AT FEMA we (me and others) used to laugh at how successful many STATES and their local governments were in having timely disasters in the sense that their budget coffers needed renewal badly. Some of the Key states were California, Louisiana,Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and West Virginia. Alabama does okay also. Of course FEMA is horrible at statistics and it would be interesting to see a table of total federal disaster outlays since passage of Public Law 875 of the 81st Congress, specifically the Disaster Relief Act of 1970. Those outlays should be by STATE, COUNTY, and CITY. But of course FEMA does not have those numbers. I guess FEMA in its efforts to not comply with the statutory mitigation mandate in the statute since Public Law 93-288 does not want to be inflicted with discussion of repetitive disasters for some of its favorite clients. And of course since 1969 and the issuance of the first NFIP policies any statistics on disaster outlays should also include NFIP claims paid and maybe also STATE PREMIUM TAXES paid (not illegal but not required to be paid either) and other costs of administration buried in the disaster programs, functions, and activities and NFIP ops. After all think of all those localized disaster ops and adjusting ranks showing up just like the "storm troopers" often discussed by the MSM.
Now that the STATES with the most disasters know more about FEMA policy and procedures than FEMA and in cases like California have records on individual damage surveys that allow them to argue FEMA has paid similar claims in the past or issued similar grants it is easy for FEMA to be essentially outwitted by the more competent disaster bureacracies at the STATE level for states almost constantly playing the disaster game. The same of course goes for the insureds with repetitive losses under the NFIP. Shockingly since both programs by statute were designed to be meshed in administration this never has happened either in HUD from 1973-1979 or FEMA from 1979 to the present. And perhaps more shockingly few appointees, employees etc understand both programs and exactly how they are gamed and operated in conjuction either with the STATES and their local governments or the private insurance sector.
By the way just one example! The NFIP policies look like they benefit the homeowner in the main. But because there is no federal definition of property or interests in property and certainly not in the NFIP these concepts when push comes to shove are determined under STATE law, usually found in the appellate court system of the STATE or in rulings of the various STATE AG offices. So let's take an example of the 25-35% of policies residential or commercial that have a NFIP policy in place based on ownership but in fact on structures that are underwater (not literally) just meaning those whose mortgage totals exceed the value of the property. So in those cases many states treat property insurance and in particular where mandated as being in fact two policies even though only one exists. And guess what the holder of the mortgage gets first priority draw on any paid claim. Thus in many cases the "owner" meaning he or she who is the mortgage debtor pays the policy premiums but in fact has no insurance on the property unless it is insured to full value and even if not cannot cash the claims check which the NFIP makes out to both the insured and the mortgagee without getting the latter to approve it. And in many cases the mortgage hold insists that the owner sign first to ensure they then get their money before the insured does so. And of course since it is a federal program few STATE Insurance Departments take much interest in NFIP adjustment issues or claims issues or even who benefits.
Well my point is simple. Both the disaster programs and and the NFIP are administered with inidivuals and property owners last in line. The STATES even rake off huge administrative fees as the primary grantees for disaster outlays with their cities subgrantees.
You get the picture! No one in a very long time has actually examined disaster and NFIP ops to see how their administration benefits certain parties and in fact may be in derogation of STATUTORY mandates. But of course you have to understand program ops in detail in order to document this and reach the correct conclusions.
So if you wanted to really promote mitigation reduce disaster and NFIP outlays so no more than one payout for any structure in any 5 year period. Suddenly there would be an incentive to mitigate between claims and payments. Anyhow my guess is Governor Jerry Brown knows and has alerted his administration to take every advantage of FEMA should disaster strike. Maybe even the "big one"!
Showing posts with label Federal Disaster Relief Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Federal Disaster Relief Policy. Show all posts
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Monday, December 20, 2010
Is the New FEMA prepared for ICE STORMS and Energy Outages?
