute inadequate punishment for such offenses.

(b) Urging of revision to guidelines

Congress urges the United States Sentencing Commission to revise the relevant sentencing guidelines to provide for increased penalties for offenses relating to importation, attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies under the following provisions of law:
(1) Section 11 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410).
(2) Sections 38 and 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2780).
(3) The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(4) Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 2156a(c)) [42 U.S.C.A. §2139a(c)].

§2333. International border security

(a) Secretary of Defense responsibility

The Secretary of Defense, in consultation and cooperation with the Commissioner of Customs, shall carry out programs for assisting customs officials and border guard officials in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic state, and other countries of Eastern Europe in preventing unauthorized transfer and transportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials. Training, expert advice, maintenance of equipment, loan of equipment, and audits may be provided under or in connection with the programs.

(b) Funding

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301, $15,000,000 is available for carrying out the programs referred to in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Assistance to states of the former Soviet Union

Assistance under programs referred to in subsection (a) of this section may (notwithstanding any provision of law prohibiting the extension of foreign assistance to any of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union) be extended to include an independent state of the former Soviet Union if the President certifies to Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to extend assistance under this section to that state.

SUBCHAPTER III---CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS THREATENING THE UNITED STATES

§2341. Elimination of plutonium production

(a) Replacement program

The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a cooperative program with the Government of Russia to eliminate the production of weapons grade plutonium by modifying or replacing the reactor cores at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 with reactor cores that are less suitable for the production of weapons grade plutonium.

(b) Program requirements

(1) The program shall be designed to achieve completion of the modifications or replacements of the reactor cores within three years after the modification or replacement activities under the program are begun.
(2) The plan for the program shall--

(A) specify--
(i) successive steps for the modification or replacement of the reactor cores; and
(ii) clearly defined milestones to be achieved; and

(B) include estimates of the costs of the program.

(c) Submission of program plan to Congress

Not later than 180 days after September 23, 1996, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress---
(1) a plan for the program under subsection (a) of this section;
(2) an estimate of the United States funding that is necessary for carrying out the activities under the program for each fiscal year covered by the program; and
(3) a comparison of the benefits of the program with the benefits of other nonproliferation programs.

SUBCHAPTER IV--COORDINATION OF POLICY AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

§2351. National Coordinator on Nonproliferation

(a) Designation of position

The President shall designate an individual to serve in the Executive Office of the President as the National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters.

(b) Duties

The Coordinator, under the direction of the National Security Council, shall advise and assist the President by---
(1) advising the President on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including issues related to terrorism, arms control, and international organized crime;
(2) chairing the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title [United States Code Title 50-War and National Defense]; and
(3) taking such actions as are necessary to ensure that there is appropriate emphasis in, cooperation on, an coordination of, non-proliferation research efforts of the United States, including activities of Federal agencies as well as activities of contractors funded by the Federal Government.

(c) Allocation of funds

Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $2,000,000 is available to the Department of Defense for carrying out research referred to in subsection (b)(3) of this section.

§2352. National Security Council Committee on Nonproliferation

(a) Establishment

The Committee on Nonproliferation (in this section referred to as the "Committee") is established as a committee of the National Security Council.
(b) Membership

(1) The Committee shall be composed of representatives of the following:

(A) The Secretary of State.
(B) The Secretary of Defense.
(C) The Director of Central Intelligence.
(D) The Attorney General.
(E) The Secretary of Energy.
(F) The Administrator [sic] (Director) of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(G) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(H) The Secretary of Commerce.
(I) Such other members as the President may designate.

(2) The National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters shall chair the Committee on Nonproliferation.

(c) Responsibilities

The Committee has the following responsibilities:

(1) To review and coordinate Federal programs, policies, and directives relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies, including matters relating to terrorism and international organized crime.
(2) To make recommendations through the National Security Council to the President regarding the following:

(A) Integrated national policies for countering the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.
(B) Options for integrating Federal agency budgets for countering such threats.
(C) Means to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments have adequate capabilities to manage crises involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials or technologies, and to manage the consequences of a use of such weapon or related materials or technologies, and that use of those capabilities is coordinated.
(D) Means to ensure appropriate cooperation on, and coordination of, the following:
(i) Preventing the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(ii) Promoting domestic and international law enforcement efforts against proliferation-related efforts.
(iii) Countering the involvement of organized crime groups in proliferation-related activities.
(iv) Safeguarding weapons of mass destruction materials and related technologies.
(v) Improving coordination and cooperation among intelligence activities, law enforcement, and the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy in support of nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts.
(vi) Improving export controls over materials and technologies that can contribute to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
(vii) Reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.

§2353. Comprehensive preparedness program

(a) Program required

The President, acting through the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title [United States Code Title 50--War and National Defense], shall develop a comprehensive program for carrying out this chapter [United States Code Chapter 40-DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION].

(b) Content of program

The program set forth in the report shall include specific as follows:

(1) Plans for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(2) Plans for training and equipping Federal, State, and local officials for managing a crisis involving a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction, including the consequences of the use of such a weapon.
(3) Plans for providing for regular sharing of information among intelligence, law enforcement, and customs agencies.
(4) Plans for training and equipping law enforcement units, customs services, and border security personnel to counter the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(5) Plans for establishing appropriate centers for analyzing seized nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, and related materials and technologies.
(6) Plans for establishing in the United States appropriate legal controls and authorities relating to the exporting of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, and related materials and technologies.
(7) Plans for encouraging and assisting governments of foreign countries to implement and enforce laws that set forth appropriate penalties for offenses regarding the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.
(8) Plans for building the confidence of the United States and Russia in each other's controls over United States and Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials, including plans for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
(9) Plans for reducing United States and Russian stockpiles of excess plutonium, reflecting---

(A) consideration of the desirability and feasibility of a United States-Russian agreement governing fissile material disposition of excess plutonium; and
(B) an assessment of the options for United States cooperation with Russia in the disposition of Russian plutonium.
(10) Plans for studying the merits and costs of establishing a global network of means for detecting and responding to terroristic or other criminal use of biological agents against people or other forms of life in the United States or any foreign country.

(c) Report

(1) At the same time that the President submits the budget for fiscal year 1998 to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of Title 31, the President shall submit to Congress a report that sets forth the comprehensive program developed under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The report shall include the following:

(A) The specific plans for the program that are required under subsection (b) of this section.
(B) Estimates of the funds necessary, by agency or department, for carrying out such plans in fiscal year 1998 and the following five fiscal years.

(3) The report shall be in an unclassified form. If there is a classified version of the report, the President shall submit the classified version at the same time.

§2354. Termination

After September 30, 1999, the President---

(1) is not required to maintain a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters under section 2351 of this title; and
(2) may terminate the Committee on Nonproliferation established under section 2352 of this title.

SUBCHAPTER V---MISCELLANEOUS

§2361. Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State, to the extent authorized by law, should---
(1) contract directly with suppliers in independent states of the former Soviet Union when such action would--

(A) result in significant savings of the programs referred to in subchapter III of this chapter; and
(B) substantially expedite completion of the programs referred to in subchapter III of this chapter; and
(2) seek means to use innovating contracting approaches to avoid delay and increase the effectiveness of such programs and of the exerciser of such authorities.

§2362. Transfers of allocations among Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
Congress finds that---
(1) the various Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are being carried out at different rates in the various countries covered by such programs; and
(2) it is necessary to authorize transfers of funding allocations among the various programs in order to maximize the effectiveness of United States efforts under such programs.

§2363. Sense of Congress concerning assistance to states of former Soviet Union

It is the sense of Congress that---
(1) The Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other United States programs authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994 should be expanded by offering assistance under those programs to other independent states of the former Soviet Union in addition to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and
(2) The President should offer assistance to additional independent states of the former Soviet Union in each case in which the participation of such states would benefit national security interest of the United States by improving border controls and safeguards over materials and technology associated with weapons of mass destruction.

§2364. Purchase of low-enriched uranium derived from Russian highly enriched uranium

(a) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that the allies of the United States and other nations should participate in efforts to ensure that stockpiles of weapons-grade nuclear material are reduced.

(b) Actions by the Secretary of State

Congress urges the Secretary of State to encourage, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, other countries to purchase low-enriched uranium that is derived from highly enriched uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons.

§2365. Sense of Congress concerning purchase, packaging, and transportation of fissile materials at risk of theft

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) The Secretary of defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State should purchase, package, and transport to secure locations weapons-grade nuclear materials from a stockpile of such materials if such officials determine that---

(A) there is a significant risk of theft of such materials; and
(B) there is no reasonable and economically feasible alternative for securing such materials; and

(2) if it is necessary to do so in order to secure the materials, the materials should be imported into the United States, subject to the laws and regulations that are applicable to the importation of such materials into the United States.

§2366. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions

(a) Reports

Not later than 6 months after October 11, 1996, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on---
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.

(b) Form of reports

The reports submitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

§2367. Annual report on threat posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles

(a) ANNUAL REPORT. —The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress by January 30 of each year a report on the threats posed to the United States and allies of the United States—
(3) by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles; and
(4) by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

(b) CONSULTATION. -- Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED. —Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(9) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that possesses weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(10) A description of the means by which any foreign country and non-State organization that has achieved capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles has achieved that capability, including a description of the international network of foreign countries and private entities that provide assistance to foreign countries and non-State organizations in achieving that capability.
(11) An examination of the doctrines that guide the use of weapons of mass destruction en each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(12) An examination of the existence and implementation of the control mechanisms that exist with respect to nuclear weapons in each foreign country that possesses such weapons.
(13) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that seeks to acquire or develop (indigenously or with foreign assistance) weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization.
(14) An assessment of various possible timelines for the achievement by foreign countries and non-State organizations of capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, taking into account the probability of whether the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China will comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, the potential availability of assistance from foreign technical specialists, and the potential for independent sales by foreign private entities without authorization from their national governments.
(15) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target the United States or its territories with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign or non-State organization achieves that capability.
(16) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target members of the United States Armed Forces deployed abroad with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of the date of the enactment of this Act [November 18, 1997], an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability.

(d) CLASSIFICATION. —Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.

PUBLIC LAW 104-201

TITLE XIV---DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Extract from House Conference Report No. 104-724

Domestic Preparedness

Enhancing the nation’s ability to prevent, and, if necessary, to respond to a terrorist incident involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons or materials is the cornerstone of this program. The conferees note that an interagency group, composed of the Federal Response Plan signatory agencies led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) completed and forwarded to the President on July 1, 1996, a report titled ”Consequences Management for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Terrorism.” The report documents the inadequacy of the Federal Response Plan to deal with NBC terrorist incidents and makes specific recommendations regarding capability enhancements. The conferees agree to a provision (§1411) that would require the President to take immediate action to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to respond to such incidents and to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response and law enforcement agencies to respond to such incidents. The provision would further require the President to provide to the Congress by January 31, 1997, [published in the Congressional Record on February 26, 1997] a report containing an assessment of such capabilities, improvements required, and measures that should be taken to achieve such improvements, including additional resources and legislative authority that might be necessary.

The conferees agree to recommend $50.0 million for the establishment of a domestic emergency assistance program for the Department of Defense to immediately begin sharing its unique expertise, experience, and equipment in dealing with chemical and biological weapons and materials with local emergency first respondents (firemen, policemen, and medical workers).

The conferees expect that the Secretary of Defense will work expeditiously with the Secretary of Health and Human Services in providing DOD resources and expertise to the Office of Emergency Preparedness for the formation of emergency medical teams that are trained and equipped to handle incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

The conferees agree to provide $15.0 million for DOD to conduct interagency exercises that will focus on testing and improving the U.S. Government’s ability to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
The conferees have agreed to an additional provision (§1414) that would require DOD to establish at least one Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Team for rapid response to domestic terrorism. The conferees expect that such teams would be similar in concept to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Accident Response Groups that are maintained by DOE for response to a nuclear incident. The conferees note in the joint DOD/DOE report [prepared in consultation with FEMA] to the Congress, “Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, or Chemical Terrorist Attack,” dated June 13, 1996, that the DOD is attempting to establish such a capability. The conferees note that many of the capabilities sought for such teams are already present in the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, and Chemical Defense and Infectious Disease Medical Research Institutes. The conferees also note the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee’s “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation’, dated May 1996, which states that the U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic was scheduled to activate a Department of the Navy/Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force on June 1, 1996, to respond to chemical and biological incidents (terrorist or otherwise) occurring on naval installations and Department of State legations worldwide. The conferees understand that the unit has been activated and is now in training.
In §1416, the conferees agree to provide authority, very narrowly defined and carefully constructed, for the President and the Attorney General to request military support to local authorities in incidents involving chemical and biological weapons. This authority is in addition to the authorities otherwise provided in Chapter 18 of title 10, U.S. Code. The conferees agree that the use of the military in any emergency situation involving biological or chemical weapons or materials should be limited both in time and scope to dealing with the specific chemical or biological weapons-related incident.
Finally, the conferees have included a provision (§1417) that would require Federal Response Plan agencies to develop and maintain an inventory of equipment and other assets that could be made available to aid State and local officials in search and rescue and other disaster management and mitigation efforts associated with an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction, and would require FEMA to maintain a comprehensive master list of the inventory. The provision would also require FEMA to establish a data base on chemical and biological agent and munitions characteristics and safety precautions and to develop a system to provide federal, State, and local officials access to the data base and to the master inventory.

EXTRACT FROM SENATE REPORT 105-24
JUNE 9, 1997

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

From page 6 of the report:

In his unclassified confirmation testimony before the Committee, the Acting DCI committed to prepare annual National Intelligence Estimates or comparable reports on (1) the ballistic and cruise missile threats to the United States, and (2) the threat to the United States of “non-traditional” attacks using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons delivered by means other than by ballistic or cruise missiles. The Committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence] welcomes the ADCI’s commitment in this regard, and looks forward to reviewing these products. These estimates should be provided to the Congressional Intelligence Committees annually, on or before February 15, with the first report to be submitted on or before February 15, 1998.

The annual estimate on the ‘non-traditional’ WMD threat to the United States shall include, at a minimum:

(1) The current threat of an attack against the United States using a weapon of mass destruction, including the ability of terrorist groups or hostile governments to produce and deliver to the United States a WMD, or the components thereof;

(2) The degree to which the threat will increase by the year 2010;

(3) The sources of the threat;

(4) The potential delivery means of carrying out a WMD attack against the United States;

(5) The relative feasibility of different means of delivery and the probability that such an attack against the United States would use ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or any other means of delivery; and

(6) The vulnerability of the United States to such an attack, including, but not limited to, the ability of terrorist groups or hostile governments to clandestinely transport into the United States a WMD or the components necessary to construct a WMD, and the capability of the United States to detect and intercept the importation of such a weapon.

Not later than March 15, 1998, the President shall submit to the Congressional Intelligence Committees a report that identifies the funds appropriated in Fiscal Year 1998 and requested in the fiscal Year 1999 budget to defend the United States against a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons attack using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or any other means of delivery.

. . . . . . ..

BRIEF HISTORY OF FEMA INVOLVEMENT WITH WMD PREPAREDNESS

From September 1981 until November 1993, a National Preparedness Directorate existed in FEMA. E.O. 12148, in its §2-103 has assigned FEMA the consequences of major terrorist events role. That role was assigned to the State and Local Support Directorate during the period September 1981 to November 1983, since it was viewed as primarily a civil defense function or a disaster response function. FEMA was reorganized in November 1993 but it wasn't until the establishment of a Director of National Security and the drafting and issuance of PDD-39 in April 1995 that FEMA again focused on the terrorism assignment. The Director in a memorandum dated September 9, 1997 created a Terrorism Coordination Unit independent of the Director of National Security function when he issued a memorandum dated October 1, 1997, subject: FEMA's Role in Terrorism and Consequence Management. The new unit had a scheduled life of six months and on June 21, 1998 was subsumed in a new organizational the Office of National Security Affairs reporting to the Director, that also combined the Director of National Security function. This organization now has principal jurisdiction over three new PDDs [62, 63, and 67] signed by the President in May and October 1998. The Acting Chief Information Officer of FEMA has been delegated responsibilities under PDD-63 as the Chief Information Assurance Officer and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer.

A relatively comprehensive Office of General Counsel opinion issued February 21, 1991, subject Application of Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act, addressed the issues raised by the language of the Act “that an emergency exists for which the primary responsibility for response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority . . .” See GCM 91-2-21.

Since the date of that memorandum, it has also been made clear by President Clinton’s issuance of PDD-39 and PDD-62 that any terrorist event or involvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be considered automatically to involve the Federal government’s “preeminent responsibility and authority.” In GCM-96-11-21, a legal opinion issued to staff of the National Security Counsel, the General Counsel of FEMA concluded that the Attorney General should be included on decisions to use the Stafford Act emergency authority with respect to findings as to areas of Federal preeminent responsibility and authority.

Note this technical note prepared before FEMA incorporated into DHS on March 1, 2003

For a Listing of early reports on Federal capability
to respond to an WMD attack see the following reports

• June 1996, Joint Report to Congress, Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, or Chemical Attack, prepared by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy in consultation with FEMA.

• House Document 105-29, January 21, 1997, Policy Functions/Operational Roles of Federal Agencies in Countering the Domestic Chemical/Biological Threat, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting A Report Describing the Respective Policy Functions and Operational Roles of Federal Agencies In Countering The Threat Posed By the Use or Potential Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Within the United States, Pursuant to Pub. L. 104-201, §1416(e) (110 Stat. 2724).

• House Document 105-79, May 5, 1997, COMPREHENSIVE READINESS PROGRAM FOR COUNTERING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting A Report That Describes The United States Comprehensive Readiness Program For Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Pursuant to Public Law 104-201, §1443(c (110 STAT 2729).

• Department of Defense, Report to Congress, DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, May 1, 1997.

• General Accounting Office, NSIAD-97-254, September 26, 1997, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy.

• General Accounting Office, NSIAD-98-39, December 1, 1997, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination.

• House Document 105-224, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE, Communication 7735 from the President of the United States, March 5, 1998.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-74, April 9, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, April 23, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues, Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, October 16, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency.

The Definitions of PPD-8

2011-11-29T09:19:00.000-05:00

Several new definitions appeared in the March 30th PPD-8 issued under President Obama's signature. These follow:

Definitions
For the purposes of this directive:
(a) The term “national preparedness” refers to the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recovers from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.
(b) The term “security” refers to the protection of the Nation and its people, vital interests, and way of life.
(c) The term “resilience” refers to the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.
(d) The term “prevention” refers to those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. Prevention capabilities include, but are not limited to, information sharing and warning; domestic counterterrorism; and preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For purposes of the prevention framework called for in this directive, the term “prevention” refers to preventing imminent threats.

(e) The term “protection” refers to those capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism and manmade or natural disasters. Protection capabilities include, but are not limited to, defense against WMD threats; defense of agriculture and food; critical infrastructure protection; protection of key leadership and events; border security; maritime security; transportation security; immigration security; and Cybersecurity.
(f) The term “mitigation” refers to those capabilities necessary to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters. Mitigation capabilities include, but are not limited to, community-wide risk reduction projects; efforts to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure and key resource lifelines; risk reduction for specific vulnerabilities from natural hazards or acts of terrorism; and initiatives to reduce future risks after a disaster has occurred.
(g) The term “response” refers to those capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred.
(h) The term “recovery” refers to those capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively, including, but not limited to, rebuilding infrastructure systems; providing adequate
interim and long-term housing for survivors; restoring health, social, and community services; promoting economic development; and restoring natural and cultural resources.

It will be of great interest if these definitions become widely used and accepted. That is what the Directive mandates but many departments and agencies or even sub-units of DHS don't have a clue. I would suggest that a separate budget code be developed by OMB for each of these categories. According to the PPD-8 each definition defines program, functions, or activities that will be getting or already have their own national framework or strategy.

Each of these definitions deserve independent analysis. One basis for the analysis should be how do the definitions related to each other?

REP-Radiological Emergency Preparedness

2011-11-23T03:53:00.001-05:00

IN a program that is FEMA's closest to formal public health and safety regulatory effort outside of the NFIP the REP [Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program]effort dating back to the Carter Administration, new revised guidance has been published by both FEMA and NRC in today's Federal Register both by FEMA and NRC. This reflects a decade long effort to incorporate lesson's learned from the past including the events of 9/11/01!

Analysis of the changes will take some time.

FEMA's Office of Chief Counsel

2011-11-22T18:45:00.001-05:00

It has been reliably reported to me that FEMA's Office of the Chief Counsel now has almost 150 positions of various types including those in the field. Until John Carey, GC from 1994-1997 there were never more than 33 FTE's all in Hqs. John was able to get Director James Lee Witt to approve 40 DAE field attorneys and that number appeared in fact before John departed. Apparently a number of those DAE attorneys now hold positions of power and influence in OCC including Adrian Seveier, the Deputy Chief Counsel, who was a DAE during the 2001 attack on the WTC, and Mary Ellen Martinet who has been an outstanding lawyer on disaster issues even before I retired.

It sounds to me like OCC is the best positioned ever to do its job. Many of the field attorneys have a largely operational focus and that is useful to the system. There also were several highly skilled technical attorneys while I was in GC that still remain. Most of the senior litigation staff including its leader Jordan Fried. Lisa Katchka also very skilled at administrative law and dealing with the foibles of some of FEMA's program officials.

I wish them all well at this Thanksgiving including all those who I have never met but respect for their efforts in keeping FEMA going.

Hoping some of the new attorneys and paralegals review the historical document postings on the homepage of this blog.

I retired on October 1, 1999. But am now deeply involved in a book about FEMA, DHS and the WH on plans and preparedness activities and policies during the period 2001 to 2009. It is expected to be published sometime next fall by the Institute for Naval Proceedings an organization that published Tom Clancy's very first book--The Hunt for Red October. I don't believe the book I am working on will have quite that cache!

One question I would have for Brad Keiserman the Chief Counsel is this one--What should the OCC be doing that is important that it is not doing? And of course now that he has been there for 18 months what are his impressions of what he inherited and has accomplished. No need to respond Brad--just what I would ask you if I was able to do so.

To my knowledge all of the former GC's and CC of FEMA are still living. The oldest is George Watson who lives in Bethany Beach Delaware. Brad you might find a reunion interesting. All added quite a bit to FEMA's history. Some more than others.

Who is David Miller? Acting or not? Head of FIMA?

2011-11-18T08:30:00.003-05:00

Having not checked daily to see various appointees the name David Miller has turned up running the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Adminstration. Can anyone tell me who he is and his background and CV and whether he was Senate confirmed. The title of that directorate is not honest--should be Flood Insurance and Natural Hazard Mitigation Adminstration not as it reads now. But basic honest often an issue with FEMA administrations.

Send info to either of my e-mails at vlg338@yahoo.com or vacationlanegrp@aol.com

For the most recent FEMA org chart I have go to the FEMA Historical Docs section on the HOMEPAGE of this blog. Just keep clicking and the entries on the FAS website maintained for me by Steve Aftergood will show up. I continue to add docs that otherwise might get lost permanently either because before the virtual age or superseded and lost forever in the virtual age.

PPD-8 and the forthcoming National Preparedness Goal

2011-11-18T08:24:00.001-05:00

Under the provisions of the PRESIDENTIAL PREPAREDNESS Directive 8 FEMA will be publishing a new National Preparedness Goal document on November 23, 2011. For once FEMA should indicate who prepared the document, what levels of review and cooridation it have, contractors involved, and level of signoff. Since that basic sign of competence is not likely again suggest perhaps the "NEW" FEMA is not yet new. Reading and thinking still in short supply in FEMA.

Also on its way to the President for signature is a bill enacted by Congress that would replenish the PRESIDENT's DRF[disaster relief fund]. Whew! Thought for a moment the governments principal ATM for STATES and their local governments had come up empty.

A wonderful CRS report on PPD-8 has been posted on my other blog at http://www.vacationlanegrp.wordpress.com

That CRS report is also available now on this blog on the home page under FEMA historical resources. Click on that heading and then the next highlighted heading and docs will come up on your screen.

Happy Thanksgiving to all readers, friends, and families. And colleagues. I include in that all EM personnel world wide.

Hey I hope the new Superintendant at EMI position now being filled is filled by someone in the Academic world with a PhD, perhaps even in EM. But since EM is a multi-disciplinary arena could be a sociologist, anthropologist, engineer, geographer, political scientists, government specialist, etc.etc. As long as they have brains and brawn. The latter needed to withstand the cozy pleasures of overeating and enjoying the bucolic life of an EMI/NFA/NETC principal. The crown jewel in the FEMA geography.

A Critical Month for FEMA and DHS

2011-11-14T16:50:00.000-05:00

Once the Presidential primaries start you can almost feel the air going out of any current administration. As the Obama Administration prepares to submit its last budget (perhaps forever) in this term in late January the likelihood is that it will reflect the need of the President to reflect the current fiscal constraints that will have been developed and fleshed out over the next month. Budget always reflects policy and it should be of interest that large scale recipients of federal disaster relief are not represented very well on the Special Committee that reports out on November 23rd.
So the STATE and LOCAL gravy train that is FEMA and DHS could well end because the new arrangements will minimize aid to STATES and their local governments even as Harrisburg, PA and an Alabama county surrounding Birmingham go bankrupt.