There once was a time when snow and ice were not the subject of disaster declarations. In fact the Fire, flood, or explosion litany of the disaster legislation often seemed to not even include those hazards. Snowstorms have now been added.
The current definition reads:
"Major disaster” means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado,
storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any
fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination
of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant
major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby."
Thus icestorms and energy outages are not specifically listed unless accompanied by one of the listed hazards or the specifically named ones--fire, flood or explosion. And of course radiological releases and terrorist attacks are also not specifically listed or generically listed.
Well it will be interesting to see exactly what FEMA and DHS do in the event of a prolonged icestorm or energy outage or even what their plans and capabilities are in fact. A large ice storm in KY last winter has resulted in an outpouring of disaster largess and surely this was partially the result of efforts by the long serving Congressman from KY Fifth Congressional District now chair of the House Appropriations Committee in the forthcoming 112th Congress.
Not relying on FEMA documentation of capability (there is little to rely upon) but open source materials on other agencies including the Department of Energy a mass and long term outage of power in a major metropolitan area--I would argue the top 500--would result in deaths and damages that would or should qualify this for major disaster status. Perhaps in the South and West, as both FRANCE and Russia have now experienced, heat wave deaths in unairconditioned shelter can be devastating to URBAN populations.
So suggesting that these situations be added to the planning scenarios and any statutory issues be addressed in the 112th Congress.
Winter now but yes with the winter solstice arriving summer now the solstice after next.
Merry Christmas and Happy New Years to all.
The current definition reads:
"Major disaster” means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado,
storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any
fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination
of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant
major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby."
Thus icestorms and energy outages are not specifically listed unless accompanied by one of the listed hazards or the specifically named ones--fire, flood or explosion. And of course radiological releases and terrorist attacks are also not specifically listed or generically listed.
Well it will be interesting to see exactly what FEMA and DHS do in the event of a prolonged icestorm or energy outage or even what their plans and capabilities are in fact. A large ice storm in KY last winter has resulted in an outpouring of disaster largess and surely this was partially the result of efforts by the long serving Congressman from KY Fifth Congressional District now chair of the House Appropriations Committee in the forthcoming 112th Congress.
Not relying on FEMA documentation of capability (there is little to rely upon) but open source materials on other agencies including the Department of Energy a mass and long term outage of power in a major metropolitan area--I would argue the top 500--would result in deaths and damages that would or should qualify this for major disaster status. Perhaps in the South and West, as both FRANCE and Russia have now experienced, heat wave deaths in unairconditioned shelter can be devastating to URBAN populations.
So suggesting that these situations be added to the planning scenarios and any statutory issues be addressed in the 112th Congress.
Winter now but yes with the winter solstice arriving summer now the solstice after next.
Merry Christmas and Happy New Years to all.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Followup to December 7th post--Who are the beneficiaries of federal disaster relief?
My colleague Claire Rubin sent me a copy of a comment posted on the Recovery Diva blog and asked me to answer it. It was posted on her cross-reference to my blog and blog post on disaster assistance.
Here is the comment:
"It would be interesting to see the writer follow up with his recommendation and address how implementation could be achieved.
Some of the issues that jump out at me right up front is the desire to assist those with less. How would you provide an equitable program to those who are socially vulnerable verses [sic] those who are not, considering many disaster survivors are victims based on location verses social or economical status. Additionally how do you address those whose status change[s] based on the event and the new ramifications upon the population?
I am always apprehensive of the comment of “study and beefing up” used in the same sentence. Studies in their purest form either describe or explain a situation using generalization which can be replicated. Researcher study, recovery practioners use the information to create change but must weigh the idiosyncratic elements involved in every situation to render a solution.
By beefing up the duplication of benefits do you mean allowing more duplication or establishing stricter guidelines to identify more frequent occurrences of duplication and therefore take corrective action to minimize the occurrences?
It truly would be interesting for the state and local governments to ask FEMA to divulge statistical information about disaster victims. Most requests are denied because of the federal government’s requirement to protect client information.