Most Governors should be streamlining their local governments now to make each unit ones with general taxing authority and sue or be sued authority and eliminate all others. Where any city and county are overlapping contiguous areas that should be eliminated by expansion of one or the other. WE don't need 90,000 local jurisdictions each acting as claimants on the STATE and Federal fiscs.

But it is now clear after almost three years of this Administration that Obama really cares little about HOMELAND SECURITY or EM. And Janet N. has really become an absentee landlord as she probably realizes she needs to have fun and/or focus on her next job as she trapses off to Norway and Sweden to discuss her portfolio. Another failed DHS leader IMO. This critical budget time is not the time to be out of pocket as crucial decisions are made by the Congress and OMB and she may be presiding over a deeply scarred operation in 2012 before she departs.

I now am pretty much willing to believe a Republican win in 2012 means the demise of DHS and perhaps FEMA and that prediction will be discussed at some length over this blogs next several months.

And it was definitely a Christmas gift to DHS that Rick Perry's 53 second gaffe did not end with a reference to DHS as the third Cabinet department to eliminate should he be elected.

NEVER SO FEW--LESS THAN 10,000?

2011-11-07T07:35:00.000-05:00

In the PUBLIC SAFETY arena there are pretty good statistics on the policing function, the FIRE SERVICE, EMT, and even PUBLIC HEALTH. But not so good on the EM field. Who should be considered a qualified Emergency Manager? I would argue that the certificates and degrees certainly help. Education is part of the three legged stool upon which an EM sits. The others of course being training and experience. But since the onset of the EM discipline in the 70's my guestimate is that fewer than 20,000 have cycled through FEMA as an organization either as PFT, DAE, or CORE or consultants. At the STATES and their local levels perhaps more and perhaps less. But on active duty so to speak and excluding retirees and other I would guestimate less than 10,000 full time EMs nationwide. This is a very very tiny proportion of the total PUBLIC SAFETY arena, and by the way IAEM in designing a new mission and logo did use the term PUBLIC SAFETY which I would have avoided doing. But perhaps they wished to encourage larger enrollment in their organization as opposed to some other categories.

It would be interesting however to have FEMA collect the statistics each year on self-identified EM that are employed full time doing the EM mission. And did you know that a statutory definition for the first time ever appeared in PKEMRA 2006? I like the statutory definition even though I have long used a different one that can be found on my website at www.vacationlanegrp.com!

So come on academics, teachers and students let's get some more accurate studies of the EM discipline and identify how they were done and what the statistics show?

UN efforts concerning International Disaster Reduction!

2011-11-01T17:00:00.000-04:00

Furnished by Dr. Jane Rovins,PhD, now living in China and formerly in FEMA REGION IV! AS I always told my clients and staff in FEMA opportunities existed to develop and become not just a national but also international expert on disaster issues. After all Mother Nature Does NOT Grant Variances. Nor apparently does technology and human developed systems and processes.

So here goes:

This is a message from the United Nations' Assistant Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction to the delegates of the Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) (my conference - it was part of the opening address) and my programme (IRDR)....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nECDgR_G4cg&feature=youtu.be

We will have more pictures and video up in the next week or so...

Not with a Bang but a Whimper; How the last CD NSDD accelerated all-hazards

2011-10-31T18:28:00.002-04:00

The federal civil defense program had a statutory basis in Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress. Its repeal in 1994 under President Clinton might have covered up the fact that since the 1970's and President Nixon civil defense was not a real factor in the strategic equation of nuclear weapons. MAD, however is still the US strategic doctrine. The US Congress after the 1970's gave almost no oversight to the CD program and in fact accelerated its grant program as unrestricted revenue sharing.

Theoretically, the President's did not want to deal with CD after JFK and in a series of PD's and NSDD's used that system to largely fig leaf a decrepit effort. It should be said however that honorable people ran the program and did worry and lose sleep over the survival of a substantial portion of the US population should an attack occur. Two policy adoptions would have facilitated CD. First, renunciation of the MAD doctrine and simultaneous renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons. Even President Obama seems held captive to the DoD and DoE nuclear priesthood even as costs of the cleanup of the bomb complex realistically are probably close to $1 trillion.

Even weaker than the statute itself as amended as of the date of NSDD-66 (U) the language adopts the all-hazards mantra that now even rules in DHS.

So here is the text annotated by me for readers!

Editors note- While copied from the original several
editorial highlights have been added to enhance emphasis.
It should also be noted that this was the last Presidential Directive/ National Security Directive issued to provide guidance on Civil Defense prior to portions of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended being incorporated in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Essentially it mandates all-hazards preparedness and was reflected in a formal statutory amendment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 by Public Law 103-160 in 1993]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON 20284

March 16, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
MANAGER, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

SUBJECT: CIVIL DEFENSE (U)

POLICY

The United States will have a civil defense capability as an element of our overall national
security posture. The objective of the civil defense program is to develop the required capabilities common to all catastrophic emergencies and those unique to attack emergencies in order to protect the population and vital infrastructure. Civil defense can contribute to deterrence by denying an enemy any confidence that he could prevent a concerted national response to attack. (U)

The civil defense program will support all-hazard integrated emergency management at State and local levels. In so doing, the civil defense program will: (U)

1) Recognize and respect the primary responsibility of State and local governments to provide for the safety and well being of their citizens in emergencies other than national security emergencies.

2) Provide a focal point within the Federal government to work with State and local governments on integrated multi-hazard response planning and operations to deal with the consequences of catastrophic emergencies. (U)

3) Continue to implement a policy of dual use of civil defense resources through the development and use of capabilities at Federal, State and local levels to perform emergency functions to respond to emergencies of all kinds including attack. (U)

4) Focus on the development, jointly with State and local governments, of the required capabilities common to all catastrophic emergencies and those unique to attack emergencies, thus ensuring that the use of civil defense funds is consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from attack preparedness. (U)

5) Provide for the development of a civil defense infrastructure capable of expansion in a national security emergency involving the threat of all forms of attack on the United States which provide advanced warning. (U)

6) Utilize to the maximum extent the existing capabilities, facilities and resources of all appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, in accordance with Executive Order 12656 and, with their consent, those of the States and political subdivisions thereof, and of private sector organizations and agencies. (U)

Disaster-specific programs such as hurricane or flood relief programs which may be incorporated into the civil defense program and which are currently funded within domestic discretionary accounts will continue to be budgeted in this manner. In addition, any equipment or programs not needed for the consequence management of national security emergencies will be funded within the domestic discretionary accounts.

IMPLEMENTATION

The program under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with the support of heads of the Federal Departments and agencies, and under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council, will include: (U)

1) Population protection capabilities, with the Federal Government providing guidance and assistance to enable State and local governments to effectively support the population in all catastrophic emergencies. (U)

2) State and local government crisis management capabilities to effectively
support the population in all catastrophic emergencies. (U)

3) Information to promote a clear understanding by the public of the civil defense program, all threats which may affect their localities and actions they should take to minimize their effects. (U)

4) Information to assist U.S. business and industry in taking measures to protect their work forces and physical assets in all catastrophic emergencies and encouragement of the private sector to make maximum use of private sector capabilities. (U)

5) Voluntary participation by citizens and institutions in community civil defense activities and emphasis on citizen protective actions. (U)

6) Plans for sustaining survivors, for restoration of critical life support capabilities, and to establish a basis for recovery. (U)

7) Definition of and an assessment of the base capability necessary to respond to emergencies that do not provide warning, and the development of those base capabilities which are common to all catastrophic emergencies and unique to attack. (U)

8) Plans for a civil defense surge from the base capability to the total required capability in a national security crisis involving the threat of attack. These plans should assume advanced warning, adequate time to conduct the surge, and the required base capability form which to surge. Total required capability is that operational capability necessary to protect the population and vital infrastructure through preparedness measures common to all catastrophic emergencies and unique to attack emergencies. (U)

The Department of Defense will support civil authorities in civil defense, to include facilitating the use of the National Guard in each state for response in both peacetime disasters and national security emergencies. Subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, readiness of the armed forces for military contingencies will have precedence and civil authorities should not rely exclusively on military support. Federal military resources will be employed in civil defense missions only if State and Federal civil resources are not sufficient. Nothing in this directive alters or otherwise affects the chain of command for the armed forces established by the Constitution and laws of the United States. (U)

Nothing in this directive provides for any new Federal responsibilities which are now the responsibility of State and local governments. (U)

RECISSION

National Security Decision Directive 259, dated February 4, 1987, is rescinded. (U)

/signed/ George H.W. Bush

Fugate Claims New Legal Authority under PKEMRA 2006

2011-10-28T07:53:00.000-04:00

Administator W. Craig Fugate testified before the House Homeland Security Committee on Tuesday October 25th. His testimony and video of entire hearing still on the Committee website at HOUSE.gov!

In his response to questions, Adminstrator Fugate claimed that the Stafford Act is no longer the be all and end all of response. But that in fact PKEMRA 2006 fixed some broken reeds in FEMA response and in particular the leaning forwards aspects of response to disasters.

Some history. The George H.W. Bush administration argued to the Congress's investigative arm that a statutory change would be necessary to the STAFFORD ACT if FEMA was to be forward leaning in disasters. This claim was fundamental to its defense of its organizational performance in Hurricane Andrew that made landfall in August 1992. The Stafford Act was never formally modified to reflect this position. And perhaps oddly the George H. W. Bush Administration used so-called PUSH packages to lean forwards in response to Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii in late 1992.

Only an insider to OGC legal policy formulation could understand this debate. I was often asked by new General Counsels in the independent FEMA OGC during my service from 1979-1999 to brief them on an open-ended basis as to items they should be concerned with. Usually my briefings were very short, most less than 5-15 minutes depending on the questions I was asked.

I will pick on John Carey the first Demoratic GC of FEMA after the position was made political by the George H.W. Bush Administration, a non-career SES. I had received WH calls twice asking whether it should be career or non-career and somewhat odd since I was a GS-15 who had once applied for it indirectly in 1985.
I said I thought the career GCs were being rolled and excluded too often by the political appointees in crucial situations so that the position should be non-career. It was made an dual appointed position eventually and could be held by either a career or non-career lawyer. At least one later paid a $25,000 fee to become the GC of FEMA as a campaign contribution. No names please.

So what did I tell Mr. Carey! I told him that few of the FEMA Directors to-date had been proactive and few even were willing to view FEMA as an operational entity as opposed to an organization that served the WH and its minions and policies. Many WH directives to FEMA had been orchestrated by OMB and that was an OMB that wanted FEMA to do as little as possible with respect to funding disaster response and recovery. In fact an argument could be mounted that OMB supported the creation of FEMA only to reduce the federal role in disasters. That did not happen of course. But OMB still tried to accomplish that goal in many direct and indirect ways.
Anyhow I told Mr. Carey that there were a mountain of OGC opinions that opined FEMA had little or no authority to do much of anything. Certainly not be a creative organization in disaster response. So I said that I viewed Mr. Carey's principal client, Director Witt, as more proactive [which he was] and he would have to decide the validity of those prior OGC opinions. The key legal opinions were given by me to the head of the NAPA team that wrote the report "Coping With Castastrophe" released in February 1993. There was a legal appendix to that report that was never published. I have made it available in both the original version and my annotated version to requesters. Largely an opinion by an outstanding and then retired career SES lawyer John Bell it should be required reading for any involved in EM and in particular noting the application of the NAPA report, the appendix, and FEMA OIG reports on Hurricane Andrew in light of Hurricane Katrian response 13 years later.

Mr. Carey chose not to modify the prior opinions but to await Director Witt's requests! Strangely and perhaps necessarily Director Witt made few formal requests to FEMA OGC for opinions. I did have cards printed with the broadest discretionary mandate to him in any FEMA legislation and distributed them to Director Witt in the form of 50 copies of plasticized wallet cards. Director Witt's comment to me on receiving those cards was of interest! He said to me "you mean I have that much authority?" and I replied "yes'!

So back to PKEMRA 2006 as a statute vesting legal authority in the Adminstrator FEMA! Obviously some opining officially or unofficially has been done by the OCC [Office of the Chief Counsel] in FEMA as to authority granted to the Administrator to pre-position and moreover to do even more prior to any declaration. I would like to see that opinion. I would suggest that authority to stockpile could arguably contain authority to utilize but given FEMA past legal opining that would be a revolution. While almost no basis exists for legal challengs to disaster ops that case law so far applies only to the STAFFORD ACT!

Personally I have always favored FEMA leaning forwards ever since having to defend FEMA to GAO in the TMI core-melt accident that was NEVER declared a disaster but much effort was expended in case it had been declared.

National Disaster Recovery Framework [NDRF]

2011-10-27T22:56:00.000-04:00

The NDRF has been posted in the FEMA historical docs section on the home page of this blog thanks to Steve Aftergood of FAS.

That document has now been confirmed as FEMA's effort to fullfill the requirements in the statutory mandate laid down by PKEMRA 2006 that states as follows:

"SEC. 682. NATIONAL DISASTER RECOVERY STRATEGY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator, in coordination with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, State, local, and tribal government officials (including through the National Advisory Council), and representatives of appropriate nongovernmental organizations shall develop, coordinate, and maintain a National Disaster Recovery Strategy to serve as a guide to recovery efforts after major disasters and emergencies.
(b) CONTENTS.—The National Disaster Recovery Strategy
shall—
(1) outline the most efficient and cost-effective Federal programs that will meet the recovery needs of States, local and tribal governments, and individuals and households affected by a major disaster;

(2) clearly define the role, programs, authorities, and responsibilities of each Federal agency that may be of assistance in providing assistance in the recovery from a major disaster;

(3) promote the use of the most appropriate and cost effective building materials (based on the hazards present in an area) in any area affected by a major disaster, with the goal of encouraging the construction of disaster-resistant buildings; and

(4) describe in detail the programs that may be offered by the agencies described in paragraph (2), including—
(A) discussing funding issues;

(B) detailing how responsibilities under the National Disaster Recovery Strategy will be shared; and

(C) addressing other matters concerning the cooperative effort to provide recovery assistance.

(c) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report describing in detail the National Disaster Recovery Strategy and any additional authorities necessary to implement any portion of the National Disaster Recovery Strategy.

(2) UPDATE.—The Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report updating the report submitted under paragraph (1)—

(A) on the same date that any change is made to the National Disaster Recovery Strategy; and

(B) on a periodic basis after the submission of the report under paragraph (1), but not less than once every 5 years after the date of the submission of the report under paragraph (1)."

The NDRF appeared in September 2011. Given the statutes highly specific listing of points to be addressed in the NDRS [national disaster recovery strategy] I find almost no correlation of points covered in the NDRF.

In Wednesday's hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee this disparity was not addressed but Administrator Fugate did state that in accordance with PPD-8 issued last spring changes to the NDRF and other frameworks would be almost continuous.

So stay tuned.

SNOW REMOVAL ASSISTANCE and FEMA

2011-10-24T16:22:00.000-04:00

Okay the Official Hurricane Season ends November 1st although I think should run until December 1st. And now for the snow season.

FEMA and its predecessor organizations had never declared a snow disaster until 1979. President James Earl Carter sent his son "Chip" to Buffalo to determine whether a disaster should be declared. FEMA recommended against declaration for fear of setting a precedent. "CHIP" growing up on a peanut farm in Georgia had never seen snow. Buffalo had 19 feet, yes repeat not an error 19 feet of snow. "CHIP" talked to his dad and recommended a declaration.

Today snow declarations are almost routine. Presidents of both parties have declared them. Another example where the STATES and their local governments are subsidized for activity once theirs to fund.

So as we enter that fun time of year in the Norther Latitudes (and sometimes Southern) in the USA what does FEMA say of this history. See Below!

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Legislative Affairs Division
Telephone: 202-646-4500
Fax: 202-646-3600

Congressional Advisory
November 3, 2009

FEMA PUBLISHES SNOW ASSISTANCE AND SEVERE WINTER STORM POLICY

FEMA has released its final Snow Assistance and Severe Winter Storm Policy effective November 2, 2009. After the public comment period ended on Aug. 25, 2008, FEMA evaluated the potential impact of each comment on the policy, and responded to comments in the Federal Register Notice for the final policy.

Under the policy, snowstorm events will be evaluated by FEMA using the indicators identified in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, for major disaster declarations. FEMA uses these indicators to make recommendations to the President, but it does not bind the ability of the President, in his discretion, to declare emergencies or major disasters.

The policy maintains the present criteria that a county experience a record, or near record, snowfall, but updates the methodology used by FEMA to determine whether a snowfall qualifies as a record or near record snowfall. Under the policy, FEMA will compare the highest National Climatic Data Center historical record in a county (rather than the lowest as currently used) to the National Weather Service (NWS) station with the highest current event snowfall within a county to determine if the snowfall event exceeds or is near a true record for a county.

The final revision made to the policy requires states to submit an estimate of eligible Public Assistance costs, including snow assistance costs for a 48 hour period that meet or exceed the county and statewide per capita cost threshold. Although this requirement is new to FEMA’s Snow Assistance and Severe Winter Storm Policy, an estimate of damages is a normal requirement for all states requesting a major disaster declaration.

The policy, formally titled The Disaster Assistance Directorate Policy Numbers 9100.1 and 9523.1 “Snow Assistance and Severe Winter Storm Policy,” will publish in the Federal Register. The policy supersedes the following:

• The Response and Recovery Policy RR9523.1, “Snow Assistance Policy,” dated Dec. 28, 1999,
• “The Response and Recovery Policy 9523.1, Snow Assistance Policy Procedures for Determining Record or Near-Record Snowfall” Memorandum issued by Carlos J. Castillo on June 30, 2008,
• The Snow Removal section on page 76 of the “Public Assistance Guide FEMA 322/June 2007,” and
• Page 122 of the “Public Assistance Policy Digest FEMA 321/January 2008.”

Statistics and FEMA

2011-10-20T11:13:00.000-04:00

When I was in FEMA it was always of interest to me that FEMA and its components collected mostly meaningless statistics. Disaster outlays on a repeated basis to each county geographic area in the USA was never collected. This might for example be of use in analyzing mitigation efforts.
But now that STATES and their local governments are undergoing severe budget cutbacks it would be of great interest to know exactly how much each state or local government has spent on Emergency Management since say 1990 and what percentage of those expenditures came from Uncle Sugar.
The reason for collecting this statistic is simple. Funding impacts capability. It does appear that between 10-25% of all EM funding in the USA [even including Homeland Security] since 2007 has been eliminated. I think this is a worthy topic for analysis of both academics and practioners. Hoping this will occur.

Teaching at GWU!

2011-10-19T11:43:00.000-04:00

I helped Professor Richard Sylves on Monday night teach 24 grad students taking an intro to EM course at GWU! Interesting class with diverse backgrounds socially, ethnically, and discipline. Just as it should be.

I tossed out two main discussion items left unresolved since FEMA created.

First is FEMA the safety net or 911 for the feds or simply a cooperative and collaborative agency handing out money and information but not much technical assistance?

Second, in the face of declining STATES and their local government capability for many reasons should FEMA do more to help the STATES and their local governments on EM? I suggested that we did NOT need 90,000 local administrative units in the USA.

Other than above mainly gave insights or tried to do so through trivial pursuit--meaning incidents or events from the past that shed light on current EM policies and issues.

And because Rick Sylves asked me to discuss job hunting in EM I sorryfully informed the class that networking and who you know gets the foot in the door for most jobs.

Hey all the men were handsome, and all the women were pretty, and all seemed well above average because that may help in finding a job. Also thanks to Rick for the invite as it was a pleasure and hoping I was at least somewhat informative.

SURGE CAPACITY?

2011-10-05T09:12:00.000-04:00

PKEMRA 2006 effective fully on March 31, 2007 is not a statutory charter for FEMA. It helped stabilize the toying with that DHS component to some degree. But it also in reality granted little new authority to do anything to FEMA and largely imposed more administrative requirements.

Some of its definitions are quite interesting. One follows:
"the term ‘‘surge capacity’’ means the ability to rapidly and substantially increase the provision of search and rescue capabilities, food, water, medicine, shelter and housing, medical care, evacuation capacity, staffing (including disaster assistance employees), and other resources necessary to save lives and protect property during a catastrophic incident; . . ."!

This concept and definition appear nowhere in previous FEMA delegations or chartering statutes. But it is of great interest! Why?

Typically for each Governor any routine or catastrophic disaster is a "Come as you are Party"! This is the case no matter right or wrong. The theory of course [of the Governors] is that you can get away with this operational concept because the federal government will supplement your efforts with whatever you need. The federal government may or may not do this depending on whether a federal disaster or emergency is declared. Efforts to improve mutual aid and even interstate aid through EMAC and other concepts have been deterred because of uncertain funding. It would be helpful if the federal government presumed that all the governors were competent [they clearly are not] and would automatically trigger STAFFORD ACT financial assistance whenever EMAC is triggered. You might say well then the Governors are being given a blank check. In fact however they are not because it is the supplying states governor that has to agree to deployment of his/her state assets and only after the requesting governor agrees to reimbursement of the supplying state. So if the feds automatically reimburse the supplying state perhaps that state will have an incentive to deploy state assets to his/her neighboring states. In fact that is ridiculous. States are too jealous of their resources and uncertain as to what may occur while their states resources are deployed out of state to view federal reimbursement as an incentive to deploy unnecessarily.

When EMAC was signed into law and even before I argued in OGC FEMA for an automatic triggering of federal financial assistance but was of course again a loser in that advocacy. I still believe it was the correct position and believe Congress should trust the governors deploying their critical state assets out of state to make the critical call backed by federal assistance.

By the way EMAC started as a National Guard policy intending to facilitate interstate humanitarian deployment [not law enforcement] of NG asset!

Has the USA's 52nd Largest City Recovered?

2011-10-05T08:29:00.000-04:00

The October 1st edition of the British weekly newspaper the ECONOMIST has an article captioned "Counting the Missing" and discussing the demographics of NOLA! Declining 29% from the last census in 2000 the Economists states the current 2010 decennial census reveals that it had 343,829 inhabitants. Personally I doubt that given the Brookings Institution continuing Katrina analysis and documentation. But even at that it still ranks only number 52 of USA cities. In 1840 according to the article it was the third largest city in the USA.

Well there is no specific way to document when a specific locality has recovered from a disaster. So based on population alone no recovery for NOLA. But I would argue for a different metric! Is that population more or less likely to suffer a reoccurrence of the disaster based on its recovery efforts? This implicitly means of course was the recovery effort wasted. Well in NOLA until the next event no. But if the event is anywhere near a CATEGORY 3-5 hurricane or record flooding on the MISSISSIPPI River or a record meterologic event then NOLA will have been revealed as not a sound investment at all. Those who permanently relocated out of NOLA [an unknown number but estimated to be over 100,000] will have been the wise ones.

And note flood walls are still deficient and internal pumping stations still inadquate even for localized events. The plugging of MRGO continues.

Personally I would give up the notion of NOLA as a port and end maintenance and operation of the OLD RIVER CONTROL structure and thereby eliminate one major threat to NOLA--the Mississippi River. As always could be wrong!

S.1630-Stafford Act Reform Bill

2011-10-03T08:25:00.000-04:00

On September 23rd, Senator Landrieu introduced a bill to reform the Robert T. Stafford Act along with Senator Cochran. Most of this bill could be accomplished adminsitratively and instead of giving or taking away administrative authority it is largely and exercise in futility.
But it does some interesting things that perhaps should be developed more fully by hearings by the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in the Senate. First it substantially documents the states as the weakest link in the federal response and recovery system. Probably the top 1/3rd of STATES have at least some capability to respond to events confined to their state. The middle 1/3 can operate somewhat in that context. And the bottom 1/3 are almost totally incapable of helping their citizens even in an event confined to that state.
The bill would have the federal government document the reasons STATES cannot respond or recover to disasters. Now it is the Governors who largely unreviewed except in the crudest context that determine an event is beyond state capability. The new authority that is already in existence and repeatedly dodged by FEMA and the STATES in the requirement for STATE capability assessments might be very interesting if FEMA was allowed to and able to document STATES waste, fraud, and abuse and inherent factors in prohibiting or restricting adequate response and recovery. A recent report on TEXAS and HURRICANE IKE documents how state mismanagement has delayed recovery. So we all know that many federal programs came out of STATES incompetence or reluctance to modernize or just throwing up their hands and say let Uncle Sugar do it.

So while the bill will go not very far, a hearing on its proposed language and committee oversight of the need for it could be very interesting in an election year. We do know that FEMA is largely a contractor managed agency now as opposed to governmental employees. Key decisions are taken by contractors not FEMA and of course most mission assignments to other federal agencies (OFAs) are performed by that agencies contractors. No one seems to know what these contractors can really accomplish except to bill UNCLE SUGAR. Well perhaps time to refocus the "new" FEMA on preventing disasters and mitigating them rather than encouraging them by reckless administration. AS for the STATES some might do better to just go out of business. And we certainly don't need 90K plus units of local government.

Personal History

2011-09-30T04:09:00.000-04:00

Today marks the completion of a dozen years since I retired from FEMA on October 1, 1999. It also means the VACATION LANE GROUP has been existence 12 years. Happy Birthday VLG!

Landrieu's Stafford Act Reform Bill

2011-09-28T11:02:00.001-04:00

Since GPO [note not GAO] has yet to get the text of S. 1630 up on the Thomas.loc.gov website here is more background:

For Immediate Release
September 23, 2011
Contact:
Rob Sawicki, Landrieu, (202) 224-4893
Chris Gallegos, Cochran, (202) 224-6414

Landrieu, Cochran Introduce Stafford Act Reform Legislation
WASHINGTON –United States Senators Mary L. Landrieu, D-La., and Thad Cochran, R-Miss., today introduced legislation aimed at improving the nation’s capability to recover from major and catastrophic disasters by reforming the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
The bill, which is called the Disaster Recovery Act of 2011, builds on recommendations from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the National Emergency Management Association, the International Association of Emergency Managers, the Association of State Floodplain Managers, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Commission on Children and Disasters and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD).
“As a Senator from Louisiana, I have witnessed numerous systemic failures, misguided policies, and squandered opportunities in the way we go about facilitating community recovery after a disaster and dedicated myself as a result of those experiences to fixing these problems,” Sen. Landrieu said. “This legislation will ensure the federal government has the right tools in its toolbox to help communities recover from disasters in a smarter and more efficient way.”
“Hurricanes Katrina and Rita taught us some hard lessons. We learned that existing federal law is ill-suited to facilitate long-term recovery from catastrophic incidents. Over the past six years, we have often been forced to work on an ad hoc, congressionally-led basis to overcome the shortcomings and bureaucratic red tape built into the current law,” Sen. Cochran said. “Our bipartisan disaster recovery legislation takes what we’ve learned from the ongoing Katrina and Rita recovery efforts to improve future long-term disaster recovery from disasters of such magnitude.”
The Stafford Act authorizes various forms of federal assistance to state and local governments, certain nonprofit organizations and individuals in the event of a Presidentially-declared emergency or disaster. Since its enactment in 1988, it has been significantly revised by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. While these changes have strengthened FEMA’s capacity to support hazard mitigation and emergency response, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita revealed inadequacies in the law's ability to support comprehensive disaster recovery.
The bill would reform the Stafford Act by doing the following:
• Establishing pre-conditions and special procedures for a new catastrophic disaster declaration that would trigger more intensive tracking of funds, use of recovery metrics to measure return on federal investments, and a coordination structure to reduce waste, close recovery gaps, and ensure that programs work in unison rather than silos. The scale of the damage and the volume of federal funding that follow catastrophic events requires better management, transparency and accountability.
• Re-authorizing two expired pilot programs from the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act for rental housing and debris removal that were determined by FEMA and GAO to save taxpayers money and expedite recovery
• Providing incentives for state and local governments to adopt and enforce building codes, develop pre-incident recovery plans and pre-negotiate contracts. This will reduce damages and strengthen local capacity, which is why these ideas have support from Republicans in the House of Representatives and the insurance industry.
• Helping the environment by allowing locals to keep proceeds from recycled debris and encouraging energy-efficient rebuilding designs
• Addressing the unique needs of children in disasters, which will allow parents to get back to work and focus on rebuilding their home or business.
• Making the application process for public assistance more user-friendly for state and local governments with the help of a catalog of disaster programs and a consolidated application for federal recovery assistance
• Streamlining regulations and reducing bureaucratic waste by consolidating requirements for environmental, historic and benefit-cost reviews across different federal agencies for recovery projects.
• Improving training, certification, delivery models and information sharing for case management and crisis counseling and the faith-based groups and nonprofit organizations that provide these services.
• Establishing credentialing, training and evaluation requirements for FEMA employees, strengthening contractor oversight, requiring staffing plans for catastrophes, establishing project transfer procedures for rotating personnel, and encouraging the use of local hires in recovery field offices.
• Eliminating a perverse incentive in the law to use high-priced contract labor for emergency work instead of local government employees, which will save the federal government millions of dollars.
• Codifying temporary legislative measures that were enacted to facilitate a smarter recovery after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, including third-party arbitration of prolonged disputes and lump sum payments for criminal justice systems, school districts and other facility owners to strategically plan their reconstruction program without having to rebuild every structure to its pre-disaster condition in the exact same location.
The bill introduction comes just one day before the sixth anniversary of Hurricane Rita. At its peak intensity, Hurricane Rita was the strongest storm ever to have entered the Gulf of Mexico, breaking a record set only three weeks earlier by Hurricane Katrina. When the skies cleared, Rita ranked as the third-most-expensive natural disaster in U.S. history.

As the news release states:
"The bill, which is called the Disaster Recovery Act of 2011, builds on recommendations from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the National Emergency Management Association, the International Association of Emergency Managers, the Association of State Floodplain Managers, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Commission on Children and Disasters and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD)."

It would be of great help if the full text of any written comments from the above furnished Ms. Landrieu would be posted on her office website or perhaps made available in the extension of remarks of the Congressional record. And those having OMB approval should be separately listed from those that were informally provided to Ms. Landrieu.

The President's Disaster Relief Fund [DRF]

2011-09-28T02:02:00.000-04:00

Some may think that FEMA saved the day on the budget impass looming for last several weeks over Washington. Why? The DRF supposedly was almost empty. Then just the day before yesterday FEMA revealed it had adequate funds to carry on a few more days. The Fiscal Year 2011 ends on Friday of course and at midnight the 1st of October Fiscal Year 2012 begins with most of the Executive Branch without an approved appropriation act. The DRF of course is a revolving no-year fund which is why even the National Security STATE has tried to get its hands on it for many years.

But FEMA has as many as 1000 open disasters for which funds have been obligated. It could deobligate some of those funds at any time to fund higher priority projects or even focus on response not recovery. At least for a short period.

During my time in FEMA few if any knew the exact status of the DRF or the rate of payout at any given time. So praise for FEMA if it now has strict accounting and management controls over the PRESIDENT's DRF. After all the President does not have the time to do it. Why is it that somehow I still doubt the DRF has adequate financial controls and is administered properly? Well after all it is a relief program right, not an investment program? Apparently Senators Cochrane and Landieu want to make recovery an investment program with their new legislative initiative. I guess new federal investment in the low tax states of Louisiana and Mississippi usally far down on the lists of states in their efforts to help all their citizens believe their states deserving of all the repetitive disaster assistance poured out year after year. YUP! I will agree that without FEMA these two states would be in even bigger trouble. But when is enough enough? Perhaps FEMA might prepare a report on total disaster outlays since 1950 to all the states and rank based on population vis a vis dollars. Now that would be some statistic. But hey probably would have to be classified by DHS and its minions. The terrorists might find out what mother nature has always known--No variances for these states from their hazards!

Contagion-The Movie

2011-09-26T23:53:00.001-04:00

In the recently released movie "Contagion" FEMA is only mentioned once. Perhaps I missed other references. But in that reference I do remember FEMA's only role in a Pandemic situation is to provide emergency food to the population. Assuming that MASS CARE which now has FEMA in the lead and support from the ARC [American Red Cross] and involves mass evacuation, feeding, sheltering, and emergency medical care perhaps this reference is correct.

However look at the Department of Agricultural role in E.O. 12656 as currently amended and in a so-called NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY [note none has ever been declared and that term exists nowhere in the US Code] AG does have the emergency feeding role.

So my question is who or what organization is set up to feed the populace in crisis management situations? In most cases food on grocery shelves requires restocking every 3 days. Given theft and hoarding it might not even last 3 days before shelves are bare. Worth a study? I think so. My understanding is that there are three domestic manufacturers of MRE but not sure and not sure of international production sources.

BY THE WAY I HIGHLY RECOMMEND SEEING THE MOVIE!

NDRF and PPD-8

2011-09-25T13:51:00.000-04:00

I am reliably informed that FEMA believes that the language that follows allowed them to ignore the statutory mandated National Disaster Recovery Strategy mandate in PKEMRA 2006:

"The national preparedness system shall include a series of
integrated national planning frameworks , covering prevention,
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The frameworks
shall be built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable
coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities
to deliver the necessary capabilities . The frameworks shall be
coordinated under a unified system with a common terminology and
approach, built around basic plans t hat support the all - hazards
approach to preparedness and functional or incident annexes
to describe any unique requirements for particular threats or
scenarios, as needed . Each framework shall describe how actions
taken in the framework are coordinated with relevant actions
described in the other frameworks across the preparedness
spectrum.

I respectfully disagree and wonder if Congress was so notified. I also note that the new NDRF does not comply with the language above. Why is FEMA so poorly administered that a statutory mandate that would be helpful to FEMA and the members of the Federal Copmmunity not be complied with by FEMA?

National Disaster Recovery Framework

2011-09-23T08:22:00.000-04:00

Okay is it too much to ask for basic honesty in FEMA with respect to the various documents it issues? For example Congress called for a National Disaster Recovery Strategy in PKEMRA 2006 and apparently this recently issued FRAMEWORK is the response. Ignoring title and non-references to the statutory mandate or even prior drafts or other key documents like the lengthy SENATE letter to FEMA on the first draft of the Strategy why don't these documents indicate level of signoff, whether other federal agencies (OFA) or NGO's given review time for final version and whether prepared with assistance of a contractor or outside organization?

IMO all this helps to evaluate the potential usefulness of the document. I wonder if those struggling to recover in the North EAST after Hurricane Irene will find this document of ANY relevance or materiality to their current recovery efforts.

And why is this document not noticed for availability in the FEDERAL REGISTER? It does not have to be published full text there but given a response [at least in part] to a statutory mandate why not notice it officially?

FEMA is always dying for failure to get the details correct and wonder why this has been the entirety of its history!

My Facebook Page

2011-09-22T11:09:00.000-04:00

Please note that not all postings to my FACEBOOK page are related to FEMA, EMERGENCY Management, Crisis Management or disaster relief and recovery. Some are but often just article of interest on which I add a cryptic comment. Enjoy and remember their are some security issues with FACEBOOK that have NOT been fixed.

A Decade Later--State Capability Assessments

2011-09-19T07:13:00.000-04:00

On October 25, 2001 the following FACT SHEET was issued by FEMA Public Affairs:

"

October 25, 2001

FACT SHEET

State Terrorism Capability Assessment

In coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is conducting an assessment of State terrorism capabilities in order to determine the capability of States to respond to terrorist attacks. State governments already have effective all-hazards emergency management programs in place. However, in order to ensure that States are ready to adequately respond in the event of future terrorist attacks, we need to know their current levels of readiness and where enhancements are needed.

As announced by FEMA Director Joe M. Allbaugh at a White House press conference on October 19, 2001, this assessment will be conducted jointly between the Federal Government and the States in order to establish an accurate reading of readiness capability. The assessment is being conducted through FEMA’s ten regional offices and includes representatives from other federal departments and agencies. These interagency teams will visit each State and work face-to-face to conduct the assessment. The State Emergency Management Directors have been asked to include other emergency management and public officials, including the National Guard, in order to get a full assessment of the States’ capabilities. The data that is collected in the assessment will be used by FEMA and the Office of Homeland Security to identify areas in State readiness capabilities that need improvement for planning and budgetary purposes. This information will be transmitted to Governor Tom Ridge, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, on November 19, 2001.

Director Allbaugh will continue to work closely with Governor Ridge on the response posture of the States as well as on other issues regarding Homeland Security. FEMA is a critical link in the President’s establishment of a homeland security program. FEMA is unique in the Federal Government because of its role in saving lives and protecting property, its linkages with State, Tribal and local emergency management functions, and its partnership with first responders. Governor Ridge has been and will continue to rely on FEMA to support the Nation’s homeland security program.

For further information, or if you have any questions, please contact FEMA’s Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs Division on 202/646-4500."

Okay that first post 9/11/01 state capability assessment was never released publically. Why not do so now and issue and updated assessments? We do know that one STATE capability assessment conducted about 2005-2006 utilizing SLG-101 but not the excellent Attachment G to that document issued in April 2001 focusing on Terrorism flunked almost 60% of the STATES. The SLG 101 had been issued in 1996. So now a new CPG-101 has been issued replacing SLG-101 but not mentioning Attachment G. Some state capability assessment has been conducted and reported to higher-ups in DHS and the WH and the Congress. Those assessments are not encouraging.

I have posted before on how some states are weak sisters in the efforts to participate in reducing the threat of terrorism. About $31B has gone out since 9/11/01 to the STATES and their local governments [this does NOT include health
preparedness]! No one seems to know what that investment bought.

Perhaps time for Congressional oversight of both STATE CAPABILITY and FEMA grants!

Extension of the NFIP--And meaningless measures?

2011-09-14T12:09:00.001-04:00

IN sixteen days the NFIP authority to issue new policies or renew policies expires. I am predicting despite passage of bills in both House and Senate that a relatively clean 5 year extension will take place. Most of the measures could now occur by administrative actions but for almost two decades the NFIP managers have largely allowed Congress to dictate any changes to the NFIP administrative structure. Those measures have largely been repudiated by actual flooding events and the new ones are likely to do so also.

Despite a highly publicized effort to gather comments from many sources on NFIP reform [I myself submitted over 25] as far as I know the Administration submitted no recommendations on suggested legislative action.

In summary again the program has left behind the current managers and the competence of the Congressional staffs and lobbying interests to reform the NFIP and now it is at its highest risk ever as all begin to realize it did not impact disaster outlays from Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee in particular in Vermont, NY, and New Jersey.

Well time will tell whether my crystal ball is clouded.

Is FEMA the Little Engine That Could?

2011-09-10T06:34:00.000-04:00

Just as the one-eyed man is King in the land of the blind, FEMA when solvent has often punched well beyond its superficial weight in times of catastrophe and disaster. Why? It had bucks while other agencies did not and especially when fourth quarter events occurred, like September 11th, 2001, or Hurricane Katrina late August 2005.
Well with less than $900 billion in the DRF it is now certain that the massive number of declarations of disasters and emergencies stemming from various events from drought to Hurricane Irene and the slow-moving Tropical Storm Lee have presented an opportunity for both parties to really force the American public to understand the standoff in Washington. FEMA ops are currently being drastically impacted by the shortage of funding in the DRF [Disaster Relief Fund] no matter what W. Craig Fugate say on the record. With the daily Federal Register increasing the number of declared emergencies and disasters the ball has been kicked at the heads of the Congress in both houses who much put up or shut up on funding FEMA now, not sometime next year.

And of course the first instinct of Congress is to cut funding to other FEMA and DHS programs NOW and in the forthcoming fiscal year. So FEMA may move from stepchild in DHS to pariah as other DHS managers view FEMA as vampire. Yes, Eloise! To some degree Executive Branch budgets are a zero sum game. What one agency gets another does not.

A fascinating time to watch the FEDERAL Government see if it can govern, its basic purpose of course. And the ranks of those politicians that wish to govern as opposed to posturing have dwindled in numbers to the smallest percentage in US history. Why? The incumbents want to stay in Washington where the overwhelming number of lobbyists keep them wined and dined and corrupted even while the American people suffer drought and floods and other impacts from natural and man made hazards such as energy grid failures and pipeline explosions.

Drought and Fire!

2011-09-09T08:23:00.000-04:00

The NWS has recorded the JUNE,JULY, AUGUST period as the lowest recorded rainfall for the entirety of the STATE of TEXAS in its history. Wildland fires have impacted urban areas there and elsewhere this year.

On its formation a Department of Agriculture, DOD, Interior Dept and FEMA MOU was signed on fire issues. Then lost to memory. By the time James Lee Witt arrived FEMA did not have organizational memory of that MOU or it past roles in fighting fire or the URBAN/Wildfire interface as now called.

Director Witt was actually on Long Island, NY, directing C-130s with chemical firefighting retardant when he was informed that FEMA was not in charge. GAO reviewed the issue and concluded that the current firefighting system was broke and suggested updating. Essentially concluding that FEMA had been trying to help and done the correct thing in doing so.

Some forget that firefighting is specifically addressed in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 100-707, that repealed in part, supplemented in part, and revised in part the Disaster Relief Act of 1974,
Public Law 93-238.

Also in the Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, as amended, is authority for a specific reimbursement program for firefighting on federal property and that authority implemented by 44 CFR Part 150.

All of this documented by the OGC of the independent FEMA when the US sued California for losses caused by activity of California state authorities in starting fires impacting federal property and eventually that case lost because DOJ in its ignorance lost it on a Statute of Limitations argument by California even though it helped to ensure that DOJ was up-to-date on Statute of Limitations affecting its affirmative litigation. The largest caseload of that nature is the US to recover damages from third parties who have injured active duty service personnel.

But all this deserves close Congressional and WH review before an Australian type situation burns its way into the USA news.

And good luck TEXAS because some experts think this is a 50 year drought or longer.

Maybe FEMA should stay in DHS but MITIGATION and the NFIP should GO !t gta

2011-09-08T08:19:00.001-04:00

GAO has issued a 226 pp report on the efforts of DHS since its formation. No mention of the word "mitigation" or "Prevention" or "resilience"! Suggest all start by reading Footnote #13!

IN any event it is clear that the NFIP should be immediately removed from DHS and with the SENATE marking up an NFIP extension bill this AM now is the time. The insurance aspects should go to the Treasury Department. The mapping and mitigation activity should go to NOAA and in particular as climate change starts to dominate issues in the NFIP.

FEMA may have barely survived incorporation into DHS but MITIGATION and the NFIP were largely destroyed. Since those efforts are largely technically driven and not subject to being analyzed as a law enforcement, homeland security, or homeland defense function it is more and more crucial that the NFIP and MITIGATION team be extracted as soon as possible from DHS.

And sad to say the ignorance and lack of capability of
GAO on insurance and mitigation policies and issues looms larger and larger with each passing year.

The life and death of the NFIP despite recent extensive and dramatic riverine and inland flooding from Hurricane Irene and other storms will be driven by federal coastal policies. The riverine and inland flooding of the NFIP should cease completely after a 5-10 year transition program to STATES and their local governments.

THE TIME TO BEGIN IS NOW--SEPTEMBER 2011!

FEMA--An investor or a relief agency?

2011-09-06T08:17:00.000-04:00

It is interesting that the Public Works Committees in the Congress often view their authorizations and appropriations as "Investments" in the future of the USA. Yet their oversight of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 100-707) that repealed in part, supplemented in part and modified in part the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-288) is never viewed as other statutes under those committees jurisdiction as an "investment"!

Perhaps the reason is that disaster funds don't ever get studied for an ROI [return on investment] is because of the 3100 county geographic areas in the USA the ones that receive most of the disaster monies year by year are the top 500 by level of relief since 1950.

Just as the NFIP [National Flood Insurance Program] has paid out over 30% of its claims to properties receiving damages from floods over and over, the federal disaster program often is paying out again and again to the same county geographic areas.

So as we (the USA) looks for cost savings in federal programs perhaps mitigation and prevention might become more important in the disaster relief effort by focusing on the problems and prospects of the top 500 geographic county areas. Does investment in NOLA for example make sense?

One Week to Go until First DECADE After 9/11/01 is Past!

2011-09-04T11:36:00.000-04:00

It would be of interest if an exact accounting could be done of federal expenditures on NYC for post 9/11/01 response and recovery and a comparison after just six (6) years for Post-Katrina response and recovery. Casualties of course were over double in NYC. No measure there. Some deaths [about 167]at the Pentagon on that day.

The stories and articles and books about this first decade are multiplying day by day and of course what might be of interest is new information that they contain on events leading up to, during, and after 9/11/01 concerning the federal response.

What some may have forgotten is the SNIPER attacks in the fall of 2001 and the Anthrax attacks.

Would you be surprised to find out that health preparedness funding post the Anthrax attacks exceeds the STATE and their local governments preparedness funding by various FEMA grants [$2.1B just announced for this year]that are now estimated to be about $31B with little known of the end result of those grants in enhancing preparedness.
A recent article noted that California had purchased over 40 large screen TVs for emergency preparedness and homeland security that somehow disappeared into Californian organizations unrelated to the purposes for which the grants made.

My estimate is about $45B has gone out to STATES and their local governments for health preparedness but that result also questionable as budget reductions continue to impact staff and capability built in the STATES and Their local governments since the Anthrax attacks and enactment of the May 2002 law enhancing health preparedness.

And noting for the record a new leader for FEMA's REP activity and the North ANNA reactors in Virginia still in off status since the earthquake nearby.

Tropical Storm Lee has so far been less intense than predicted but has dropped about 10 inches of rain across the mid-southland with more to follow.

FEMA, NOLA and SIX YEARS AFTER Katrina!

2011-09-03T08:47:00.000-04:00

I have posted several new docs on this blog under FEMA Historical info on the homepage including a September 11th, 2007 on the organizational changes implemented by DHS to comply with the PKEMRA 2006. Note it is a Chertoff letter to Congress not a FEMA letter. That distinction is made because even today FEMA has not fully internalized the reorganizations of DHS that impacted its current organization. But that will be shown perhaps by the impacts of Tropical Storm Lee on NOLA.

Tropical Storm Lee may dump up to 20 inches of rain on Southern Louisiana and Missisippi.

For NOLA the result could be further calamity because while the USACOE did make some effort post-Katrina USACOE has largely not been in on the design of internal drainage for NOLA nor its implementation or operation. Seldom mentioned in analysis of Katrina and its collapse of NOLA flood walls is the difficiency in internal drainage for NOLA.

Will NOLA need a second post-Hurricane Betsy [1965] rebuilding only to be destroyed again?

The "NEW" FEMA struggles and juggles!

2011-09-01T07:31:00.000-04:00

Away for a few days with a power outage. The DRF [Presidents disaster relief fund] down under a billion. So immediate needs only funded.

And a Category 1 hurricane is NOT a test of the new FEMA. Let's see how the month of September plays out.

NFIP Reform Suggestion!

2011-08-26T11:54:00.001-04:00

Here is suggestion that many might disagree with who are in favor of strong effective floodplain management. Yet it is based on the long run which is the way the NFIP should be evaluated. 42 years still too short a period of record to determine the programs efficacy in accomplishing its purposes. And if flood walls in NOLA had not collapsed due to federal, States and their local governments negligence the NFIP would not be so far in debt. So here is the proposal:

The NFIP is composed of several statutes all codified at 42 USC Section 4001 and following. All are part of Chapter 50 of TITLE 42 captioned "National Flood Insurance"!

Current section 4023 reads as follows:

"No new flood insurance coverage shall be provided under this Chapter for any property which the Director finds State or local zoning authority, or other authorized public body, to be in violation of STATE or local laws, regulations, or ordinances which are intended to discourage or otherwise restrict land development or occupancy in floodprone areas"

Here is my suggested rewrite (and note this could be done administratively by delegation of NFIP authority to each Governor thereby avoiding a need for legislation):

NO NEW FLOOD INSURANCE OR RENEWAL OF FLOOD INSURANCE SHALL BE PROVIDED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR FEMA FOR ANY PROPERTY REPORTED TO FEMA BY ANY GOVERNOR THAT HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THAT GOVERNOR OR HIS OR HER DELEGATE TO BE IN VIOLATION OF STATE OR LOCAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, OR ORDINANCES THAT ARE INTENDED TO DISCOURAGE OR OTHERWISE RESTRICT HAZARDOUS DEVELOPMENT OR OCCUPANCY OF FLOODPRONE AREAS."

Over time FEMA and the states would be able to determine what states and their local governments are worthy of federal subsidy for existing structures in return for restrictions on future hazardous development.

Draft National Preparedness goal in RESPONSE to PPD-8!

2011-08-25T23:02:00.000-04:00

Okay folks how did FEMA come up with this metric:

"To fully establish the core capability requirements for the nation in both response and 21 recovery, we need to focus beyond any single threat or hazard. We must recognize that the complex environment of disasters includes cascading events that combined can stress the abilities of our Nation. Therefore, in order to ensure that these core capabilities can be delivered / performed in the shortest possible time and under all conditions, a set of planning factors can be used to create a composite or “meta-scenario” that illustrates the anticipated stresses on our core capabilities. The numbers identified in the meta-scenario were derived from modeling efforts for multiple high impact incidents and reviewing using the strategic national risk assessment. The following summarizes the meta-scenario that will be used to drive national-level response and 29 recovery planning efforts:
There is a no-notice event impacting a population of seven million within a 25 thousand square mile area. The impacted area includes several states across multiple regions. Severe damage is projected to critical infrastructure including essential transportation infrastructure. Ingress and egress options are severely limited. The projected number of fatalities is 195,000 during the initial hours of the event. It is projected that 265,000 survivors will require emergency medical attention. At least 25 percent of the impacted population will require mass care, emergency sheltering, and housing assistance."