By two tiered system I can only interpret that to mean you desire a two tiered Individual Assistance Program verses the current three program system of Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Mitigation system, which can be activated by the President during a federally declared disaster?"
Well these are great questions and will try to be somewhat comprehensive in my response. Perhaps of interest is that I received several comments directly at one of my e-mail addresses focusing on the following sentences in my blog post.
"FEMA is not designed or equipped as a Social Service organization. Even at the highest levels of the agency few executives have a background in dealing with the large portion of the population that has nothing before the disaster and nothing afterwards. Thus, the disaster relief program is largely if not intentionally designed and delivered in a manner to support those who before the disaster had assets and not those who did not."
I am assuming that the most basic inquiry of the Recovery Diva blog commentator also focuses on this issue.
So here goes. First always remember that the federal disaster legislation, not just the Stafford Act, is almost deliberatly designed to confuse and obfuscate the underlying issues. Ever since discrimatory actions by STATE and their Local governments burdened the Hurricane Camille recovery in 1969, even during its Tropical Storm phase, the enforcement of equal protection and due process has been an underlying concern for those administering and receiving disaster relief or participating in the process. The fact that FEMA's focus on evacuation as a Protective Action never addressed the transportation dependent, nor did the STATEs and their local governments, is a leading example as known from Hurricane Katrina. Oddly of course evacuation of Manhattan for the transportation dependent is a leading example of non-feasance, and misfeasance but probably not malfeasance by all the levels of government involved. It would be hard to argue lack of financial resources for the transportation dependent in NYC. Some surely but some not so. My point though is that the disaster legislation is not currently designed to promote crisis management, disaster respone or disaster recovery. And it certainly does not focus on those without food or shelter or basic medical care prior to the incident or event. Why?
Basically the administration of disaster relief in FEMA and its predecessor organizations was and is viewed as a public works program, not based on science, engineering study or even any theory other than expenditure of public funds to replace the built environment predisaster. Deceased Senator William Proxmire if alive would have given it his Golden Fleece award as the Governments ATM. What is unfair about that view is that at least with federal disaster relief the normal opacity of federal programs, functions and activities is somewhat clearer to the average recipient. Either he/she gets assistance or does not. Same for the STATES and their local governments.
So the first thing to do is not the only thing but would be best. Restructure the legislation into a technical assistance chapter, a financial assistance chapter, a chapter dealing with STATE and their local governments inability or unwillingness to operate post event. See for example, EO 12657 which purports to deal with this problem in response to a real-world core melt nuclear power plant accident. A fourth chapter would be dedicated to dealing with pre-disaster levels of inadequate financial resource, medical care, food and housing. The federal FOOD STAMP program became law because 1/3 of all men reporting to the draft for entry into the Armed Services in 1940-41-42 were being rejected for malnutrion. So sometimes the labels and jurisdictions of Congressional committees get in the way. Another problem with the public works mentality is rebuild in the same hazardous zone. So all the mitigation programs, functions and activities should be in another chapter.
Underlying all of this effort is the fact that so much discretion is placed in the President of the US in the various pieces of enacted disaster legislation is that the above would make things easier but are not required. In fact what often occurs post-disaster is that FEMA and the STATES argue over cost shares and other financial aspects even while people suffer. Thus, in the past on this blog I have recommended across the board 100% federal funding for the first 30 or 60 days so that lives and property are not subject to bureacratic and financial debates.
Because it is the President's disaster relief program to date only President William Jefferson Clinton was willing to use the disaster program as a replacement for otherwise Congressionally denied economic stimulus. This led to its own problems, including raising expectations and undermining mitigation and creating what the insurance business call "moral hazard"!