The 10 Most Important Management Calls IN FEMA History!

2011-08-24T09:10:00.001-04:00

I am going to utilize the period from April 1, 1979 to September 1, 2011 for this listing even though there legally was no FEMA between March 1,2003 and March 31, 2007.

So here are my top ten management calls in all of FEMA history!

1. John Macy's insistence that FEMA appointees and civil servants should be generalists and not expert in some field.

2. The failure of Louis O. Guiffrida to document publically that most of his new Preparedness and Civil Defense initiatives stemmed from Carter classified directives.

3. Director Guiffrida's decision to refer to DOJ a law suit over flood plain management against NOLA, and Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisian in 1981.

4. Director Guiffrida's cooperation in establishing the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board and helping NSC issue NSDD-47 (1982)!

5. Director Julius Becton's not caving to NRC when his Region II staff found the first Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant exercise inadequate for FEMA to give a reasonable assurance finding to LILCO and the NRC and defending that decision in the lengthiest adminstrative law proceeding in NRC history.

6. Director Julius Becton ordering and assisting in establishing and completion of the First and Last FEMA Capability Assessment (1988)!

7. Grant Peterson taking the Federal Response Plan for Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake(adopted 1987) and turning it into the FEDERAL RESPONSE Plan (adopted 1992)over the opposition of his senior career civil servants!

8. Director Wallace B. Stinckney's decision to ask President George H.W. Bush to relieve him of any role as PFO in Hurricane Andrew (1992).

9. Director James Lee Witt's decision to remove the personnel security clearances from over 40% of FEMA staff.

10. Director Joseph Allbaugh's decision to allow the George W. Bush administration to reduce FEMA staff by over 60%!

"Deadly Indifference" book by Michael Brown and Ted Scharz (2011)

2011-08-22T08:36:00.004-04:00

A Book Review and Critique of

DEADLY INDIFFERENCE-The Perfect (Political) Storm-Hurricane Katrina, the Bush White House and Beyond (219 pp)

By Michael D. Brown and Ted Schwarz

Published by Taylor Trade Publishing (2011)
ISBN 978-1-58979-485-6 (cloth)
ISBN 978-1-58979-486-3 (electronic)

An interesting selection of title by former Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response of the Department of Homeland Security Michael D. Brown. Mr. Brown also served as the General Counsel of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Deputy Director of FEMA before its statutory abolition by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 effective for that purpose on March 1, 2003, when Mr. Brown became Under Secretary. In those positions Mr. Brown served as a Presidential appointee of President George W. Bush.

The book serves as documentation in part and apologia in part for the learning curve experienced by Mr. Brown ending shortly after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005.

Disclosure: I worked at FEMA from September 10, 1979 until October 1, 1999. From April 1, 1979 until September 10, 1979 I ran FEMA’s litigation under IAA between FEMA and HUD. I never worked for Mr. Brown.

Even now Mr. Brown is somewhat ambivalent about both his role and those he served during his time in office. He does give substantial evidence that he was at least as qualified as some other FEMA General Counsels, Deputy Directors, and Under Secretaries in DHS. Personally I believe he was qualified to lead FEMA during his time in office. Many would disagree with that conclusion but my standards may be different because I have seen so many totally incompetent and some corrupt political appointees during over 30 years of federal service. The problem of course is that high level federal jobs are not easy jobs and the learning curve for all is very steep. Leadership of the nation’s premier organization to response and recovery from disasters given its statutory and other parameters is one of the toughest. Thus, even those with the best of preparation, intention, high intellect and motivation may well fail and often have. I have posted notes on each FEMA Director on my blog at Vacation Lane Blog and that process is not yet complete.

The first failure of Mr. Brown was his lack of understanding of the aphorism “Beware the Trust of Princes” because ultimately it was those above Mr. Brown not below that undercut his potential success during Hurricane Katrina. Second, was his failure to understand the USACOE (Corps of Engineers) and its long history in the NOLA area and the problems it solved and created.
Mr. Brown should have been expert on NOLA because of what some may find unusual. FEMA had with the cooperation of the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against two Parishes in the NOLA area in 1981. It had referred NOLA (when NOLA referred to it means Orleans Parish) itself to DOJ at the same time. DOJ declined to file suit against NOLA when USACOE argued successfully that its operations in the New Orleans District would not bear scrutiny and becoming entangled in a civil lawsuit where extensive disclosure and discovery of its problems would not help its long term efforts in that area. I would argue that USACOE which is largely a contractor led operation with a very thin military and civilian overlay was actually corrupt as was the City of New Orleans government generally, as well as various Levee Districts, and the State of Louisiana itself.

The bottom line on that lawsuit was a formal consent order susceptible to long term enforcement and oversight and some monetary recovery as well as informal accounting to the defendants by me that in meeting over 40 opposing lawyers with a single DOJ attorney now deceased I warned that unless the defendants and NOLA area generally treated their flood hazards with the almost military precision of the Dutch they would be under water. That is pretty much what happened. One specific suggestion we made public was that all pumping stations in the NOLA area have their electric standby generators fueled and operated on the roof tops of the building housing them. As do the Dutch which are the source of most of the large pumps in the NOLA area.

But of course I am also sure that few if any in FEMA OGC understood that past effort when Mr. Brown arrived as General Counsel in spring 2001. Nor has FEMA had an active subrogation effort with large cases since I left as the Associate General Counsel for Litigation in 1986. That transfer of position by me was to assist in making sure that the National Security portfolio of FEMA and its REPP (Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program) did not end FEMA’s existence as an independent agency.

So first of all I would argue that given FEMA’s history substantive knowledge of NOLA and Louisiana in FEMA’s programs was something that Mr. Brown should have known cold. It is certainly true that one of the most knowledgeable Congressional delegations about FEMA was that from Louisiana and the NFIP might have been the key federal program for those who have property protected by insurance in all of Louisiana. And ultimately FEMA lives and dies politically by its Gulf of Mexico coastal states. In fact it largely acts as a special subsidy to those states for their negligence in locating properties in hazardous areas and allowing improper and inappropriate construction.

Second, Mr. Brown probably should have left when Joseph Allbaugh departed from the government when he realized he would no longer be what is called a direct report to the President. No FEMA Director without a personal history with the current President has been a total success in their job. This has been documented overtime even in academic analysis. Mr. Brown had no personal history with the President.

Third, FEMA had attrited in both staff and funding during the years from 2001 to 2005 with its Deputy former Admiral Harvey Johnson testifying under oath that one day before Katrina made landfall FEMA had less than 1500 permanent full time staff on board.
Under it prior peak staffing it had close to 3700 permanent full time staff and today has almost 5000. It also has a large cadre of temporary employees under various labels. The largest being called DAEs (Disaster Assistance Employees).

Mr. Brown lays out his relations with two DHS Secretaries, first Tom Ridge (former Governor of Pennsylvania) and then Michael Chertoff. Both are intelligent men with very different backgrounds. Secretary Chertoff had a brilliant history in the criminal justice system before his time at DHS. Unfortunately, the skills of Ridge and Chertoff were not those needed for handling large scale catastrophic events, nor were Mr. Brown. And certainly the President himself was not up to a domestic crisis the size and scope of Hurricane Katrina. In President Bush’s home state of TEXAS the National Guard and the USACOE handle most of the disaster work and has quite a weak EM (emergency management) regime. That regime is what former Governor Bush and Joseph Allbaugh were used to from their time in TEXAS. During his father’s administration when FEMA suffered through Hurricane Hugo (1989) and the Loma Prieta Earthquake (1989) and Hurricane Andrew (1982) FEMA’s performance was always somewhat questionable. And in fact Bush’s Vice President hated FEMA and had encouraged its abolition that could well have occurred if George H.W. Bush had won the fall 1992 election. And it should be noted that 95% of all nation-states use their military for disaster response and recovery. This of course is largely to ensure that existing power structures are maintained including political leadership. And these issues impact a civilian FEMA as documented in DEADLY INDIFFERENCE.

I hope that Mr. Brown had read the NAPA study published in February 1993 entitled “Coping with Catastrophe” because it nailed many of the issues addressed by Mr. Brown in his book. I have long recommended that a copy be given to each new FEMA employee whether full time or temporary followed by Q&A sessions on its contents and recommendations.

It must always be remembered that federal programs are political solutions to perceived or actual problems and are not conceived with efficiency and effectiveness as their primary object. FEMA is no exception in this regards.

So finally what Mr. Brown faced is in some cases generations of neglect or waste, fraud, and abuse in federal programs operated on the coast of the GOM but also in the STATES and their local governments. Even now the Louisiana delegation tries to get FEMA to make up for the failures of government in the NOLA area and other parts of the state.

And Mr. Brown apparently in his entire time in FEMA did nothing to resolve officially whether FEMA is just a cooperative and collaborative agency that hands out money and information to all or the federal systems ultimate “safety net” that must do it all when all others fail.

My bottom line is that this book should be read by all and all should draw their own conclusions.

First Anniversary of Death of Jerry Strope

2011-08-18T12:19:00.002-04:00

Death Notice for Walmer “Jerry” Strope of Mount Holly Virginia

“Jerry” passed quietly on August 15, 2010 in Richmond Virginia at MCV Hospital. A long time resident of Glebe Harbor, Westmoreland County, VA, Jerry was actively engaged in research and writing on radiological issues throughout the last decades of his life. A full scholarship graduate of the leading naval architecture and engineering college in the US, the WEBB INSTITUTE in New York City, Jerry received his degree at the outbreak of WWII and was immediately employed by the Department of the Navy as a civilian naval Architect and engineer, Jerry during WWII held various responsible positions in the Department of the Navy and eventually became the head of Radiological Defense research for the US Navy. After leaving the Department of the Navy, Jerry was further employed by the Department of Defense as head of research for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and independent agency housed in the Department of Defense, Jerry led efforts to conduct research and defenses for the civilian population of the United States for those organizations. Thus, Jerry’s efforts led to the adoption not only of many specific civil defense policies but his research as an individual and as an administrator led to many breakthroughs in the knowledge of mankind on radiological and health physics impacts on humans and specific approaches to limiting the impacts should a nuclear strategic exchange have occurred. Is specific knowledge, innovations in research, research design and administration helped to protect the national security of the United States throughout the Cold War.
Jerry was also a respected technical advisor to many Congressional Committees throughout his life and the Committee On the President Danger headed and established by the Honorable Paul Nitze, and remained influential throughout his life for his technical knowledge. After leaving the federal government in the late 1960’s he became a principal in the Center For Planning and Research, Inc. of Palo Alto California and Fairfax Virginia. That organization acted as the Federally Funded Research and Development Center for the federal civil defense program which existed from 1950 to 1994 pursuant to Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress.
Throughout the decades of the 1980’s, and 90’s Jerry wrote a newsletter and was President of the American Strategic Defense Association which was an influential voice in both nuclear strategic policy and defense and constantly made its readers aware of emerging threats.
The impact of “Jerry” Walmer Strope on the radiological defense and National Security of the United States cannot be overemphasized. He was close personal friends with the giants of the development of the atomic age, including Jerome Wigner and Edward Teller.

IS THE NRF FEMA'S TO FIX? NO!

2011-08-18T08:40:00.002-04:00

The Federal Response Plan that existed from May 1992 until replaced by the National Response Plan (since warped into the NRF) still does not allow the USA to leverage all its resources and respond to catastrophic situations. Where was this issue first identified officially and why has it not been fixed?

See:

United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division
B-253822
July 23, 1993
Congressional Requesters

The nation's management of catastrophic disasters was intensely criticized
after Hurricane Andrew leveled much of South Florida and Hurricane Iniki
destroyed much of the Hawaiian island of Kauai in 1992. Prior to these
storms, other major disasters, such as Hurricane Hugo and the Loma
Prieta earthquake in 1989, also generated intense criticism of the federal
response effort. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the
lead federal agency for disaster management, responds to many smaller
natural disasters every year without extensive public scrutiny. Unlike the
bulk of the disasters requiring FEMA to respond, however, catastrophic
disasters overwhelm the ability of state, local, and voluntary agencies to
adequately provide victims with essential services, such as food and water,
within 12 to 24 hours. The response to Hurricane Andrew raised doubts
about whether FEMA is capable of responding to catastrophic disasters and
whether it had learned any lessons from its responses to Hurricane Hugo
and the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
Congressional requesters asked us to examine the adequacy of the federal
strategy for responding to catastrophic disasters and to develop solutions
for improving it Since January of this year, we have presented the results
of our work at hearings before five Senate and House Committees and
Subcommittees.l This report summarizes our analyses, conclusions,
recommendations, and matters for congressional consideration presented
at those hearings."

So why has this not been fixed by the powers that be? Because they all hope it does not happen on their watch! Get to work ALL!

For a companion post go to http://www.vactionlanegrp.wordpress.com

Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina-PKEMRA 2006

2011-08-16T07:58:00.000-04:00

It has been suggested that the report of the
White House--Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina--underlies Congressional efforts leading to enactment of the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. That statute became effective fully on March 31, 2007. It also led to the departure of Under Secretary George Foresman from DHS.

Chapter 5 of the report discusses in detail critical challenges derived from the federal response and is the key portion of the document concerning lessons learned.

Here is a Chapter 5 extract:

Hurricane Katrina Critical Challenges
1. National Preparedness
2. Integrated Use of Military Capabilities
3. Communications
4. Logistics and Evacuations
5. Search and Rescue
6. Public Safety and Security
7. Public Health and Medical Support
8. Human Services
9. Mass Care and Housing
10. Public Communications
11. Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment
12. Environmental Hazards and Debris Removal
13. Foreign Assistance
14. Non-Governmental Aid
15. Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned
16. Homeland Security Professional Development
and Education
17. Citizen and Community Preparedness

CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNED

This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. We are going to review every action and make necessary changes so that we are better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could
threaten our people.
—President George W. Bush, September 15, 2005

The preceding chapters described the dynamics of the response to Hurricane Katrina. While there were numerous stories of great professionalism, courage, and compassion by Americans from all walks of life, our task here is to identify the critical challenges that undermined and prevented a more efficient and effective Federal response. In short, what were the key failures during the Federal response to
Hurricane Katrina."

I would argue that PKEMRA 2006 came nowhere near to dealing with the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina federal efforts. So that is the first disconnect. The second is that PKEMRA 2006 has yet to be fully implemented. GAO has documented that failure. So as we approach the sixth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina landfall perhaps time to document this failure more closely.

FEMA ISSUED A NEW STRATEGIC PLAN-February 2011

2011-08-15T17:37:00.002-04:00

The most complete metrics in the strategic plan appear on page 14 as follows:

Key Outcomes to Achieve-
(1) Establish a national capability to treat, stabilize, and provide care for 265,000 casualties following a catastrophic event;
(2) Establish a national capability to move and distribute materiel and supplies to meet the needs of 1.5 million disaster survivors within 72 hours;
(3) Establish a national capability to restore and sustain basic services and community functionality for an affected area of seven million people within 60 days;
(4) Establish a national capability to recover the communities of 1.5 million disaster survivors within 5 years of the event;
(5) Implement a performance-based qualification requirements system for all FEMA personnel participating in disaster response and recovery activities and a dynamic readiness measurement system for FEMA teams and deployable assets

“In the event of a terrorist attack, natu-ral disaster, or other large-scale emergency, the Department and FEMA provide a coordinated, comprehensive federal response and work with Federal, state, local, and private sector partners to ensure a swift and effective recovery effort. Working together, we continue to build a ready and resilient nation by providing grants and training to our partners, coordinating the federal government’s response to disasters, and streamlining rebuilding and recovery along the Gulf Coast and throughout the Nation.”
-Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security

I have given much thought to this goal and wondering what progress has been made so far? More to follow! I am not sure I understand the metrics and what they actually mean. I have found no discussion of this goal since publication of the document. How were they derived and what research or study is behind their establishment.

Pre 9/11/01 Reports on WMD Preparedenss!

2011-08-15T14:57:00.000-04:00

For a Listing of early reports on Federal capability
to respond to an WMD attack see the following reports

• June 1996, Joint Report to Congress, Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, or Chemical Attack, prepared by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy in consultation with FEMA.

• House Document 105-29, January 21, 1997, Policy Functions/Operational Roles of Federal Agencies in Countering the Domestic Chemical/Biological Threat, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting A Report Describing the Respective Policy Functions and Operational Roles of Federal Agencies In Countering The Threat Posed By the Use or Potential Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Within the United States, Pursuant to Pub. L. 104-201, §1416(e) (110 Stat. 2724).

• House Document 105-79, May 5, 1997, COMPREHENSIVE READINESS PROGRAM FOR COUNTERING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting A Report That Describes The United States Comprehensive Readiness Program For Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Pursuant to Public Law 104-201, §1443(c (110 STAT 2729).

• Department of Defense, Report to Congress, DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, May 1, 1997.

• General Accounting Office, NSIAD-97-254, September 26, 1997, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy.

• General Accounting Office, NSIAD-98-39, December 1, 1997, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Government wide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination.

• House Document 105-224, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE, Communication 7735 from the President of the United States, March 5, 1998.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-74, April 9, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, April 23, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues, Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, October 16, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program.

• General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency.

WMD and the Interest of Congress Begins!

2011-08-15T14:52:00.002-04:00

PUBLIC LAW 104-201

TITLE XIV---DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Extract from House Conference Report No. 104-724

Domestic Preparedness

Enhancing the nation’s ability to prevent, and, if necessary, to respond to a terrorist incident involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons or materials is the cornerstone of this program. The conferees note that an interagency group, composed of the Federal Response Plan signatory agencies led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) completed and forwarded to the President on July 1, 1996, a report titled ”Consequences Management for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Terrorism.” The report documents the inadequacy of the Federal Response Plan to deal with NBC terrorist incidents and makes specific recommendations regarding capability enhancements. The conferees agree to a provision (§1411) that would require the President to take immediate action to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to respond to such incidents and to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of State and local emergency response and law enforcement agencies to respond to such incidents. The provision would further require the President to provide to the Congress by January 31, 1997, [published in the Congressional Record on February 26, 1997] a report containing an assessment of such capabilities, improvements required, and measures that should be taken to achieve such improvements, including additional resources and legislative authority that might be necessary.

The conferees agree to recommend $50.0 million for the establishment of a domestic emergency assistance program for the Department of Defense to immediately begin sharing its unique expertise, experience, and equipment in dealing with chemical and biological weapons and materials with local emergency first respondents (firemen, policemen, and medical workers).

The conferees expect that the Secretary of Defense will work expeditiously with the Secretary of Health and Human Services in providing DOD resources and expertise to the Office of Emergency Preparedness for the formation of emergency medical teams that are trained and equipped to handle incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

The conferees agree to provide $15.0 million for DOD to conduct interagency exercises that will focus on testing and improving the U.S. Government’s ability to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
The conferees have agreed to an additional provision (§1414) that would require DOD to establish at least one Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Team for rapid response to domestic terrorism. The conferees expect that such teams would be similar in concept to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Accident Response Groups that are maintained by DOE for response to a nuclear incident. The conferees note in the joint DOD/DOE report [prepared in consultation with FEMA] to the Congress, “Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, or Chemical Terrorist Attack,” dated June 13, 1996, that the DOD is attempting to establish such a capability. The conferees note that many of the capabilities sought for such teams are already present in the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, and Chemical Defense and Infectious Disease Medical Research Institutes. The conferees also note the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee’s “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation’, dated May 1996, which states that the U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic was scheduled to activate a Department of the Navy/Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force on June 1, 1996, to respond to chemical and biological incidents (terrorist or otherwise) occurring on naval installations and Department of State legations worldwide. The conferees understand that the unit has been activated and is now in training.
In §1416, the conferees agree to provide authority, very narrowly defined and carefully constructed, for the President and the Attorney General to request military support to local authorities in incidents involving chemical and biological weapons. This authority is in addition to the authorities otherwise provided in Chapter 18 of title 10, U.S. Code. The conferees agree that the use of the military in any emergency situation involving biological or chemical weapons or materials should be limited both in time and scope to dealing with the specific chemical or biological weapons-related incident.
Finally, the conferees have included a provision (§1417) that would require Federal Response Plan agencies to develop and maintain an inventory of equipment and other assets that could be made available to aid State and local officials in search and rescue and other disaster management and mitigation efforts associated with an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction, and would require FEMA to maintain a comprehensive master list of the inventory. The provision would also require FEMA to establish a data base on chemical and biological agent and munitions characteristics and safety precautions and to develop a system to provide federal, State, and local officials access to the data base and to the master inventory.

FEMA slides into WMD PREPAREDNESS!

2011-08-15T14:47:00.000-04:00

BRIEF HISTORY OF FEMA INVOLVEMENT WITH WMD PREPAREDNESS

From September 1981 until November 1993, a National Preparedness Directorate existed in FEMA. E.O. 12148, in its §2-103 has assigned FEMA the consequences of major terrorist events role. That role was assigned to the State and Local Support Directorate during the period September 1981 to November 1983, since it was viewed as primarily a civil defense function or a disaster response function. FEMA was reorganized in November 1993 but it wasn't until the establishment of a Director of National Security and the drafting and issuance of PDD-39 in April 1995 that FEMA again focused on the terrorism assignment. The Director in a memorandum dated September 9, 1997 created a Terrorism Coordination Unit independent of the Director of National Security function when he issued a memorandum dated October 1, 1997, subject: FEMA's Role in Terrorism and Consequence Management. The new unit had a scheduled life of six months and on June 21, 1998 was subsumed in a new organizational the Office of National Security Affairs reporting to the Director, that also combined the Director of National Security function. This organization now has principal jurisdiction over three new PDDs [62, 63, and 67] signed by the President in May and October 1998. The Acting Chief Information Officer of FEMA has been delegated responsibilities under PDD-63 as the Chief Information Assurance Officer and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer.

A relatively comprehensive Office of General Counsel opinion issued February 21, 1991, subject Application of Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act, addressed the issues raised by the language of the Act “that an emergency exists for which the primary responsibility for response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority . . .” See GCM 91-2-21.

Since the date of that memorandum, it has also been made clear by President Clinton’s issuance of PDD-39 and PDD-62 that any terrorist event or involvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be considered automatically to involve the Federal government’s “preeminent responsibility and authority.” In GCM-96-11-21, a legal opinion issued to staff of the National Security Counsel, the General Counsel of FEMA concluded that the Attorney General should be included on decisions to use the Stafford Act emergency authority with respect to findings as to areas of Federal preeminent responsibility and authority.

Note this technical note prepared before FEMA incorporated into DHS on March 1, 2003

FEMA's Long Slide Into a Future DHS Begins!

2011-08-15T14:36:00.002-04:00

Response On the Record to Terrorism- Related Issues at the Confirmation Hearing for Director Allbaugh-January 2001

Background

In response to the comments on the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) Report raised by Senators Lieberman and Akaka at the confirmation hearing, the following provides an analysis of areas of the report that most impact the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) followed by comments specific to each Senator’s comments, issues or concerns.

FEMA Analysis of the Hart-Rudman Commission Report

The report advocates fifty recommended changes in five areas to improve U.S. national security to include ensuring security, recapitalizing educational strengths, redesigning Executive Branch institutions, overhauling the personnel system, and reorganizing the role of Congress. Many of the recommendations, particularly with respect to creating a new agency to combat terrorism, directly impact FEMA.

The Commission finds that the United States is “very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland.” With resources scattered across various Federal agencies, the report argues for major organizational changes based upon a national strategy. The first recommendation is for the development of a “comprehensive strategy to heighten Americas ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail.”

The Commission recommends the creation of the National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) responsible for “planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security,” using FEMA as its key building block. The director of the NHSA would be a member of Cabinet and advisor to the National Security Council and the single person accountable for homeland security.

Because the NHSA would be built upon FEMA, it would be chartered to “provide a focal point for all natural and manmade crisis and emergency planning scenarios.” Most of FEMA’s current functions at the Headquarters level would be incorporated into the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response. Regionally, the NHSA would employ the FEMA Regional Office structure, with much of its daily work taking place “directly supporting state officials in its regional offices.”

Additionally, the NHSA establishes two additional directorates, including a Directorate of Prevention for border security and the Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) to handle the ever increasing cyber threat. In order to accomplish the tasks of these two directorates, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard be transferred to the NHSA, while “preserving them as distinct entities.”

Additionally, the existing National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), and the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) also would be relocated to the NHSA.

Also, the Commission recommends the creation of a National Crisis Action Center (NCAC) to be located in the NHSA. Directed by a two-star National Guard general, the interagency center would be “the nations focal point for monitoring emergencies and coordinating federal support in a crisis to state and local governments, as well as to the private sector.” During the response phase of a crisis, the NCAC would be accountable for the monitoring of ongoing operations and requirements.

Stating that the NHSA would strengthen FEMA’s ability to response to natural and manmade disasters, the Commission outlines the mechanism for responding to emergencies. This would include State officials having the initial lead role for response, with the President designating a Federal Coordinating Officer only during major crises. In the event that the National Guard is federalized or Reserve forces are used, a Defense Coordinating Officer would be appointed to provide civilian oversight.

The National Guard would have homeland security as its primary mission. This would require that the Guard be “reorganized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.” In accomplishing this mission, the Guard would participate in planning for a WMD incident, train and help organize responders, maintain inventories of available resources and equipment, plan for inter-state support, and develop an international capability for humanitarian assistance.

Another restructuring change that the Commission recommends is for Congress to create a single body to deal with homeland security issues that would include members of all relevant Congressional committees but would not have a legislative or oversight mandate. Additionally, there would be only one committee in each house with responsibility for appropriations and oversight for homeland security functions.

Senator Lieberman’s Comments

During the confirmation hearing, Senator Lieberman brought up the threat of domestic terrorism specifically referencing the Hart-Rudman Commission Report that recommends the formation of a new agency (involving FEMA and others) to prepare the United States in case of an attack. Senator Lieberman encouraged Mr. Allbaugh to get involved in this. Mr. Allbaugh said he would review the report and respond to Senator Lieberman.

Director Allbaugh’s Response to Senator Lieberman

FEMA agrees with the concerns of the Commission regarding the need to seriously examine the current efforts and associated roles and responsibilities to prepare for and respond to terrorist events and other national security incidents that are spread across several departments and agencies. We also agree with the need for a comprehensive national strategy addressing terrorism prevention and preparedness. The preparedness effort needs to focus primarily on local and State responders so they are adequately prepared to respond to terrorist incident of all kinds. Under its current authorities and Presidential guidance, FEMA has a key role in leading the response to the effects of a terrorism incident as well as helping States and local governments to be adequately prepared to respond to such an event. We agree with the need for a defined and accepted Federal leadership role, supported by the White House and Congress, that includes the authority for a lead agency to provide overall direction, integration and oversight for the implementation of all Federal terrorism preparedness programs and activities, to include the authority to preclude duplication of effort among various Federal departments and agencies.

The concept of a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) attempts to address this need, but raises some specific concerns as well. One is the creation of a new agency that duplicates much of what FEMA already does on a daily basis in working with State and local governments in preparedness and response. Under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) structure, FEMA coordinates the activities of 27 Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross in providing Federal assistance to supplement the efforts of the affected local and State governments responding to a variety of natural and manmade disasters and emergencies. This is a well known and tested structure that incorporates many of the agencies active in homeland security, including the Department of the Defense and the National Guard. The role of the National Crisis Action Center (NCAC) in the NHSA to monitor and coordinate Federal support to State and local governments is an unnecessary duplication of FEMA’s primary role under a Presidential declaration of a disaster or emergency, to include the response to a terrorist incident. The vesting of homeland security functions with the National Guard, to include planning, training and resourcing also presents challenges, in that the Guard is first of all a State asset on call by the Governor for a variety of missions, not just terrorism response, and that these activities are already being addressed by FEMA and other agencies under existing authorities. In short, FEMA would become the basis of an organization that would create more complexity in both the preparedness and response arena that currently exists.

We are in agreement with the recommendation the report for some restructuring within Congress to create joint committees to consolidate the several program committees and funding streams that now take in terrorism preparedness and response.

Senator Akaka’s Comments

Senator Akaka asked how did Mr. Allbaugh think this restructuring would take place and potentially impact FEMA as a whole – especially activities such as floodplain mapping and national hazards research. Mr. Allbaugh said he would respond.

Director Allbaugh’s Response to Senator Akaka

The restructuring would potentially impact FEMA’s other all-hazard preparedness and response missions. Although terrorism is an important threat, FEMA also is responsible for preparedness programs in other areas involving significant natural hazards such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. Restructuring the agency as a homeland security agency could diminish FEMA’s lead role as a natural disaster preparedness and response agency. FEMA must be able to continue to address the larger threat spectrum consisting of both natural hazards and national security threats with adequate resources in both areas.

FEMA agrees with the concerns of the Commission regarding the need to seriously examine the current efforts and associated roles and responsibilities to prepare for and respond to terrorist events and other national security incidents that are spread across several departments and agencies. We also agree with the need for a comprehensive national strategy addressing terrorism prevention and preparedness. The preparedness effort needs to focus primarily on local and State responders so they are adequately prepared to respond to terrorist incident of all kinds. Under its current authorities and Presidential guidance, FEMA has a key role in leading the response to the effects of a terrorism incident as well as helping States and local governments to be adequately prepared to respond to such an event. We agree with the need for a defined and accepted Federal leadership role, supported by the White House and Congress, that includes the authority for a lead agency to provide overall direction, integration and oversight for the implementation of all Federal terrorism preparedness programs and activities, to include the authority to preclude duplication of effort among various Federal departments and agencies.

The concept of a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) attempts to address this need, but raises some specific concerns as well. One is the creation of a new agency that duplicates much of what FEMA already does on a daily basis in working with State and local governments in preparedness and response. Under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) structure, FEMA coordinates the activities of 27 Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross in providing Federal assistance to supplement the efforts of the affected local and State governments responding to a variety of natural and manmade disasters and emergencies. This is a well-known and tested structure that incorporates many of the agencies active in homeland security, including the Department of the Defense and the National Guard. The role of the National Crisis Action Center (NCAC) in the NHSA to monitor and coordinate Federal support to State and local governments is an unnecessary duplication of FEMA’s primary role under a Presidential declaration of a disaster or emergency, to include the response to a terrorist incident. The vesting of homeland security functions with the National Guard, to include planning, training and resourcing also presents challenges, in that the Guard is first of all a State asset on call by the Governor for a variety of missions, not just terrorism response, and that these activities are already being addressed by FEMA and other agencies under existing authorities. In short, FEMA would become the basis of an organization that would create more complexity in both the preparedness and response arena that currently exists.

Senator Akaka’s Comments

Senator Akaka asked Mr. Allbaugh how FEMA could improve awareness among health care professionals regarding biological weapons threats. Mr. Allbaugh said he has also discussed this issue with Sen. Mikulski and would respond back to both of them.

Director Allbaugh’s Response to Senator Akaka and Senator Mikulski

Of all the terrorism threats, the use of biological weapons presents the most complex preparedness challenges. As the lead agency for the response to a terrorist event, including the use of biological weapons, FEMA work closely with our Federal and State partners involved in the health care delivery system to support awareness and expand training in this important area. With the Department of Health and Human Services and others, FEMA is a partner in the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) that provides awareness training in hospitals across the country. FEMA also provides grants to the States that can be used for planning, training and exercises, to include improving awareness among government health care responders. We will continue to work with our local, State and Federal partners to enhance this awareness to the greatest degree possible.

Does FEMA do surveillance?

2011-08-15T09:54:00.000-04:00

Readers of this blog may also be following events in Great Britain. One Director of FEMA in the REAGAN ERA wanted FEMA to be a designated member of the INTEL community under the current system then in effect. The 16 members of the INTEL community are actually listed I believe in E.O. 12333, and its predecessors. That did not happen and in fact under President Bill Clinton FEMA even lost its authority to create its own black (compartmented) programs.

To my knowledge FEMA does not participate in any kind of surveillance over the citizens and residents of the USA. The WIKIPEDIA entry on SURVEILLANCE is instructive and partially follows:

"The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United States and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject.

Surveillance (play /sərˈveɪ.əns/ or /sərˈveɪləns/)[1] is the monitoring of the behavior, activities, or other changing information, usually of people and often in a surreptitious manner. It most usually refers to observation of individuals or groups by government organizations, but disease surveillance, for example, is monitoring the progress of a disease in a community.

The word surveillance is the French word for "watching over".

The word surveillance may be applied to observation from a distance by means of electronic equipment (such as CCTV cameras), or interception of electronically transmitted information (such as Internet traffic or phone calls). It may also refer to simple, relatively no- or low-technology methods such as human intelligence agents and postal interception.

Surveillance is very useful to governments and law enforcement to maintain social control, recognize and monitor threats, and prevent/investigate criminal activity. With the advent of programs such as the Total Information Awareness program and ADVISE, technologies such as high speed surveillance computers and biometrics software, and laws such as the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act, governments now possess an unprecedented ability to monitor the activities of their subjects.[2]

However, many civil rights and privacy groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and ACLU have expressed concern that by allowing continual increases in government surveillance of citizens that we will end up in a mass surveillance society, with extremely limited, or non-existent political and/or personal freedoms. Fears such as this have led to numerous lawsuits such as Hepting v. AT&T.[2][3]
Contents
[hide]

1 Types of surveillance
1.1 Computer surveillance
1.2 Telephones
1.3 Surveillance cameras
1.4 Social network analysis
1.5 Biometric surveillance
1.6 Aerial surveillance
1.7 Data mining and profiling
1.8 Corporate surveillance
1.9 Human operatives

It is unknown whether the DHS FUSION CENTERS share their surveillance results with FEMA. These units were created adminstratively but now have a statutory basis.

As many readers of this blog I think it would be a real reform and important change to have the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 100-707. to make clear that FEMA does not pay for any federal, STATES and their local governments, Law enforcement activity and cannot also be used for gathering of domestic intelligence in any way. Congress are you listening?

The NEW FEMA?

2011-08-13T08:40:00.000-04:00

Well I have had pretty solid confirmation that FEMA now approaches almost 5,000 Permanent Full Time (PFT) employees, appointees and others. With CORE and DAE staff much larger of course. This far exceeds anything existing even in that "golder age" wherein Director James Lee Witt was ordered by President Clinton to focus on natural disasters and in effect to let the National Security portfolio of FEMA slide. Of course the written Direct Presidential orders on the National Security side such as PD-39 and PD-63 and others and their ineffective implementation just confirms that natural hazards was the FEMA mission during the Clinton years.

And of course the OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL where I worked from 1979-1999 had a ceiling of no more than 40 including support staff and often less and no regional counsel (except from 1983-86 when a single lawyer was placed in 5 Regions)!

Now apparently almost 150 PFT in OCC (the Office of the Chief Counsel FEMA) so hoping that show of support to Brad Keiserman by W. Craig Fugate is paying off. Hopefully comprehensive legal audits of all programs, functions and activities are occurring. Hopefully all opinions and advice rendered to clients since April 1, 1979 of lasting significance are arranged and accessible so that OCC advice is consistent or when issued makes clear it is a change of direction.

One area that was weak in my time was delegations so hoping that the legal requirements for proper delegations is now covered completely. Almost no regulatory updates or changes being made in Title 44 including removal of obsolete sections and replacement of them or explanation why not occurring.

And wondering if all training materials and other documents furnished to both FEMA employees, states and their local governments, or even other federal agencies undergoing thorough legal review.

And of course procurement always a problem so hoping that is well covered legally. IN the one year I was senior procurement lawyer (1992) it was brought to my attention that over 6,000 unauthorized contracts had been issued by FEMA staff and offices.

And finally of course, hoping that many in OCC are cleared security wise for all FEMA programs and that those programs are completely and thoroughly undergone legal reviewed.

And just because you are cleared into a program does not mean that program has had complete legal review.

And of course hoping that when an issue arises in litigation a complete administrative record of consideration and decision comes with it and that program officials are no longer hiding even written documents from the litigation staff.

And finally of course hoping that the FEMA staff contains many highly qualified scientists, and engineers, economists, geographers, climatologists, seismologists, meterologists, etc. etc.

And perhaps the former Coasties as once being part of an HRO (highly reliable organization) have imparted some of that culture to FEMA generally.

Of course maybe the best have retired from the Coast Guard and now nicely double dip in FEMA and elsewhere in DHS for retirement and salary. Who can blame them?

But I would argue that one of the huge huge stories a decade after 9/11 is how badly treated the Coast Guard itself has been budget and administratively within DHS since its formation on March 1, 2003.

Well time will tell in the next catastrophe how "New" the "New" FEMA is in fact.

FEMA's Role in Riots and Civil Disorders

2011-08-09T11:25:00.000-04:00

The LONDON riots prompt this post. FEMA has always taken the position that it has no role in law enforcement aspects of riots and civil disorders. It funded ops by DOD improperly in my opinion in the LA RIOTS of 1992 after the President declared a disaster based on FIRE not riots and civil disorder and the California National Guard was mobilized/federalized under Title 10 of the US Code.

You might ask does FEMA conduct training for STATES and their local governments on riots and civil disorder and response them. Not in my time from 1979-1999 but who knows.

SEE BELOW:

New Free Fire/EMS Response to Civil Unrest Training Available
The Firefighters Support Foundation’s (FSF) newest free training program, Fire/EMS Response to Civil Unrest, is now available. Civil unrest events are becoming more prevalent and FD and EMS units are playing a greater role in responding to them. This program consists of a 40-minute video program and an accompanying 46-slide PowerPoint program. Firefighters and EMTs can view the video material with the PowerPoint file acting as their hard copy notes, or they can use either resource independently. Simply go to www.ffsupport.org to download your free copy.

The program covers:

Types of events
Dispatch issues
Body armor
The effects of alcohol
Coordination with other agencies and the police
Approach strategies
The potential for violence
The NFPA mandate
Lessons learned from previous events
Why no jurisdiction is too small
Proven tactics

The PowerPoint and video portions of the program can be used by any agency or member either as-is, or as a basis from which to construct training modules or presentations of their own. Simply go to www.ffsupport.org to download your free copy.

Of course no one knows what the rest of DHS thinks it is supposed to do if their is a riot or civil disorder!

Is the Past Prologue?

2011-08-07T07:20:00.000-04:00

From time to time the Berkeley Electronic Press sends me a message like the one below with history of downloads of product of VLG published on its Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management site. That journal is now edited by a brilliant young PhD Irmak Renda-Tanali who is a friend and the book review section is headed by Claire Rubin also brilliant and also a friend of long standing.

So the latest:

"FEMA's Path to Homeland Security: 1979-2003"
9 full-text downloads between 2011-07-07 and 2011-08-07
1760 full-text downloads since date of posting (2004-01-28)
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol1/iss2/11

"The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook"
1 full-text download between 2011-07-07 and 2011-08-07
311 full-text downloads since date of posting (2006-03-04)
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol3/iss1/6

"Review of Disaster Response and Homeland Security"
2 full-text downloads between 2011-07-07 and 2011-08-07
180 full-text downloads since date of posting (2007-09-25)
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/5

What any Governor needs to Know!

2011-08-07T00:32:00.000-04:00

From time to time New Governors are elected to office and some run for and are elected President. Their Homeland Security and Emergency Management staff, plans and operations should be fair game for the MSM and citizens of each state. A while back I wrote up the VLG technical note set forth below:

VLG Technical Note 2010-11-12

TOP DOZEN TOPICS AND QUESTIONS EACH NEW GOVERNOR
SHOULD ASK STAFF

1. I ask that each senior person in a management position provide a copy of the November 2010 Governor’s Guide to HS to his/her staff. Giving each person 10 working days to do so, please have each person provide a one page document [maximum length] expressing any concerns or disagreements with that documents information or suggestions and alternatives. These responses including your own one-pager should not be edited but collected and bound into a document for me personally and a copy of that bound document provided all other components involved in EM or HS in our state, and to each individual that provided comments. The one page document should bear the name of the individual but anonomus submissions may be submitted to me personally at _____________. These latter submissions should not duplicate anything in the attributed submissions.

2. Has the Attorney General of my state reviewed all mandatory and discretionary authority of the Governor [now me] for adequacy? If not adequate has proposed legislation been submitted to deal with defects? Can this be done this legislative term or is more drafting time necessary?

3. To what extent does HS and EM in my state rely on federal grants for EM and HS, or the National Guard when not federalized for emergency response, recovery, mitigation, prevention, protection, preparedness? I reverse the normal order of paradigms in case I must react immediately to some incident or event!

4. What open declared disasters and emergencies are now in existence and who declared them and when? What are total obligations by the federal government to date for those open incidents/events? What are total state obligations? Local obligations?

5. Are the NG units in our state up-to-date on CBRNE training? Logistics and operations? When and where was that training conducted? Who paid for it?

6. What is the total number of public safety personnel in my state and where and how are they dispersed? This includes, police, fire, EM, HS, public health, and EMT and HazMat!

7. Please have the most expert person on EMAC in our state government arrange a briefing that can be a webinar for all state employees and in that briefing indicate what our STATES obligations are, do we have that capability, and for adjacent states that are signatories what is their capability including fiscal to assist if EMAC activated? Also who activates EMAC for our state, am I the one?

8. Please prepare a letter to Secretary DHS and Administrator FEMA requesting permanent assignment of a liaison cell to our STATE EOC! Request documentation to accompany that request supporting the request?

9. What capacity does the private sector in our state have to assist in disaster ops including NGO’s and for profit sector?

10. Do we have any standby contracts for disaster ops and how are they funded, if at all?

11. ON a scale of 1-10 with 10 being fully operable, where do our STATE and our local governments stand on communications interoperability, redundancy, and robustness?

12. Who is the key expert in our state government on warning, notification, alerting, and mobilization and arrange to have that person or persons prepared a briefing for me and all state employees through webinar on those subjects including activation, prescripted messages, rumor control and other Emergency Public Information factors?

My guess is that when push comes to shove a sitting Governor or former Governor will lead the GOP ticket and perhaps even the VP nominee on that ticket will also be a current Governor or former Governor. Thus we (the USA) could have in essence a campaign between those who were once or still are Governors and the Current President and VP whose key elective office was as U.S. Senators. I am predicting that the DEMS will lose the Senate in the 2012 election but time will tell.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

2011-08-03T10:27:00.001-04:00

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Clicking on the above will take you to the 1964 OEP Emergency Preparedness Plan assigning roles to all Executive Branch components. It was supplemented in 1969 by EO 11490 and that E.O. was revoked and replaced by EO 12656 (November 18, 1988) now amended.

Levees and FEMA--failed structures failed policy

2011-07-29T14:23:00.000-04:00

A new chapter in the 40 year old struggle of FEMA and its mapping program to NOT examine levee risks on its NFIP maps!

See new GAO report:

FEMA and the Corps Have Taken Steps to Establish a Task Force, but FEMA Has Not Assessed the Costs of Collecting and Reporting All Levee-Related Concerns
GAO-11-689R July 29, 2011
Full Report (PDF, 15 pages)

Summary
In Process

In summary, FEMA and the Corps have taken steps to establish the task force to address levee mapping issues in local communities. For example, in what they described as an initial step towards addressing the congressional concerns outlined in the Senate committee report, FEMA and the Corps developed a joint memorandum that describes their relationship and five planned actions. In addition, FEMA officials report that the task force does not have the capability to collect and report all contacts it has with communities that involve levee-related concerns, as directed by the Senate committee report. According to FEMA officials, developing and implementing a system that would enable the agency to collect and report this information would be unduly resource intensive. However agency officials have not completed an analysis to determine the costs of developing such a system, and documented and communicated that information to Congress. FEMA could better support its position that implementing a system to collect and report all levee-related community concerns would be unduly resource intensive if it performs and documents an analysis of the costs and timeframes needed to develop such a system. Furthermore, this analysis could include the identification of potential alternatives that might address the Senate committee report language in more cost-effective ways. To assist congressional decision makers, we are recommending that FEMA assess the costs and timeframes needed to develop a system to collect and report all contacts with communities that have levee-related concerns; identify, if applicable, cost effective alternatives to address the intent of the Senate committee report language; and document and communicate this information to Congress. To assist congressional decision makers, we recommend that the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency assess the costs and time frames needed to develop a system to collect and report all contacts with communities that have levee-related concerns; identify, if applicable, cost-effective alternatives for addressing the Senate committee report language; and document and communicate this information to Congress.

NOAA is about Science! FEMA is about Engineering?

2011-07-27T06:35:00.000-04:00

NOAA has released a wonderful data set on natural weather related disasters of the last three (3) decades that cost more than $1B each in adjusted dollars. Interesting of course is that the agency that pays out many of these dollars probably could not produce these numbers.

More importantly an agency led largely by Scientists has begun the long process of destroying the credibility of FEMA just because of its competence. When I arrived in FEMA on September 10th, 1979 almost 300 personnel had advanced technical degrees with over 200 with Doctorates. When I departed on October 1, 1999 less than 50 personnel had such advanced degrees.

I don't blame White House personnel because two the apparently most competent organizational leaders James Lee Witt and W. Craig Fugate have only high school degrees. But perhaps it is time for a scientist to lead FEMA. The one engineer a register PE was Wallace B. Stickney and he proved not up to the task specifically asking to not be assigned the lead in Hurricane Andrew response and recovery resulting in the WH naming Andrew Card then Secretary of DOT and later Chief of Staff to George W. Bush in his WH years.

The real question underlying this discussion is whether science is important to FEMA? After all its real mission is funding the STATES and their local governments in response and recovery and funding the FEDERAL establishment with various mission assignments. But can FEMA even know if what it is doing makes sense without a Chief Scientist among others in its ranks or just showing respect for science in its programs and policies. Perhaps DHS and FEMA management types that number over 500 dedicated FTE could study the issue or if not competent to do so manage a contract to do so.

A simple analysis would demonstrate that most science issues in FEMA had traditionally been left to complete politicization--climate change impacts--perhaps the most startling--but then without any scientist in the room when decisions are made this is always going to be the likely result.

Hey hoping FEMA studies the NOAA data and reaches some conclusions. I have but then despite 65 undergrad credit hours in hard science and math I have reached some of my own that will blog later upon.

Good luck to FEMA and its nonscientists. After NEWTON just remember it was called SCIENCE and not NATURAL PHILOSOPHY!

Is the Past Prologue?

2011-07-26T09:34:00.000-04:00

I heard another old timer retiring from FEMA on Friday. Vern Wingert. He goes back to the NGA study on Emergency Management and while raising horses actually contributed much to FEMA over the years. It is for others to measure a person's contribution but as for my take on VERN his heart and head were often in the right place IMO on policy issues and operations. And he busted his A__!

But hey I am biased because Vern was always a big help to me. He helped me understand what I refer to as the countervailing forces in FEMA meaning those officials who would do anything to save their skin even while undermining the long term strength of FEMA and adversely impacting the American polity.

My best to VERN and you should be extensively debrieffed by the Adminstrator and others as to your career because their eyes might become wide open. If not them perhaps GAO. Or DHS/IG!

Thanks VERN on behalf of the American people. Come visit me.

So Who is Running FEMA?

2011-07-25T09:47:00.000-04:00

Strongly suggest that the total travels of W. Craig Fugate, Richard Serrino, and Tim Manning be summarized and made available to the public and annotated with those directly tied to a disaster domestic or International [I give full credit to Tim Manning for his trip to New Zealand and helping out the KIWIs as well I am sure as learning from the experience]. I also suggest a footnot as to total annual leave taken by these three although it used to be technically PAS personnel were NEVER on annual leave. All these three are Senate confirmed.

The above would give some insights as to how policy is formulated within and by FEMA's key appointees and whether one or all might show up in a catastrophic disaster situation--my definition by the way is where multiple states are involved or government capability to respond and recovery are knocked off status immediately by the event and like to be disrupted for 10 or more days. THE FEDERAL PRIORITY IN CASE YOU DID NOT KNOW IS TO MAKE SURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THAT A STATES CAPABILITY IS RESTORED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE EVEN TAKING PRIORITY OVER FEMA OF RESTORATION OF ITS OWN CAPABILITIES. You heard it hear first but this was long contained in my briefing of federal and state officials during my FEMA career from 1979-1999.

This does not indicate in anyway of course that FEMA has command and control over any state or local resources and in my opinion (IMO) does not and cannot be given that authority by Congress or the President. This does not mean that FEMA cannot assist state and local government officials or even fund their operations. Isn't it interesting that so little attention has been given officially to these important questions. Oddly when DOJ officials where involved in FEMA decision making and to see where they might be see the FEMA/OGC opinions on the home page of this blog they often called me to ask questions and if I had a position. They did this because from my entry to FEMA to October 1, 1986, when I became involved in REP, I ran FEMA's interface on litigation with DOJ and I was supposedly a known quantity. My answers were often relayed higher up the DOJ totem pole and perhaps strangely they often agreed with my position. Perhaps I and DOJ were wrong and FEMA officialdom and other lawyers were right but what is fascinating is that when put to the test of a written opinion DOJ always sided with me not FEMA or its lawyers. Hey you have to have some fun in the gummit.

My point is that FEMA does not itself have a clear cut chain of command. This could be handled in formal delegations but is not.

And then of course even if FEMA decides how is that reviewed and approved or rejected by DHS? There can of course be some urgency in these decision making processes. How soon will FEMA approve exercises where the play reflects the NORWEGIAN tragedy?

FEMA's Indian Policy

2011-07-24T07:47:00.000-04:00

Recently W. Craig Fugate has made a major effort to involve the Native Americans more deeply in FEMA programs, functions and activities. Unfortunately, he is between the proverbial rock and a hard place. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 100-707 that supplemented in part, repealed in part, and modified in part the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public Law 93-288, treats tribes as local government units. The rulings of SCOTUS (Supreme Court of the US) and federal law including treaty law treat them as sovereign nations. In an administrative law process the Department of Interior rules on which tribes will be given recognized federal status, include the right in some cases to open and operate casinos.