Since a disaster incident or event is not just a "local event" when aggravated over time by repetition and failure to mitigate, it does represent a new "opportunity" to determine whether STATES and their local governments have through ignorance or intent allowed a situation to exist that could be modified post event. The problem is of course is that neither FEMA, its contractors, its leadership or staff is really organized to take advantage of the opportunity to be a change agent. Part of this is because FEMA is NOT a learning organization and often when the so-called rubber meets the road its programs are operated on staffer deep and thus the underfunded understaffed FEMA has to desperately hope others will be making wise decisions post-incident or event. This rarely happens. One example I will detail. At one time FEMA relied on HHS for Certificates of Need to determine whether hospitals would be replaced or reconstructed. That changed under Director Witt who personnally directed massive aid and reconstruction for numerous old and new hospitals. The problem of course is that large consolidated hospitals like Charity Hospital in NOLA no longer make sense. Instead a system of smaller more friendly in size and location medical service outlets make sense with more skilled facilities accessible through severe trauma operations. And of cours NGO's just don't do medical care in the US disaster system. ARC pulled out of this function after the death of many doctors and nurses in the 1918 epidemic.
So here are more specific examples of what might be done!
The Director of FEMA or Secretary HHS should ask the President or Director of OMB to task all Executive Branch agencies to identify generic "resilience" issues that might well be aggravated should the most likely hazard strike the
nations cities and counties and STATES and of course the same for the vulnerablility of federal assets. The military has invested over $30 B in what they call force protection since 9/11/01 and perhaps the civil sector could learn from that effort. Critical infrastructure protection is largely left to the federal government to sort out, except for regulated industries where seldom do the regulators worry about resilience.
With this data in hand, and note that there still is a remarkable concentration of poverty, lack of education (FEMA through Dept of ED builds a lot of schools--over 400 in Northridge were repaired or replaced--and STANFORD U got new graduate housing and a new UNDERGRAD library out of that same disaster), lack of food, lack of medical care has always been faced with an aggrevated situation where this has occurred. Aggravated of course by the disaster. So is this FEMA's problem to fix or someone elses? That is why the always permanent question for FEMA is it the SAFTEY NET if all other programs, functions, and activities have failed to make the disaster zone resilient prior to the disaster? Perhaps it is time for the President and Congress to answer this question. This will make possible the redesign of FEMA's disaster programs to deal with the answer whatever it is!
Short of that it is almost impossible to do the disaster relief redesign effort imbedded in my earlier post and the wonderful comment posted to the Recovery Diva. And thanks Claire for forwading the question and hoping this starts to answer a critical inquiry that should receive a more thoughful and knowledgeable answer than mine.
As to duplication of benefits this is rarely an issue with those without medical care, housing, or food prior to the incident or event. It is a problem in that systems and processes in FEMA largely do not exist to police this waste, fraud, and abuse. Nor do those in the insurance business faciitate policing of this restriction. Why? They directly and indirectly beneift from gaming the disaster efforts of the federal government and the disaster program directly in some cases and indirectly in others subsidizes that busines. Certainly, the NFIP also a disaster and land use program must always be understood to promote the subsidy of the insurance business.
Here is the comment:
"It would be interesting to see the writer follow up with his recommendation and address how implementation could be achieved.
Some of the issues that jump out at me right up front is the desire to assist those with less. How would you provide an equitable program to those who are socially vulnerable verses [sic] those who are not, considering many disaster survivors are victims based on location verses social or economical status. Additionally how do you address those whose status change[s] based on the event and the new ramifications upon the population?
I am always apprehensive of the comment of “study and beefing up” used in the same sentence. Studies in their purest form either describe or explain a situation using generalization which can be replicated. Researcher study, recovery practioners use the information to create change but must weigh the idiosyncratic elements involved in every situation to render a solution.
By beefing up the duplication of benefits do you mean allowing more duplication or establishing stricter guidelines to identify more frequent occurrences of duplication and therefore take corrective action to minimize the occurrences?
It truly would be interesting for the state and local governments to ask FEMA to divulge statistical information about disaster victims. Most requests are denied because of the federal government’s requirement to protect client information.