Under the Clinton Adminstration an effort by a brilliant young staffer (actually trained as a chemist) to resolve this conundrum led to her being drummed out of FEMA for following federal law and policy. Although the office of the General Counsel was never asked to rule officially on this split in legal authority during my time there 1979-1999) I did my best to support the staff effort which I believe directly contradicts the Stafford Act approach.

In his famous treatise on statutory construction, Professor Sutherland opines that Congress is presumed to both know its own mind and to know federal law. Thus, Congressional enactments should be construed to avoid conflicts whenever possible. Only where there is a direct statutory conflict should the statute later in time have some weight as controlling. But the Indian Tribal rights issues have plagued American law since President Jackson blotted his contribution to history by ejecting the Choctaws, Cherokees, and other tribes from the Southeast so there land could be settled by White Americans.

This is the kind of issue that should have been addressed by the OLC (Office of the Legal Counsel) at the DOJ (Dept. of Justice) but since FEMA has historically been reversed by OLC on both its legal analysis and policies almost 100% of the time in cases referred this was never a likely step to be taken by FEMA in the past when independent and certainly not likely to be taken by the GC of DHS, currently Mr. Fong.

If this was resolved properly my hope would be that recognized tribes and other Native Americans could in fact become more heavily utilized not just as recipients of federal disaster outlays and other FEMA programs, but could be trained up and utilized much as the NGO's are for disaster operations. Time Will Tell!

Where Have I been?

2011-07-23T08:32:00.000-04:00

My last post on this blog was on June 23rd and now July 23rd. I spent the last 4 weeks visiting friends and visiting spots I had not seen in New England for almost 40 years. But much has been happening in FEMA land and elsewhere in that time. So gradually will be catching up.

The biggest news from and about FEMA is that the President's DRF [Disaster Relief Fund] is dangerously low as we enter the heights of hurricane season. Let's play a game however and ask whether anyone knows (including FEMA officials) whether FEMA has ever paid out relief for drought and heat as a declared Presidential disaster.

Winners are entitled to visit me here where I live on the Little Wicomico River near the mouth of the Potomac. They can stay until tired of my shrillness and Nostrodomus like predictions many of which have proved only too accurate over the last year. And yes, Greece will declare a default because now despite efforts at rescue the rescuers waited only too long to conduct the rescue. Hey the Drachma will be back before the end of the year and time to visit Greece and its splendors of the present and past. A great people and attended a Greek Festival in New England on my pilgrimage.

So here's to returning to blogging.

Today's Senate NFIP Hearing!

2011-06-23T13:56:00.000-04:00

There were some signs of intelligence from the panel of outsiders briefing the Senate Banking Committee tomorrow. But no real concensus except for a lengthy NFIP statutory extension. Not much in the way of intelligence expressed by the Senators themselves. Clearly the fact that the flood insurance program is drive by science and engineering and land use not insurance principles continues to escape most of the Committee.

And the NFIP officials continue to waste legislative opportunities to strengthen the NFIP. The GAO witness was equally unhelpful and wondering how this important federal program escapes from sophisticated analysis. Senator Vitter of Louisiana of course begged that this crucial program for Louisiana's survival be extended and made cheaper and broader as a relief program for that clueless state.

I now see why so few real reforms came out of the financial meltdown. This Senate Committee is just not smart people and a drag on the future of the USA.

Even the Homebuilders rep made nothing but special pleading trying to avoid tough enforcement by the feds, the states and the locals as if the developers had not been almost totally responsible for development of housing in substandard areas.

So the NFIP will be extended from its September 30th expiration and most of the effort to modify will be to study it more as if its problems are unknown to one and all.

The bottom line of course is that flood insurance and disaster outlays will be increasing not decreasing as STATES and their local governments continue to be grossly negligent in allowing unwise development.

There are solutions to the NFIP's problems but few understand them enough to articulate them and see their implementation. One key one of course would be to void all policies issued ab initio when determined post claim to be in violation of flood plain management regulations but give innocent homeowners the right to sue their community for damages for allowing such a violation to occur.

NLE 2011 After Action Report

2011-06-23T07:56:00.001-04:00

Readers of this blog may remember that I recommended cancellation of the NLE 2011 exercise or at least postponement because of the disasterous outbreak of tornadoes in April and May this year. The exercise was held and now it will be of interest to learn of the lessons captured and read any after action report.

The After Action Report is being prepared under the auspices of a former FEMA SES Gil Jamison who rose from the DAE cadre in Tropical Storm Agnes that occurred in 1972 and its aftermath to a position of power and influence in the Hurricane Katrina recovery operation. Gil was a protege of Bill Tidwell also a career SES and Acting Regional Director in many FEMA regions over his career and Chief of Staff under Director Julius Becton.
The demise of the relationship between Bill Tidwell and Director James Lee Witt had a direct impact on Gil but his career eventually found fruition in the disaster program in which he started out in a predecessor organization to FEMA, specifically HUD's FDAA (Federal Disaster Assistance Agency).

Oddly perhaps, the FDAA while it existed under President's Ford and Carter was the only time that it was led by someone that believed that disaster outlays should not be administered as a general relief program to eliminate economic distress but in fact to target assistance to not make the next disaster more serious. This was accomplished by its leaders Thomas Dunne and William Wilcox, two extremely capable administrators both of which should be given the benefit of a biography by some historian. Both were mentors which was always in the past and is currently a rare commodity in FEMA leadership.

Well looking forwards to any and all information released about NLE 2011. This is the exercise series replacing the so-called TOPOFF series. Hoping many senior officials in DHS and FEMA played the exercise just in case that play forecasts some event during the remainder of the Obama Presidency.

NFIP Reform? NOT THIS YEAR!

2011-06-13T09:29:00.001-04:00

Okay here is my take on NFIP reform efforts! THERE WILL BE NO REFORM THIS YEAR BUT A LENGTHY EXTENSION of the NFIP perhaps for 5 years. This is the fifth time in the 42 year history of the NFIP that reforms to improve the NFIP's policies and administration by statutory change will have been undercut by the programs lack of preparedness to take long-term advantage of congressional interest. The basic problem of course is that the NFIP is a land use not an insurance program.

My basic reform proposal that would infuriate the Banking Committees and would be to confine insurance availability to the 1% annual occurrence floodplain (the so-called 100 year base flood)!

THE REASON THE BANKING COMMITTEES SHOULD NOT BE THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES FOR THE NFIP IN CONGRESS IS THAT THEIR POLITICAL PRESSURE AND CONSTANT MANIPULATION OF THE PROGRAM TO PROMOTE THE BANKING AND HOUSING SECTORS AND LAND DEVELOPERS AND BUILDERS OPERATING IN HAZARDOUS AREAS HAS UNDERMINED THE PROGRAM AND THIS YEARS LEGISLATION WILL PROVE THIS CONCLUSION AGAIN.

W. Craig Fugate did pretty well in his House and Senate testimony but the NFIP is too counter intuitive a program to allow even someone with Administrator Fugate's background and knowledge to present the Congress with real choices. And clearly he is making legal issues out of many policy decisions that could be made under current law, probably in a decision to push accountability elsewhere as he constantly did in his Senate presentation where he often stated it was up to Congress to decide. He did not make recommendations in most instances as to what they should decide or even why their decision was necessary.

So while a long extension is helpful only very skilled and competent leadership of the NFIP and even WH level interest can save it from eventual elimination in the favor of "free" disaster relief with no mapping most if not all legislative changes this year in the Congress will undermine program solvency and result in increased disaster outlays.

Another key recommendation is to put not another insurance lawyer in charge of the NFIP but a STATE Flood Plain Manager.

For the Congress two new findings to the ones that already exist should be added.

First, mapping is the principal compliance tool of the NFIP!

Second, that the NFIP should cooperate, and collaborate to the extent possible with the Endangered Species Act of 1973!

One major error could be increasing the limits of coverage! This should be veto bait if the WH and FEMA understand the program!

WOW-W. Craig Fugate Gets IT--Disaster Relief and NFIP are INTERTWINED

2011-06-10T09:40:00.000-04:00

The history of the NFIP and the disaster relief program are closely intertwined although neither program has ever been housed bureacratically in the same sub-agency organization. The objective of the NFIP is to reduce disaster outlays since 80% of all natural disaster outlays have historically been flood and hurricane related. The NFIP was started in part because damage from flood was an excluded peril from homeowners insurance coverage one it expanded beyond the peril of "fire" in the modern broad form policies. The original NFIP issued policy largely substituted the peril of "flood" wherever the 1041 NY Fire Policy read "Fire" as the covered peril. The result was an original concern of the property/casualty insurance underwriters that federal or state courts would expand the coverages under the fire policies and homeowners policies as they digested the new "flood" peril. This has not happened and will not.

AND ALWAYS REMEMBER THE NFIP IS A LANDUSE NOT AN INSURANCE PROGRAM!

The NFIP is up for an extension of its expiration date of September 30th of this year. I am flatly predicting a 5 year clean extension but the HOUSE has passed a version that expands coverage of te program, denigrates from the programs purposes, makes it more likely that the NFIP will not come close to solvency and in fact will become a futher drain on the federal fisc. The NFIP is in the whole about $18B largely due to Hurricane Katrina and due to expensive subsidies to the property/casualty industry that performs WYO services.

EVEN AT 42 YEARS THE NFIP IS AN EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM AND THE PERIOD OF RECORD IS FAR TOO SHORT TO MAKE PREDICTIONS ON ITS PERFORMANCE AS OF TODAY!

What we do know is that "free" disaster relief as currently administered undercuts the purposes of the NFIP. The result is to create "free" NFIP insurance that will shift the forms of disaster relief but not solve the problems of increased outlays of disaster funds.

W. Craig Fugate seems to understand that while they related the NFIP and the disaster programs involve policy tradeoffs to avoid one adversely impacting on the outlays of the other---adversely impacting meaning increasing outlays of the other program when both theoretically are designed to work cooperatively.

FEW IN FEMA UNDERSTAND BOTH DISASTER RELIEF AND THE NFIP! After yesterdays performance in the Senate it is clear that Administrator Fugate does understand this which is a real accomplishment and almost the first to do sol.

The Senate acted serious about finding out more about the NFIP and Adminstator Fugate dodged many questions by offering his answers in writing in the future. Who knows if this will happen.

AT any rate it was good to see a largely substantive NFIP hearing even though the mapping program should be subject to oversight by the House and Senate Science Committees since the statutory mapping standard is to have the maps "Scientifically and technically correct"!

It was clear that neither Administrator Fugate, the Senators, or their staffs understood exactly what this standard means. And FEMA has frequently undermined this standard through its policy decisions and ignorance, even on its mapping staff.

NOAA should be charged by the PRESIDENT and assisted by NAS in examining comprehensively the NFIP mapping decision process to determine whether the standard is being met.

AND AFTER ALL AT THIS POINT THE MAPS OF THE NFIP ALSO ARE THE ENFORCEMENT ARM OF THE NFIP!

What FEMA DOES NOT DO and NEVER WILL!

2011-06-05T07:36:00.000-04:00

Okay let's give GAO some help in their forthcoming FEMA study as part of review of DHS in its totality re: accomplishment of missions and goals assigned to it since its door opening on March 1, 2003!

First, FEMA never does technical response meaning monitoring and decontamination of HAZMATS!

Second, FEMA rarely gives guidance on how the STATES and their local governments (90,000+) should obtain technical assistance from other federal sources. Nor does FEMA indicate how technical guidance should be obtained from it in its programs, functions,and activities.

Third, FEMA does not publish any internal delegations so that outsiders can understand how its components relate to each other. All other federal Executive Branch components do this (in accordance with law)!

Fourth, FEMA has never completely or adequately explained the connection between the Robert T. Stafford Act and the Price-Anderson Act, nor does it understand the relationship if any. FEMA refused to answer questions posed by the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee on how a FUKISHIMA style event would be handled in the USA!

Fifth! FEMA is not under the direct command and control of the WH during disasters. Nor has it explained whether it can separately contact the WH on a self-initiated basis with DHS approval!

Sixth! FEMA cannot self initiate (nor its OIG/DHS) audits or reviews of its major contractors.

Seventh! FEMA has not published a COG chain of succession for itself or its components.

Eight! FEMA has NO role in WMD prevention or response!

Nine! FEMA has no capability in Cyber Security issues and policies.

Tenth! FEMA can barely answer Congressional correspondence without contractoce! It relies on contractors to perform many inherently govenrmental functions like preparation of strategic plans.

More to follow!

GAO Study

2011-06-04T09:23:00.000-04:00

The General Accountability Office (GAO) will conduct an entrance interview on June 17th to DHS and FEMA kicking off a study of how DHS and FEMA (and other DHS orgs) have attempted to and hopefully accomplished their assigned statutory missions since the events of 9/11/01! The report will be issued on September 10th, 2011.

I would argue that DHS, FEMA, and other orgs, have totally failed to handle the WMD assignment, the Cyber Security (CIP) assignment, and the Domestic Intel (together with privacy, civil liberties) assignment!

My conclusions reflect the reports of GAO itself and numerous other THINK TANKS!

It should also be noted that a slug of books and articles will be appearing after July 4th on the events of 9/11/01, and efforts successful and failed to adjust to those events since that date!

Two failed efforts that will be discussed are the failures of the FBI and the continued lack of interoperability of First Responders!

Good luck to all!

Where Have I Been? Thinking!

2011-06-02T19:59:00.001-04:00

All good think tanks should spend time thinking! So over the last two weeks recharged the batteries and thinking! Watched the series "The Tudors" largely about Henry the VIII who like his cousin the French King died of end stage syphillis. Hey the Queens that lost their heads maybe lucky!

So a study in power and corruption! When in doubt lop off a few heads.

FEMA leadership keeping its head down and working hard! Yesterday hurricane season opened for 2011! Whatever happens this year will control FEMA's fate in my opinion for 2012 and beyond. REASON is simple! Little but outside events even happen to an administration in an election year with the WH and the Executive Branch paralyzed by the need to project the illusion of control.

So now events are in the saddle! As perhaps they always are in fact!

Again GOOD LUCK FEMA in all your endeavours!

Gilbert F. White

2011-05-18T08:30:00.002-04:00

In light of the current situation on the Mississippi River I thought it might be useful to post the Wikipedia discussion of Dr. Gilbert F. White, the modern father of the discipline of FPM [floodplain management]! Too bad the Obama Administration has not updated the two Carter Executive Orders, EO 11990 and 11988! I have personal knowledge that Dr. White approved of those orders as a significant step in the right direction for federal policy.

Gilbert F. White
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Gilbert Fowler White (November 26, 1911 in Chicago – October 5, 2006 in Boulder, Colorado) was a prominent American geographer, sometimes termed the "father of floodplain management" and the "leading environmental geographer of the 20th century" (Wescoat, 2006). White is known predominantly for his work on natural hazards, particularly flooding, and the importance of sound water management in contemporary society.

Contents

1 Background
2 Scholarly contributions
3 Recognition
4 Publications
5 References
6 External links
7 Notes

Background

White was raised in Chicago in the Hyde Park neighborhood, and spent summers in the Tongue River Valley of Wyoming, before studying at the University of Chicago, where he earned his B.S. in 1932 and his PhD in 1942. From 1946 to 1955 he was President of Haverford College. He then returned to Chicago as a professor of geography, where he was the central figure in the "Chicago school" of natural hazards research. In 1970, he moved to the University of Colorado, before retiring after ten years there. Having published his first paper in 1935, he was still publishing into his 90s (Wescoat and White, 2003).

White was motivated by his Quaker faith to do research beneficial to humanity. As a conscientious objector to World War II, from 1942 to 1946 he served with the American Friends Service Committee aiding war refugees in France, and was briefly interned by the Nazis at Baden-Baden. He continued to serve as a leader in various Quaker service organizations for much of his life. He was also heavily involved in applying his research to reform flooding and water policy in the United States and the Middle East.

In 1944, White married Anne Underwood, with whom he would have three children (Will, Mary, and Frances). Anne collaborated with Gilbert in his research until her death in 1989. Gilbert remarried in 2003 to Claire Sherridan.

Scholarly contributions

White's main contributions to society and to scholarship have been classified by Kates (2007) as follows:

How to bring safe water to all the world’s people as a human right
How to reduce significantly the global toll of hazard deaths and damages
How to facilitate peace, through joint water development and management
How to make geography (in particular) and science (in general) more useful to the world
How to enable people to coexist with nature and develop sustainably.

USACOE and FEMA Have not a Clue!

2011-05-17T06:25:00.000-04:00

Most have been riveted by the gushing waters of the recently opened Mississippi Main Stem spillways--including one by dynamite. This effort was largely designed before the era of computers and the USACOE and FEMA no longer have the in house skills to predict what will happen exactly from these efforts. Nor do they have the contractor talent to help them that they once did. The Vicksburg Waterways Experiment Station and the Hydraulic Engineering Center in Davis, CA may be working overtime but they cannot make up for the lack of detail, calibrated actual openings, and other data that just have not been collected to understand fully the impacts of these various man made changes in the river flow. The entirety of the system was really designed largely by guesswork long before computers so now almost anything could happen over the next 6 weeks.

THE 2011 MISSISSPPI RIVER EVENT WILL BE STUDIED FOR YEARS AS TO THE CHOICES MADE AND RESULTS AND COULD HAVE BEEN OR MIGHT HAVE BEENS. Hey give boys toys and they will always choose to play with them even when highly dangerous.

Good luck those subject to these GUESSTIMATES!

Disaster Housing--The FEMA Nemesis?

2011-05-14T09:39:00.000-04:00

Once again disaster housing looms huge in FEMA's future efforts. The disaster housing strategy has not yet been finalized by HUD and FEMA since being mandated in PKEMRA 2006!

So again a short history of disaster housing just to maintain the record as we enter another "temporary" housing crisis.

OEP (Office of Emergency Preparedness) in the WH was ended by President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 that sent disaster response and recovery to HUD. COOP and COG for the federal government went to FPA! Frank Carlucci, a Deputy Director of OMB had been the first true FCO in history and his clout was demonstrated when Nixon fired Secretary of HUD George Romney at Carlucci's request over disaster housing issues. Carlucci said you will and Romney said I can't!

So disaster housing was sent to a HUD that had as its statutory charge "decent, safe, sanitary housing for Americans"! In fact HUD, a largely corrupt bureaucracy that until DHS was created had the highest number of politically vetted positions in the entire Executive Branch was largely run to benefit the middlemen/women of the housing world. Lacking specific regulatory authority in many circumstances some in HUD, like the OIG fought the corruption but were largely unsuccessful. Between July 1, 1974 when I arrived and September 10, 1979 when I left over 2000 HUD officials and program participants were indicted and/or convicted.

Under President Carter, Secretary HUD Patricia Roberts Harris, an honest but patrician DC lawyer, the new disaster housing program was completely unwelcome and remained a stepchild in HUD! When ordered by Carter to W.VA during a disaster and trying to sort out housing problems Pat Harris decided to do all that she could to get rid of that mission. She told Carter she would lead the fight against the FEMA creation if he did not include disaster housing in the FEMA mission when created. The result was the stepchild was booted out of HUD's door and therein lies the tale!

An argument could be mounted successfully IMO that the recovery mission in disasters is largely housing. But few FEMA appointees have had a clue about disaster housing and have mostly worried over buying and selling "trailers" which only in Katrina were RV's with their formaldehyde problems and largely have been mobile homes/manufactured housing.

Always remember that FEMA is largely a grant making administrative agency with little real knowledge of the private sector and in particular the FIRE sector. The result continues that disaster housing is still a disaster. Both FEMA and HUD need to really do some hard thinking and work to come up with solutions. I believe the planning basis for disaster housing [to be surged in an event even higher] should be 500,000 homeless needing permanent housing. I have advocated that number for 30 years and always was shouted down by FEMA management.

How Flowage Easements may end the NFIP?

2011-05-12T00:45:00.000-04:00

Flowage easements allow the USACOE to periodically innundate not just agricultural land but also improved real estate and are designed to allow preservation of levees and other flood control structures during high water. The issue of prohibiting the issuance of NFIP insurance on flowage easements was addressed by me during my time in FEMA--1979-1999 and even before in HUD from 1974-1979! Not only was I opposed by those adminstering the NFIP but even the USACOE opposed such a prohibiton. As with areas behind levees, the NFIP maps never showed flowage easements. Now like Hurricane Katrina and its collapsed floodwalls in NOLA many claims may well be paid on insured real estate and further undermine the NFIP solvency.

Those who have followed my blogs and suggestions for NFIP reform know that I have continuously suggested that areas containing unmapped hazards have NO AVAILABILTY of NFIP insurance.

Since the NFIP by law is prohibited from subsidizing structural protection works means that the NFIP should send the bill for any payments to the USACOE as part of the costs of the USACOE opening the Bird's Point Floodway Levees and the Morganza Spillway.

Clear documentation of my efforts exist in NFIP rulemaking files because the exclusion for flowage easements actually made it into proposed rulemaking even though not finally adopted.

Another case where I would argue that program administrators had no real understanding of the NFIP or the fact that it is a LANDUSE program not an INSURANCE program.

And sympathy to those impacted by the opening of the various spillways and levee systems.

I also understand the Old River Control Structure has been partially opened to protect that structure. Time will tell but all should know that in the last 5000 years the actual outlet of the Mississippi river has wandered/meandered from the TEXAS border to the Mississippi STATE border.

FEMA February 2011 Org chart posted on Baseline Docs

2011-05-07T18:37:00.000-04:00

New org charts seem to arrive at least annually from FEMA or at least semi-annually. The FEMA counsel's office has taken the legal position that no necessity exists under any applicable federal law to publish FEMA's official delegations in the Federal Register. It should be of interest that NO other counsel office in the entirety of the federal executive branch takes this legal positon not even other components of DHS. The result is that we have to guess what authority and what programs, functions, and activities are delegated to the various FEMA components. Some basics might be in order.

First, just because legal authority is delegated it does NOT mean that the person vested with legal authority to delegate cannot in fact operate under the delegated authority. Thus, in any specific disaster the President could in fact operate all provisions of the STAFFORD ACT without consultation or even cooperation of FEMA. This actually has been done a number of times by the President sometimes without FEMA knowing about it until the bill showed up in the DRF to be paid.

Second, cross-delegations are always authorized thus the Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Labor in my time were delegated certain STAFFORD ACT activities although the delegation to HHS was de facto revoked by Director James Lee Witt when he started building hospitals.

Third, the President's power to delegate, once challenged in various cases, now rests primarily on the provisions of 3 US Code Section 301. Unless his/her delegation prohibits redelegation then any delegee of the President may redelegate to any other appropriate organizational head.

When a specific person by name is given authority that is usually referred to as a "designation" not a delegation.

Finally without published delegations the FEMA is in violation of the provisions of Constitutional law set forth by C.J. Marshall in Little v. Bareme. That case held that anyone who was impacted by FEDERAL actions was entitled to know the authority of the person taking the official action. Of course FEMA has always thrived on lack of accountability in its actions and often acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner with no construction of an administrative record. This is because FEMA is largely insulated from judical review because Sovereign Immunity has not been waived in the STAFFORD ACT. This should be remedied.

Just for fun review the FEMA org chart and try and figure out who exactly is accountable for the statutory function of prevention of terrorism assigned by PKEMA 2006 to the FEMA Administrator. Or ask who in FEMA is responsible for gathering, collection, analysis, and dessemination of domestic INTEL? Does FEMA have any law enforcement authority? Can FEMA personnel carry weapons? Does FEMA have any authority to support STATES and their local governments in controlling riots and civil disorders?

Another interesting question! Do other agencies in conducting mission assignments get held harmless by FEMA?

Is FEMA or other water resource agencies required to comply with the Principles and Standards for Water Resource Projects when funded under the DRF?

Has anything of importance not been given a categorical exclusion from preparation of an EIS when conducting its activities?

Many questions and different answers in many of the FEMA regions.

FLOODWAYS REPRESENT POLITICAL DECISIONS NOT HYDROLOGIC CONDITIONS

2011-05-06T02:54:00.000-04:00

From a recent news article:

"Compared to the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 this flood is going to be a lot nastier," said Marty Pope, senior hydrologist for the National Weather Service in Jackson, Miss.

The river is predicted to crest at 64.5 feet on May 17 in the Vicksburg, Miss. area. Vicksburg has a flood stage of 48 feet, which means the river will crest more than 16 feet above normal, according to flood experts at the National Weather Service.

The flood waters will reach more than a foot above the Yazoo Backwater Levee near Yazoo City, Miss. and this will flood thousands of acres of farmland, said Pope.

There were major floods on the Mississippi in 1927, 1937, 1973, 1993 and 2008. The 1927 flood caused up to 1,000 deaths and left 600,000 homeless. Floodways were adopted as a response.

Camillo said it was too early to estimate expected damage from the 2011 flooding. He noted that much has changed since the 1927 flood, including the structure of the levees and the addition of dozens of reservoirs throughout the Mississippi River basin and floodways.

The Mississippi has four floodways: Birds Point and three spillways in Louisiana.

"There is a very good possibility that we would operate three floodways ... and we have never done that before," Camillo said."

Camillo is the Chief Historian of the Mississippi River Commission.

What do I mean when I indicate that flood-ways are political decisions not hydrologic decisions. Fluid dynamics underpin hydrology and are complex but nothing could be as labyrithian as the politics of flood-ways their designation and enforcement. Witness recent court decisions on the USACOE decision to blow the Bird's Point Levee in several places.

Why? WELL to grossly over simplify designation of a floodway is where the high velocity waters during flood stage will go. By increasing channel efficiency in several ways the water will seek the path of least resistance. Thus, if on one side of the river a flood wall is constructed the river will flow over the town on the other side without the flood wall. Or perhaps a community chooses to improve hydraulic efficiency by mowing down forest and paving over the main channel thus improving channel efficiency and speeding the water downstream. The problem of course is that the Mississippi and its levee system is not a system at all an various political decisions over time have left USACOE holding the bag. Well this time they really will be holding it. Perhaps opening the MORGANZA spillway and opening the Old River Control Structure sending waters to where the Mississippi river would like to head naturally. And save NOLA of course but goodbye Morgan City and others.

Well the die are cast and now only the passage of the next few weeks will see how this plays out.

Whatever the situation Old Man River will keep on rolling along!

WELL the LUCKY STATES are? Those with floods and tornadoes?

2011-05-05T01:58:00.000-04:00

Well there is no statutorily mandated Disaster Housing Strategy in place nor a Long-Term Recovery Strategy but hey FEMA is on the move. In two wide scale geographic events, an historic level of tornado activity in the month of April and what appears to be large-scale main stem Mississippi River flooding of historic proportions we are about to find out if it is the NEW FEMA or not. Good luck to all involved. Please also cancel NLE 2011 because Craig you need any and all talent for the real deal.

But the subject of discussion is how lucky some STATES and their local governments are to be experiencing natural disasters since at least potential federal stimulus dollars will be arriving through FEMA as long as they are smart enough not to wast them on restoring existing mistakes.

We only have to look at Japan as a sophisticated nation-state seven weeks into its major crisis to see that efforts there have been stymied and blown by bureaucratic stove piping, failure to deal with reality, dependency on the private sector to fix what is has broken (with help from Mother Nature of course) to make us understand that EM is the real deal and not pretend. Real events whether labeled Black Swan or otherwise do occur and they must be responded to by any of those in governance positions. These events will test President Obama and FEMA over the next few months and may possibly overshadow foreign policy during those months in particular if the President and his advisers now think they can rest on their laurels after expending over two trillion dollars on the hunt for one man who until the very end outsmarted the USA big time.

Well we now know levees not only are proved valueless when over topped by events exceeding design intervals, or poorly maintained, but also by USACOE dynamite.

And keep your eyes on the Old River Control Structure and the Morganza Spillway. If you don't know what these are please get a copy of John McPhee's wonderful book from early 80's "The Control of Nature"! Goodbye Morgan City?

FEMA--An Engine for Economic Development?

2011-04-29T11:10:00.001-04:00

A brief history! In the Senate hearings and debates over the formation of FEMA in 1978, Senator William Proxmire foretold a FEMA future as an ATM for the STATES and their local governments. That prediction was followed by the defeat in spring 1993 of the Clinton Administration's economic development and stimulus plan. Instead Clinton was fortunate to have the 12 weeks notice of the late spring 1993 floods in the UPPER Midwest and he used that opportunity for the first time in disaster history to actually meet with the impacted STATES governors and promise them disaster outlays to stimulate not just their economic revival but even expansion. This was done by Director Witt under the direction of the WH political staff. It was successful. Now the same thing looks like it is about to occur under President Obama, and strangely it is NOT the current tornado outbreak but again the prospect of historic levels of mainstem riverine flooding that will provide the opportunity. Whether this foreshadows a FEMA pulled out of DHS in the forthcoming series of federal reorganizations that will end HUD as a Cabinet level department with FHA being merged with FNMA and FHMC is unknown at this point but probable. Now most of the real brain power on disaster housing and long-term recovery is coming from HUD not FEMA.

Interestingly a number of the major powers in the Approps Committee in the HOUSE are from Alabama and Senator Jeff Sessions whom I met in Alabama when US Attorney have enough seniority and status that Alabama will indeed be getting huge outlays of fresh disaster dollars. Also the federal facilities in Alabama including the Marshall Space Flight Center, knocked out from support of the last shuttle mission, will be getting large amounts of money to restore its operations.

Strangely, the Economics Profession has never agreed on whether the disaster outlays revive the devastated communities or not. There are examples both ways. Kobe, Japan for example despite the largest single outlays of disaster relief and recovery funds in world history have created a bright shining new city and port. But oddly its container and shipping traffic still has not reached pre-disaster levels. Suffice it to say the DHS/OIG and GAO have never looked at disasters from the potential economic stimulus point of view but the OBAMABA Administration like the Clinton Administration is about to do so.

Tornadoes

2011-04-27T08:27:00.000-04:00

Some how tornadoes have always been my favorite for testing local governments in their immediate response capability. Warnings have improved with the Community Weather Service effort of NOAA but still it is not perfect. That program was scheduled by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978 the plan that created FEMA to be moved to FEMA and even was included in EO 12127 but it never happened. That order has not been revised but the REAGAN ADMINISTRATION reversed course on that issue in 1982. FEMA three times to my knowledge under Congressional pressure funded wide scale provision of NOAA weather radios to communities. Also note that community warning through social media has not really been supported much at all by the federal government although the FCC is now taking an interest. The FCC post-Katrina efforts on emergency communications have been outstanding but worrisome is the impact of events that knock out cellular communications as occurred in Japan's recent catastrophe.

Well tornadoes are NO NOTICE EVENTS and therefore little federal help except after the fact federal financial assistance can be provided. The last tornado that really had a fundamental impact on federal disaster policy was Xenia, Ohio in 1974 in which my memory is that over 800 people died. Survivors wandering the streets weeks later led to the enactment of the provision of mental health counseling in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public Law 93-288. This was accomplished by personnel at NIMH over the objections of FEMA which seldom has sought expansion of its actual disaster relief authority and usually has opposed it even when enacted by bureacratically undermining the statutory mandate. Essentially because FEMA is largely immune from suit for its disaster activities it often chooses to ignore legal mandates. Perhaps Congress should review that exemption?

TOP TEN PREDICTIONS FOR EM in NEXT DECADE!

2011-04-27T08:13:00.000-04:00

Okay more idle speculation!

1. FEMA will not be around in present form at end of the administration whatever the party that wins at the end of the administration beginning January 20, 2012. Why? W. Craig Fugate has been doing an admirable job but the shifting sands of Washington are simply beyond his ken and the ken of those now employed or appointed to FEMA positions.

2. The National Security portfolio of FEMA will be removed by the NSC and President before the end of this first (or last) Obama Administration.

3. DHS will be severely reduced in size before the Presidential election of 2016 no matter who wins in 2012.

4. A new Department focusing on federalism and STATE and local economic development will be in place by 2017. Why? Currently most of the Executive Branch is focused on contracting not grants to the STATES and their local governments. Few federal appointees or employees have experience in STATE or Local Government.

5. Restrictions on deployment of the National Guard for war fighting will be imposed on DOD!

6. AID [Agency for International Development] will be removed from the STATE Department before 2017.

7. Haiti, Chile, NZ, and Japan will suffer at least one more large-scale earthquake this decade. This will devastate the recovery efforts following their recent efforts although some like in Haiti are quite feeble. Also large scale earthquakes will impact Turkey, Iran, China, and huge vulcano eruptions in Indonesia.

8. The UN disaster mission effort will be enlarged.

9. The UN military intervention role will be enlarged with US approval.

10. The USA will join the ICC under duress before 2020. The ICC is the International Criminal Court. And in a sharp turn left SCOTUS will repudiate most of the BUSH/OBAMA national security state activity.

FEMA and Catastrophic Preparedness

2011-04-19T08:44:00.000-04:00

FEMA issued it Preparedness Task Force report to Congress last fall. An advisory committee had been authorized by Congress to prepare a report informing Congress of what it could do to enhance National Preparedness. It has been suggested that PPD-8 was one outcome of the Task Force report. I argue that the TASK FORCE under leadership of FEMA and DHS did not come close to helping Congress understand the problems in the current national preparedness setup and certainly did not provide any kind of information base upon which the Congress could legislate to fill preparedness gaps. Please judge for yourself as you read over the recommendations that follow. I would argue that all could be addressed without further legislation but are more a matter of will in FEMA and DHS and the Executive Branch. Perhaps someone will be addressing this deficiency in depth at some point after the next catastrophe.

Here are the Recommendations of the TASK FORCE:

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS

Appendix A: Recommendations to Congress
Strategic Investments to Sustain and Grow Preparedness

Recommendations 1-25

#1: Include preparedness in the portfolio of strategic, futures-oriented analysis currently
conducted by the National Intelligence Council.

Desired Outcomes:

The National Intelligence Council integrates preparedness-related futures analyses into its
activities; and
.
DHS is able to use futures analyses to make authoritative judgments about future
requirements and/or capabilities, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas.

#2: The Department of Education, working with FEMA, should develop materials that school districts can use to implement a preparedness curriculum.

Desired Outcomes:
.
School districts around the country integrate preparedness principles and materials into
curricula; and Citizens entering adulthood understand the preparedness mindset and have taken basic steps to better prepare themselves individually or as a family at home, in the community, and in the workplace.

#3: Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to train and materially prepare for emergencies.

Desired Outcomes:
.
Governments at all levels increasingly consider and implement innovative financial
incentives to promote preparedness; and increasing numbers of individuals and businesses engage in preparedness planning and activities.

#4: Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the length and magnitude of disaster recovery.

Desired Outcomes:
.
Jurisdictions take steps—such as those identified in the San Francisco Success Story—to
initiate advanced recovery planning efforts; and jurisdictions are able to recover from catastrophic events more efficiently, rapidly, and effectively.

#5: Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness implications.

Desired Outcomes:
.
Cybersecurity capability enhancement is prioritized at the local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial levels; and

#4. National cybersecurity policy is expanded to include considerations for the resiliency of increasingly cyber-dependent preparedness and emergency management activities at all levels of government.

#5. Policy and Guidance

Desired Outcome:

Transform existing advisory bodies into a “networked” overarching
preparedness policy advisory system capable of influencing policy
policy from initiation to implementation.

#6: Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council.

Desired Outcome:
.
The NAC functions as an intergovernmental focal point and forum for local, State, Tribal,
and Territorial participation in all stages of the preparedness policy process.

#7: Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils.

Desired Outcome:

The RACs serve as regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that
communicates regional local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives and informs
national-level policy decisions.

#8: Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in the FEMA National Preparedness Directorate (NPD).

Desired Outcome:

.
Embedded local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials advise their Federal counterparts on emerging policy issues and serve as a conduit through which the NAC and RACs can
contribute to and keep informed of national preparedness policy.

#9: Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process.

Desired Outcome:

.
DHS establishes a clear, consistent, and efficient preparedness policy process that better
balances the Department’s need for deliberative flexibility with its need to engage broader elements of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise in collaborative policy-making.

#10: Engage non-governmental stakeholders in a collaborative policy process.

Desired Outcome:
.
Individuals and non-governmental organizations are engaged in a genuinely collaborative
preparedness policy process.

#11: Planning-related policy and guidance should ensure that basic emergency plans match community demographics.

Desired Outcome:
.
Communities better understand and account for their unique requirements and plans reflect these realities.

#12: Establish and fund a national, comprehensive mutual aid system based on NIMS.

Desired Outcome:
.
Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments efficiently coordinate mutual aid before,
during, and in the aftermath of major emergencies and events requiring national or
interstate level responses through a national, comprehensive mutual aid system.

#13: Develop a strategic policy planning process to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges.

Desired Outcome:

The NAC futures analysis workgroup performs long-range assessments and policy planning to mitigate the risk of strategic surprise and optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of preparedness investments.

Capabilities and Assessment --Overarching Prioritize development and phased implementation of a national Recommendation preparedness assessment framework

#14: Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation to justify preparedness improvements.

Desired Outcomes:
.
All levels of government are able to assess their risks using appropriate methodologies;
.
Framework for preparedness Investment Justifications is established;
.
Preparedness levels and progress are measured from year to year by evaluating the gaps
between current and targeted capability levels across all levels of government; and
Investments made to close gaps in capability levels result in a more prepared Nation and
reflect a measurable return on investment.

#15: Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List with tiered, capability-specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements.

Desired Outcomes:
.
All levels of government are able to assess their capability levels, with associated
performance objectives and resource needs;
.
FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address capability performance
gaps; and
.
FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address gaps in nationally
deployable NIMS-typed resources.

#16: Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland security and emergency management assets.

Desired Outcome:
.
Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders have greater visibility into
and access to the range of nationally deployable assets.

#17: Use existing, familiar, user-friendly systems, such as NIMSCAST, to collect preparedness assessment and resource inventory data from all levels of government.

Desired Outcome:
.
FEMA provides a system for data collection and subsequent reporting that is transparent,
repeatable and defendable.

#18: Implement the elements of a preparedness assessment framework over a three-year period, with an integrated set of annual milestones.

Desired Outcomes:
.
All levels of government have an understanding of their threat and hazard profiles,
associated capability needs, and documented capability shortfalls;
.
Grant investments and other preparedness activities are linked to documented capability
shortfalls; and
.
All levels of government have access to a NIMS-typed resource inventory of nationally
deployable assets.

Grants Administration

Make targeted improvements to preparedness grant-related

Overarching coordination and collaboration, business processes, and
capability assessment linkages.

#19: Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at the Federal level.

Desired Outcomes:

Federal agencies administering preparedness grants meet regularly to coordinate, as
appropriate, development of grant guidance, application/award timelines, monitoring, and
assessments;

.
Federal agencies providing preparedness grants have visibility into grantee-developed

strategic documents and use these documents to inform grant allocations and awards;
.
Preparedness grant programs reflect more consistent timelines; and
.
Preparedness grant programs employ the Grants.gov system as a common system.

#20: Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders regarding preparedness-related grant funds.

Desired Outcome:
.
SAAs for all Federal grant programs have increased visibility into grant initiatives,
resulting in more efficient and effective use of Federal grant funds.

#21: DHS should evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal preparedness assistance grants to ensure that match requirements do not disincentivize local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation and that they support capability development and sustainment.

Desired Outcome:
.
DHS conducts evidence-based evaluation to understand how match requirements influence local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation in preparedness grants.

#22: Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring functions should ensure consistent application of standards.

Desired Outcome:
.
Grant programs are administered and monitored consistently by regional offices.

#23: Allow grantees flexibility to use federal grant funds to support sustainment and maintenance costs without limitation.

Desired Outcome:
.
Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial grantees are able to use federal preparedness grants
flexibly to sustain and maintain existing capabilities.

#24: To reflect the diverse goals and objectives of Federal grant programs, grant funding should be allocated using a variety of approaches, including: 1) baseline amounts for each state and territory; 2) amounts based on risk formulas targeted to specific areas; 3) category/programs specific grants; and 4) competitive programs that encourage innovation.

Desired Outcome:
.
Grantees have access to a full range of preparedness grants to meet diverse needs.

#25: More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.

Desired Outcome:

Assessment data supports local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying
how grant funds contribute to capability improvements.

1906-San Francisco

2011-04-18T09:26:00.003-04:00

Rom today in history blog:

April 18: General Interest
1906 : The Great San Francisco Earthquake

"At 5:13 a.m., an earthquake estimated at close to 8.0 on the Richter scale strikes San Francisco, California, killing hundreds of people as it topples numerous buildings. The quake was caused by a slip of the San Andreas Fault over a segment about 275 miles long, and shock waves could be felt from southern Oregon down to Los Angeles.

San Francisco's brick buildings and wooden Victorian structures were especially devastated. Fires immediately broke out and--because broken water mains prevented firefighters from stopping them--firestorms soon developed citywide. At 7 a.m., U.S. Army troops from Fort Mason reported to the Hall of Justice, and San Francisco Mayor E.E. Schmitz called for the enforcement of a dusk-to-dawn curfew and authorized soldiers to shoot-to-kill anyone found looting. Meanwhile, in the face of significant aftershocks, firefighters and U.S. troops fought desperately to control the ongoing fire, often dynamiting whole city blocks to create firewalls. On April 20, 20,000 refugees trapped by the massive fire were evacuated from the foot of Van Ness Avenue onto the USS Chicago.

By April 23, most fires were extinguished, and authorities commenced the task of rebuilding the devastated metropolis. It was estimated that some 3,000 people died as a result of the Great San Francisco Earthquake and the devastating fires it inflicted upon the city. Almost 30,000 buildings were destroyed, including most of the city's homes and nearly all the central business district."

VLG Comment: Not sure about the 20K evacuees on the warship Chicago but also true that several mass care shelters were established for the first time in US history. Also the use of troops was clearly unlawful although perhaps warranted. Humanitarian assistance only by those troops was lawful not law enforcement and such "shoot to kill orders" have long been determined to be unlawful across the board.

Recent appearance of an obsolete Field Manual from 1945 on the FAS website demonstrates however that until 1980 and the wrestling and tugging between DOJ and DOD was resolved by a brilliant monograph on use of the Armed Forces in riots and civil disorders by a now long deceased but brilliant DOJ lawyer Mary Lawton demonstrates that riots and civil disorders in the USA have long prompted violations of federal, state, and local law and the US Constitution. Shoot first and ask later not good enough.

Bigger But is it Better--FEMA?

2011-04-12T17:04:00.000-04:00

According to the BUR [Bottom up review published last July] this is FEMA's current on-board personnel strength:

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):
Workforce
A blended workforce of 16,590 with 4,200 permanent, 3,390 temporary and 9,000
reserve employees Headquarters and Supporting Resources (1,988: 1,539 perm; 382 temp; 67 reserve)
Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center (837: 669 perm; 166 temp; 2 reserve) National Emergency Training Center (NETC) training facility (243), includes:
Emergency Management Institute (EMI) (58 perm; 15 temp; 9 reserve)
National Fire Academy (NFA) (110 perm; 1 temp)
Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) training facility (50 perm) Regional offices (10) and Area Offices (3)
Region 1 (100 perm; 17 temp; 570 reserve)
Region 2 (107 perm; 10 temp; 608 reserve)
Region 3 (101 perm; 14 temp; 519 reserve)
Region 4 (156 perm; 91 temp; 1311 reserve)
Region 5 (126 perm; 17 temp; 439 reserve)
Region 6 (126 perm; 85 temp; 912 reserve)
Region 7 (97 perm; 58 temp; 446 reserve)
Region 8 (89 perm; 20 temp; 433 reserve)
Region 9 (126 perm; 22 temp; 473 reserve)
Region 10 (97 perm; 15 temp; 585 perm)
Texas Transitional Recovery Office (1 temp)
Louisiana Transitional Recovery Office (1 perm; 485 temp)
Mississippi Transitional Recovery Office (276 temp)
Disaster Reservists (9,000) Disaster Support Resources
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) (1)
Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) (10)
Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO) (1 perm; 37 temp)
National Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT) (2)
Regional Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT) (4)
Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Detachments (6), each comprised of:
MERS Operations Centers (MOC)A-3
Incident Response Vehicle (IRV) capability Mobile Emergency Operations Vehicle (MEOV) capability Forward Communications Vehicle (FCV) capability
Logistics Distribution Centers (8)
Mobile Disaster Recovery Centers (MDRC) (60)
U.S.

The information available to me is that the totals of personnel in all categories as of January 20, 2009 were under 9.000.

Assuming the BUR is correct what are the implications of this array? First FEMA is bigger than in any time in its history. Second. what training and background -education, training, On the Job experience and does this cadre have now not tomorrow?

FEMA definitely needed to expand from the under oath testimony of Harvey Johnson that the day before Katrina landfall FEMA had on board less than 1500 FTEs.

I have studied FEMA's budgets rather closely over the years. I find no evidence of funding in the budget for the numbers above so can only assume that the much is funded out of the President's Disaster Relief Fund.
Prior to FEMA's existence both OEP (WH) and then FDAA (HUD)were authorized to spend 5% of disaster outlays on administrative costs including personnel. In 1982 Chairman Boland of the House Appropriations Committee required FEMA to bring on budget a portion of its disaster personnel costs. This was a huge change as you might imagine. FEMA now had to plan ahead.

So it is interesting to speculate on what personnel costs, organizational costs are now off budget again and who has review that system and how those costs are allocated.

Perhaps at some point the DHS/OIG and/or GAO will provide information adequate to inform the Congressional Committees and interested members of the public. It should be easy to document needs post-Katrina. By the way I have never seen a formal delegation from the Secretary DHS to FEMA to the various Gulf Coast states FEMA Recovery Offices and wonder if such exists?

NEMA Conducting BUR for PA on Behalf of FEMA

2011-04-11T07:11:00.000-04:00

According to a recent post on Disaster Zone by Eric Holderman NEMA on behalf of FEMA is conducting a BUR [Bottom up Review] of the PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM pursuant to the Stafford Act. Based on the questions asked by NEMA it looks like Bill Carwile's organization is looking at PA hard for the first time since the
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 [Public Law 93-288] was enacted. One of the biggest changes that law wrought in PA was to allow payments to nonprofit organizations that provided community services. I have long argued that only nonprofits that were exempt from FEDERAL and STATE taxes should be eligible for that assistance. Many nonprofits exist that do not have that status and are not qualified for tax deductions for contributions by donors. The Vacation Lane Group is one such organization. Of course I probably don't provide community services either.
Many nonprofits are totally unregulated and exist only to duck under the audit scope of governmental organizations with their officers taking huge salaries. Over 10% of the GDP of the USA [meaning production of goods and services] are in the nonprofit sector. Perhaps a new MORTMAIN statute in the USA?

FEMA and National Preparedness AS Expounded by PPD-8

2011-04-09T11:38:00.001-04:00

There is only a passing reference to FEMA in new PPD-8!

That reference [italics mine] follows:

Nothing in this directive is intended to alter or impede the ability to carry out the authorities of executive departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law and consistent with applicable legal authorities and other Presidential guidance. This directive shall be implemented consistent with relevant authorities, including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 and its assignment of responsibilities with respect to the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

I have previously examined in some detail PKEMRA 2006 on this blog and elsewhere. The text is available on the home page of this blog. See key statutes.

There were some assignments of new duties to FEMA in PKEMRA 2006 but almost no new legal authority to do anything or focus FEMA largely due to the fact that PKEMRA 2006 was written primarily by the Homeland Security Committee of the House of Representatives and that committee lacks oversight of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act! Thus a fundamental disconnect continues thanks to the incompetence of the Congress in organizing itself.

It will be interesting to see who reviews activities under the new PPD-8 to determine whether they are inconsistent with PKEMRA 2006. Not a small job IMO.

REP-Radiological Emergency Preparedness-Can you find this program in FEMA?

2011-03-28T02:06:00.001-04:00

If you think the new FEMA organizational charts make sense try and locate Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) as an example.

Congress has three times mandated an Earthquake Office in FEMA and perhaps that is why FEMA no long leads the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHERP) for which leadership transferred in 2004 to NIST! But hey NIST is in what Department? Hint! The Department about to be broken up President Obama's first reorganization project.

And looking like any DHS programs for which oversight is given by the Science Committees of Congress might well become part of a new Science based department that also deals with climate and natural resources.

The Obama Administration first cut will concern making sure that trade and sensitive technology transfers to other nation-states and their corporations is finally policed.

Remember I long advocated that FEMA be largely a science and engineering and research organization and let others do grants and funding of STATES and their local governments for recovery. This suggestion picking up steam as the recovery mission looking good to be out of FEMA this first term of the Obama Administration.

Footnote 19 of a 2005 CRS report stated specifically that FEMA had no recovery legal authority. I disagree but it is pretty thin gruel. When disaster ops transferred to HUD from OEP in 1973 by Richard M. Nixon in Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 the focus was on housing and community development. Looking now like that might happen but in a new form--economic aid to States and their local government taken out of FEMA and HUD and EDA at the Department of Commerce. In short DOC of which 2/3 of staff and funding is NOAA is in the cross-hairs of Presidential Reorganization.

Quick Take on Current Events

2011-03-28T01:53:00.000-04:00

My periodic take on current events will no longer appear on this blog but is being transferred to http://www.vacationlanegrp.wordpress.com

Sorry for any inconvenience!

Intergovernmental Affairs in DHS and FEMA

2011-03-27T12:37:00.000-04:00

In the "new" FEMA [that means the FEMA post March 31,2007 when PKEMA 2006 became fully effective] there once was an Intergovernmental Affairs Office! That office was moved to a direct report to the Secretary DHS by a DHS appropriations statute. The importance of that office to the overall success of FEMA and DHS is worthy of comment, study and Congressional oversight. Juliette Kayeem has returned to Harvard. I have posted on her on this blog before. Now a defeated Democratic Congresswoman has taken over the position. I have now located a position paper issued by the Project on National Security Reform that articulates the importance of that job and office far better than I could so please go to the following:

White Paper: Proposed DHS Office of Intergovernmental Coordination

It would be of interest to know what Juliette Kayeem thought of this paper issued prior to her joining FEMA and if she ever saw it before taking that job or afterwards.

NFIP REFORM TESTIMONY

2011-03-25T13:10:00.000-04:00

FEMA Adminstrator W. Craig Fugate is scheduled to give testimony on Friday next of NFIP reform. His prefiled testimony from March 11th was postponed by the Japanese earthquake and tsuanami.

I have taken the liberty of rewriting that prefiled testimony and wondering what readers of this blog think about my rewrite? If you like it write to your Congressional members and if not ignored it.

Here it is:

VLG Version

I. Introduction

Good afternoon Chairwoman Biggert, Ranking Member Gutierrez, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Craig Fugate, and I am the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It is an honor to appear before you today on behalf of FEMA to discuss the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).

The National Flood Insurance Program serves as the foundation for national efforts to reduce losses of property from flood disasters, reduce free disaster relief expenditures, and has been estimated to save the nation $1.6 billion annually in avoided flood losses. By encouraging and supporting mitigation efforts, the NFIP leads our nation in reducing the impact of flood disasters that are 80% of all disasters declared by the President. In short, the NFIP saves money.[note that no study ever indicated the NFIP saved lives.] While the NFIP has experienced significant successes since it was created 42 years ago, there are a number of challenges currently facing the program. The most significant challenge is making the program fiscally supportable.. The NFIP must continue to offer available and affordable insurance in the absence of a private market that will properly identify those at risk and provide them adequate coverage, while reducing the need for taxpayer-financed disaster assistance. Those who occupy the flood plain should bear the full costs of that occupancy including environmental costs which should be fully documented and understood.

In my testimony today, I will provide a brief history and overview of the NFIP and discuss critical changes FEMA or Congress have made to the program over the years. I also plan to discuss the recent efforts of FEMA’s NFIP Reform Working Group, which is developing policy recommendations for comprehensive NFIP reform for the Secretary of Homeland Security. It is important to note, however, that the Administration has not taken a position on the preferred course of action for NFIP reform and that these are currently draft proposals from the NFIP Reform Working Group. Congress has been a valuable partner in all of our NFIP efforts, and we appreciate your attention to this important matter.

One major recent decision on the NFIP was made in full consultation with Congress and that is to credit levees that may never be built for lower rates for policy coverage. This decision may be challenged by Environmental groups in the federal courts and does not promote fiscal soundness.

II. Overview of the National Flood Insurance Program

The NFIP is designed to insure against, as well as minimize or mitigate, the short and long-term risks to property from the effects of flooding, and to reduce the escalating cost of flooding to taxpayers. Flooding can occur along river banks, or result from weather-related coastal hazards, such as cyclonic storms, related storm surge, tsunamis,, flood related erosion or mudslides. More than half of the U.S. population lives in coastal watershed counties or floodplain areas. Flooding was the most costly and prevalent natural hazard in the United States in the last century.

History of the NFIP

Major flood disasters in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s led to federal involvement in the effort to protect lives and property from flooding. Even though Congress enacted the 1936 Flood Control Act to reduce the overall risk of flooding, there were still significant at-risk communities that lacked insurance. In the 1950s, it became evident that private insurance companies could not provide flood insurance at an affordable rate. At that time, the only relief available to flood survivors was disaster assistance through the Federal Disaster Assistance Program. In 1968, Congress established the NFIP to make affordable flood insurance available to the general public, and to protect communities from potential damage through floodplain management, which is the implementation of corrective and preventive measures to reduce flood damage.

When Tropical Storm Agnes struck the Nlorth Eastern US and in particular the Lycoming and the Cheaspeake Bay tributaries in June 1972, many communities were either unaware of the serious flood risk they faced or were unwilling to take the necessary measures to protect residents of the floodplain. Very few of the communities affected by the storm had applied for participation in the NFIP. Even in participating communities, most owners of flood-prone property opted not to purchase flood insurance; instead, they chose to rely on federal disaster assistance to finance their recovery. As a result, Congress enacted the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 to establish a mandatory flood insurance purchase requirement for structures located in identified Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) that have a federally backed insurance or mortgages.

The next year, Congress enacted the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public Law 93-288, reflecting passage of the
Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1974. that contained several preparedness and mitigation provisions to reduce disaster-related losses. The Flood Mitigation Assistance program (FMA) was created as part of the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 to reduce NFIP claims. This law established a FMA Grant Program to assist states and communities to develop mitigation plans and implement measures to reduce future flood damages. It also authorized the ICC coverage under the NFIP. This Increased Cost of Construction provision was a rider so those rebuilding in place post flood could mitigate future losses.

The federal government is underwriter of the NFIP, meaning that it determines what risks will be covered and the price of the premium to be paid for assumption of those risks. The private WYO companies that sell and service NFIP policies do not underwrite the program. And with the inherent risk that it assumes, the NFIP requires mitigation actions designed to break the cycle of repeated disaster damage and reconstruction. To mitigate against repeated losses and damage to properties associated with flooding, Congress established two programs in the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 – the Severe Repetitive Loss program and the Repetitive Flood Claims program.

Today, more than 21,000 communities in 56 states and territories participate in the NFIP, resulting in more than 5.6 million NFIP policies providing over $1.2 trillion in coverage. However, only 8,000 communities have detailed Flood Insurance Risk Maps and many do not have designated floodways. Coastal communities are mapped with different mapping models for riverine/inland communities. Some communities do have both hazards. To directly respond to the flood-risk reduction needs of communities, FEMA has produced digital flood hazard data for more than 88 percent of the nation’s population. This effort was largely based on improved contour interval data including that derived from LIDAR. The NFIP floodplain management standards in each participating community if correctly adopted and enforced can help to reduce flood losses in newly constructed buildings by more than 80 percent.

Prior to 2003, more than 70 percent of FEMA’s flood maps were at least ten years old. These maps were developed using what is now outdated technology, and more importantly, many maps no longer accurately reflected current flood hazards. Over the last eight years, Congress has provided over $1 billion to update and digitize our nation’s flood maps so we better understand the risks that our nation faces from flooding. Since the start of FY 2009, we have been implementing the Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) program, which not only addresses gaps in flood hazard data, but uses that updated data to form a solid foundation for risk assessment and floodplain management, and to provide state, local, and tribal governments with information needed to mitigate flood-related risks. Risk MAP is introducing new products and services extending beyond the traditional digital flood maps produced in Flood Map Modernization, including visual illustration of flood risk, analysis of the probability of flooding, economic consequences of flooding, and greater public engagement tools. FEMA is increasing its work with officials to help use flood risk data and tools to effectively communicate risk to citizens, and enable communities to enhance their mitigation plans.

This past fiscal year, the NFIP reduced potential flood losses by an estimated $1.6 billion and increased flood insurance policies by 47,992. FEMA also initiated 600 Risk MAP projects affecting 3,800 communities and addressed their highest priority engineering data needs, including coastal and levee areas.

As the Agency moves forward with our mapping program, we remain mindful of the challenges that flood mitigation efforts can pose for many families and communities. To that end, FEMA has used the flexibility it has under the NFIP to implement several important reforms that recognize these challenges. Two of the most notable of these reforms are the creation of Preferred Risk Policies and Scientific Resolution Panels.

Scientific Resolution Panels

Flood hazards are constantly changing. For that reason, FEMA regularly updates Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) to reflect those changes. When changes to the FIRMs are met with conflicting technical and scientific data, an independent third-party review of the information may be used to ensure the FIRMs are updated correctly.

FEMA’s new Scientific Resolution Panel (SRP) process, established in November 2010, serves as an independent third party in order to work with communities to ensure the flood hazard data depicted on FIRMs is built collaboratively using the best science available. A community, tribe or political entity that has the authority to adopt and enforce floodplain ordinances for its jurisdiction can request that FEMA use the SRP when conflicting data are presented.

The SRP is composed of technical experts in engineering and scientific fields that relate to the creation of Flood Hazard Maps and Flood Insurance Studies throughout the United States. Based on the scientific and technical data submitted by the community and FEMA, the SRP renders a written recommendation that FEMA either deny the community’s data or incorporate it in part or in whole into the FIRM. For an appeal or protest to be incorporated, the community’s data must satisfy the NFIP standards for flood hazard mapping. The SRP process is reflective of the value FEMA places on the importance of community collaboration to create accurate and credible flood maps.

Preferred Risk Policy

In 2003, with the support of Congress, FEMA began to implement several initiatives to update our flood maps, especially in those areas that are subject to a high risk of flooding. These initiatives include the Flood Map Modernization program (called MapMod), risk mapping, assessment and planning (by way of Risk MAP), and the Provisionally Accredited Levee (PAL) program.

These flood map updating efforts have yielded maps that more accurately calculate the flood risk. As a result of these efforts, many buildings that were previously considered low-risk have been designated as Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs). The flood risk is real and many property owners now find themselves in high-risk areas, and subject to a flood insurance purchase requirement. Notably, approximately the same number of structures have been removed from the SFHAs as have been added as a result of FEMA’s updated mapping program.

While these map changes provide a more accurate reflection of a community’s flood risk and will minimize the long-term risks and costs to people and property from the effects of flooding, FEMA recognizes the financial hardship that SFHA designation may place on individuals in newly identified SFHAs. Consequently, last year, FEMA announced a policy that went into effect on January 1, 2011, extending eligibility of low-cost preferred risk policies (PRPs) for individuals newly mapped into an SFHA.

Pursuant to the new PRP eligibility extension, owners of buildings newly mapped into an SFHA on or after October 1, 2008, and before January 1, 2011, are eligible to receive a reduced premium for up to two policy years beginning January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2012. Owners of buildings that will be added to an SFHA because of a map revision on or after January 1, 2011, are eligible to receive up to two policy years of reduced premiums after a map revision.

Eligibility extension of PRPs should help to ease the financial burden on affected property owners in this difficult economic environment. With this change, property owners should also have adequate time to understand and plan for the financial implications of the newly communicated flood risk and the mandatory purchase requirement. Finally, this two-year extension provides more time for the affected communities to upgrade or mitigate flood control structures to meet FEMA standards and reduce the flood risk. This reduces the financial impact on residents and businesses in the long term while making their communities safer and stronger.

The NFIP has successfully reduced flood risk across the United States since its inception in 1968. Evidence of its success can be seen in the more than 21,000 participating communities, more than 5.6 million flood insurance policy holders, a modernized flood hazard data inventory, and a suite of incentives driving risk reduction across the nation. Clearly, the program has improved the resistance of existing and new construction to flooding through building standards, and has helped individuals and businesses recover more quickly from flooding through the insurance process. However, after 42 years of program operation, concerns about the program remain.

III. NFIP Reform Working Group

After more than a decade of seeking input, identifying issues, and undergoing studies, FEMA believes that the time has come to undertake a critical review of the NFIP. As Members of this Subcommittee and others in Congress consider NFIP reform, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Administration is prepared to assist those efforts as appropriate.

In 2009, I asked staff to begin a comprehensive review of the NFIP. This review has involved three important phases designed to elicit policy recommendations and engage a broad range of stakeholders, including floodplain managers, emergency managers, lenders, the insurance industry, the environmental community, federal agencies and private non-profit organizations. With so many diverse interests, stakeholder engagement has been a critical foundation of the review process.

Phase I of the NFIP review effort began in November 2009 with a listening session designed to capture and analyze stakeholder concerns and recommendations. The session included more than 200 participants and resulted in nearly 1,500 comments and recommendations from stakeholders.

Phase II began in March 2010, when FEMA formally established the NFIP Reform Working Group, tasked with identifying the guiding principles and criteria for potential proposals to reform the NFIP. This internal Working Group is comprised of a cross-section of FEMA’s NFIP staff. As a means to conduct the analysis, FEMA chose a participatory policy analysis framework to guide the NFIP review effort. This Phase II effort incorporated the recommendations and themes resulting from the NFIP listening session and web comments. The NFIP Reform Working Group concluded this phase in May 2010 and released a final report entitled “NFIP Reform: Phase II Report.” The results of both Phases I and II are now available on FEMA’s website.

As part of Phase III, which is ongoing, the NFIP Reform Working Group is reviewing a comprehensive body of work offering a critique of the NFIP, including reports by the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service and the DHS Office of the Inspector General; testimony before Congressional committees; proceedings of various policy meetings; policy papers published by industry, advocacy and professional associations; and review and analysis of scholarly works. We have been reaching out and coordinating our reform efforts with other federal agencies. One example is through The Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force which is comprised of twelve federal agencies and whose purpose is to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public by encouraging programs and policies that reduce flood losses and protect the natural environment.

Based on this research and stakeholder input, the NFIP Reform Working Group drafted a number of policy options for deliberation and public comment. In December 2010, FEMA held two public meetings and initiated a public comment period in order to solicit input from stakeholders on the policy options. Public input from these efforts served as a source for the refinement of the policy alternatives. Over 150 stakeholders attended the public meetings and we received 84 additional comments on specific policy options.

The NFIP Reform Working Group has identified several important issues that Congress may wish to address in the context of reform. They include, but are not limited to, actuarial soundness and program solvency, cost and affordability of flood insurance, mandatory purchase requirements, accuracy of mapping, economic development and environmental protection. I would like to briefly discuss each of these issues.

Actuarial Soundness and Program Solvency

Current subsidies reflect the challenge to implementing the NFIP under the legislative mandate that flood insurance “is available at reasonable terms and conditions to those who have need.”1While the current program collects more than $3 billion in premium revenue annually, estimates indicate that an additional $1.5 billion in premium revenue is foregone due to the current subsidized rate policy. This annual premium shortfall has at times required FEMA to use its statutory authority to borrow funds from the Treasury. These funds were used to pay flood damage claims to policyholders. Although payments have been made to reduce this obligation, $17.75 billion in debt remains and FEMA is unlikely to pay off its full debt, especially if it faces catastrophic loss years. The NFIP review effort is exploring fiscal soundness by analyzing inherent program subsidies and examining potential methods to further reduce the loss of life and property. Mandatory Purchase Requirement, Affordability and Cost The cost of an NFIP policy, and the affordability of flood insurance, is a topic of frequent discussion. In some communities, the introduction of updated flood hazard mapping results in new requirements for the purchase of NFIP policies. These premiums represent an unbudgeted and often unanticipated expense to property owners. To some, the insurance is unaffordable. While FEMA has implemented some measures to address affordability concerns – including the Preferred Risk Policy – the program offers no means-based test that prices premium to income level. Affordability concerns are explored in the NFIP review effort with a variety of measures examined, ranging from credits and vouchers to high-deductible policies. Accuracy of Mapping When the new and more accurate map expands the flood hazard area based on the latest science and information on flood risks, property owners newly added to this area, and thus required to purchase an NFIP policy, are understandably concerned. In some instances, this concern leads to questions about the scientific credibility of our mapping process. As noted above, we have created Scientific Resolution Panels to resolve these questions. And while FEMA is committed to working closely with communities to develop the most accurate flood maps possible, the current “in or out” nature of the SFHAs (one is either in an SFHA or not) has left the program with a perceived credibility problem, as there is no gradation of risk identified within a flood zone.

Economic Development and Environmental Protection

1 Title 42 USC Chapter 50 4001(a)

The impact of the NFIP on economic development is another matter of debate among stakeholders. Areas prone to flooding may have unique resource advantages such as proximity to waterborne transport, as well as environmental or recreational value. However, these advantages, which may be revenue positive for a property owner or community in the short term, may become liabilities during a severe flooding event. As written by the Association of State Floodplain Managers: “[l]and use decisions are made by communities and tend to be based on local short-term economic factors in the form of community growth and resultant increases in the local tax base. These decisions often favor using floodplains for economic development, with the fact that the area is subject to flooding being a much lower priority in the decision.”2The challenge of balancing economic development with floodplain management and risk reduction is explored in Phase III of the review effort. The extent to which the NFIP encourages or accelerates floodplain development, and the adverse environmental consequences that often result from that development, remains a significant source of concern. Recently, a number of Endangered Species Act (ESA) lawsuits have been filed across the country based on the Agency’s implementation of the NFIP. Several environmental groups have alleged that FEMA incentivizes and encourages development in floodplains that jeopardizes the continued survival of endangered species and results in the adverse modification of critical habitat. These lawsuits allege that FEMA has failed to adequately assess and address the potential effects of the NFIP on endangered species and habitat, and that FEMA has failed to use its authority to carry out programs to preserve certain species, as required by the ESA. ESA litigation against the agency based on implementation of the NFIP is currently ongoing in several states. As a result, concerns about the impact of the NFIP on the environment are a prominent element of the public debate about the program. Of course, these are not the only near-term issues that comprehensive NFIP reform should address. The NFIP Reform Working Group is examining other issues, which include certification of levees, properties that incur repeated loss and damages that significantly drain the NFIP, subsidies, insurance ratings, building standards, and incentives and disincentives for mitigation.

IV. NFIP Reform Policy Alternatives In January 2011, FEMA’s NFIP Reform Working Group completed the refinement of policy alternatives and began the policy evaluation phase. The policy options are intentionally provocative and designed to represent the broadest range of policy options. The four policy alternatives moving forward to the evaluation phase each represent a unique policy theme. I would like to briefly discuss each policy option. The Administration has not taken a position on the preferred course of action for NFIP reform. These are currently draft proposals from the NFIP Reform Working Group. At this time, I view our role as helping to facilitate a needed conversation on identifying an effective path forward.

Community Based Insurance Policy Option

2 Association of State Floodplain Managers Whitepaper, Critical Facilities and Flood Risk; November 10, 2010.

The NFIP uses two mechanisms for implementing the floodplain management, mapping, and insurance elements of the program. States and communities administer floodplain management requirements, including permitting and regulating land use. Communities also adopt Flood Insurance Rate Maps. However, the insurance element of the program is administered by “Write Your Own” insurance companies that participate in the program or by FEMA directly. Thus, while the community issues permits for construction in the floodplain, the policyholder bears the cost of insuring against flood risk through the payment of an annual flood insurance premium. Community land-use decisions do not account for the full cost of flood risk.

Based on what we have heard from stakeholders, we are exploring community-based flood insurance, whereby risk assessments would be performed on individual buildings and the insurance premium payment would be made by the community. As part of this option, the federal government would continue to back flood insurance contracts in exchange for the adoption and enforcement of minimum floodplain management standards and would provide an assessment and calculation of flood risk. The sum in dollars of the risk assessment for all buildings in the community would constitute the required premium. Incentives could be structured to encourage communities to implement flood mitigation measures in order to reduce their overall premium assessment.

Privatization Policy Option

The NFIP was created in 1968, in part because of the absence of any substantive means, by insurance or otherwise, to mitigate the risk of flood hazards on the private insurance markets. Many hurdles stood in the way at the time: areas prone to flood hazards and the likelihood of flooding had not been identified; building practices and codes that mitigate the flood hazard were neither known nor enforced; and the financial risk of insuring properties with the potential for large catastrophic losses posed an unmanageable threat to the solvency of insurers.

In the more than 40 years since NFIP was created, a number of our stakeholders have indicated that the landscape has changed: flood risk has been digitally mapped and identified for 88 percent of the population; private and public sector modeling tools are available to model riverine and coastal flooding; the 21,000-plus communities participating in the NFIP have adopted building codes and practices to mitigate flooding; and the insurance and financial markets have developed a variety of means to spread risk from traditional reinsurance to more recent innovations of catastrophe bonds, risk markets, and financial derivatives.

Historically, the private insurance market has taken the position that flood is either un-insurable or prohibitively expensive. With that in mind, in January 2011, we brought in Chief executives from several Write-Your-Own companies to discuss the optimal balance in flood coverage between the private and public sectors. This preliminary discussion served to initiate the conversation with the private flood industry to better understand what’s possible in the future.

Federal Assistance Policy Option

Under the federal assistance option, we are exploring a new framework for flood loss reduction in which the federal government would provide financial assistance through all federal flood management programs only in communities in which specific flood mitigation and preparedness measures have been enacted. Failure of a community to enact such measures would result in a significant reduction in federal flood-related disaster assistance, ineligibility for pre- and post-disaster grants for floodplain relocation, and could include limitations for flood control works.In this option, the program could create a rating system similar to the NFIP’s Community Rating System. The community rating could correspond to a cost share structure for federal flood disaster and mitigation programs. Communities with higher ratings could be given more favorable cost share arrangements, whereas those with lesser rating could receive a significantly reduced cost-share from NFIP.

Optimization of Current Program Policy Option

The NFIP optimization policy option outlines potential enhancements to the existing program to address programmatic weaknesses and current challenges while optimizing the existing achievements, strengths, and benefits of the program. The options for modification address many areas of the program such as Pre-FIRM subsidies, grandfathering, rating freedom, properties that are a significant drain on the NFIP (e.g. repetitive loss properties), coverage limits, mandatory purchase, assistance to low-income citizens, floodplain management standards, levees, flood hazard data, mitigation programs and grants, natural and beneficial functions of floodplains, and the NFIP debt.

These four policy proposals present a broad spectrum of the options available to enact comprehensive NFIP reform, but they are not the only ones. All policy options, however, acknowledge that even an extremely successful flood mitigation effort cannot eliminate flood risk. Flooding will continue to cause economic loss, which begs the question: who should bear that loss? The NFIP Reform Working Group heard varying opinions on this matter, which are reflected in the four draft policy options. Economic loss from flood could be borne by local economies, charitable organizations, individuals who experience the flood loss, taxpayers through disaster relief and individual assistance programs, or the private insurance market.

FEMA believes that the nature of the NFIP demands that it be looked at holistically for reform rather than piecemeal; as changing one facet impacts other aspects of the reform process. A successful outcome of NFIP reform will include a multi-year reauthorization of the NFIP to provide program stability, and a reform proposal that addresses short term issues; considers expert judgment and best practices; establishes the long term program direction; and incorporates the incremental reforms necessary to achieve that target state. The single most effective overall reform step that could be taken is to allow only those in mapped 1% annual occurrence flood plains to buy NFIP coverage leaving to the STATES, their local govenments, and the private business of insurance coverage for the flood peril outside of the so-called hundred year flood plain. Also FEMA and the NFIP should have a clear statutory mandate that no hazard unmapped should be covered under the NFIP unless specifically authorized in statute.

V. Conclusion

FEMA uses the NFIP to help communities increase their resilience to disaster through risk analysis, risk reduction, and risk insurance. The NFIP helps individual citizens recover more quickly from the economic impacts of flood events, while providing a mechanism to reduce exposure to flooding through compliance with building standards and encouraging sound land-use decisions.

While the NFIP has been an extremely successful program through its 42 years of existence, we know we can do better. Through the NFIP Reform Working Group, we have engaged stakeholders of various disciplines from across the nation to help us guide the NFIP review11 effort. We look forward to sharing the findings from this on-going effort with you as we continue to work together to ensure a strong NFIP.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

REP-Radiological Emergency Preparedness CORRECTION

2011-03-24T12:26:00.000-04:00

I believe I mentioned the Rasmussen report several times on this blog. I indicated it was published by NRC as WASH 1100 but in fact it is WASH 1400.

Apologies for the error!

National Flood Insurance Program Reform

2011-03-23T15:01:00.000-04:00

House Moving Forward on Flood Insurance Reform

The House Financial Services Subcommittee overseeing Insurance will hold a hearing on April 1 to obtain the views of FEMA on the legislative proposals to reform the National Flood Insurance Program. The panel’s only witness will be The Honorable Craig Fugate, Administrator of FEMA.

Fugate will present FEMA’s strategy for improving the NFIP, including its flood map modernization plan. He will also report on the preliminary findings of FEMA’s three phase NFIP Reform Working Group that began in 2009 and is set to conclude in 2011.

The same House subcommittee has scheduled April 6 to vote on Chairman Biggert’s NFIP Reform proposal. NAMIC supports this proposal and has been instrumental in the inclusion of several important provisions including actuarially sound rates, updated flood plain maps and incentives for pre-disaster mitigation through building codes. NAMIC Chairman Sandy Parrillo presented these views at a March 11 legislative hearing.

After subcommittee markup on April 6, the full House Financial Services Committee is expected to consider the bill in early May. It is the goal of Chairman Biggert and her Republican colleagues to pass a bill out of the House by Memorial Day so the Senate may begin consideration well in advance of the September 30 expiration date of the NFIP.

I will be posting the testimony of Craig Fugate with my analysis on http://www.vacationlanegrp.wordpress.com in the next few days.