By two tiered system I can only interpret that to mean you desire a two tiered Individual Assistance Program verses the current three program system of Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Mitigation system, which can be activated by the President during a federally declared disaster?"
Well these are great questions and will try to be somewhat comprehensive in my response. Perhaps of interest is that I received several comments directly at one of my e-mail addresses focusing on the following sentences in my blog post.
"FEMA is not designed or equipped as a Social Service organization. Even at the highest levels of the agency few executives have a background in dealing with the large portion of the population that has nothing before the disaster and nothing afterwards. Thus, the disaster relief program is largely if not intentionally designed and delivered in a manner to support those who before the disaster had assets and not those who did not."
I am assuming that the most basic inquiry of the Recovery Diva blog commentator also focuses on this issue.
So here goes. First always remember that the federal disaster legislation, not just the Stafford Act, is almost deliberatly designed to confuse and obfuscate the underlying issues. Ever since discrimatory actions by STATE and their Local governments burdened the Hurricane Camille recovery in 1969, even during its Tropical Storm phase, the enforcement of equal protection and due process has been an underlying concern for those administering and receiving disaster relief or participating in the process. The fact that FEMA's focus on evacuation as a Protective Action never addressed the transportation dependent, nor did the STATEs and their local governments, is a leading example as known from Hurricane Katrina. Oddly of course evacuation of Manhattan for the transportation dependent is a leading example of non-feasance, and misfeasance but probably not malfeasance by all the levels of government involved. It would be hard to argue lack of financial resources for the transportation dependent in NYC. Some surely but some not so. My point though is that the disaster legislation is not currently designed to promote crisis management, disaster respone or disaster recovery. And it certainly does not focus on those without food or shelter or basic medical care prior to the incident or event. Why?
Basically the administration of disaster relief in FEMA and its predecessor organizations was and is viewed as a public works program, not based on science, engineering study or even any theory other than expenditure of public funds to replace the built environment predisaster. Deceased Senator William Proxmire if alive would have given it his Golden Fleece award as the Governments ATM. What is unfair about that view is that at least with federal disaster relief the normal opacity of federal programs, functions and activities is somewhat clearer to the average recipient. Either he/she gets assistance or does not. Same for the STATES and their local governments.
So the first thing to do is not the only thing but would be best. Restructure the legislation into a technical assistance chapter, a financial assistance chapter, a chapter dealing with STATE and their local governments inability or unwillingness to operate post event. See for example, EO 12657 which purports to deal with this problem in response to a real-world core melt nuclear power plant accident. A fourth chapter would be dedicated to dealing with pre-disaster levels of inadequate financial resource, medical care, food and housing. The federal FOOD STAMP program became law because 1/3 of all men reporting to the draft for entry into the Armed Services in 1940-41-42 were being rejected for malnutrion. So sometimes the labels and jurisdictions of Congressional committees get in the way. Another problem with the public works mentality is rebuild in the same hazardous zone. So all the mitigation programs, functions and activities should be in another chapter.
Underlying all of this effort is the fact that so much discretion is placed in the President of the US in the various pieces of enacted disaster legislation is that the above would make things easier but are not required. In fact what often occurs post-disaster is that FEMA and the STATES argue over cost shares and other financial aspects even while people suffer. Thus, in the past on this blog I have recommended across the board 100% federal funding for the first 30 or 60 days so that lives and property are not subject to bureacratic and financial debates.
Because it is the President's disaster relief program to date only President William Jefferson Clinton was willing to use the disaster program as a replacement for otherwise Congressionally denied economic stimulus. This led to its own problems, including raising expectations and undermining mitigation and creating what the insurance business call "moral hazard"!
Since a disaster incident or event is not just a "local event" when aggravated over time by repetition and failure to mitigate, it does represent a new "opportunity" to determine whether STATES and their local governments have through ignorance or intent allowed a situation to exist that could be modified post event. The problem is of course is that neither FEMA, its contractors, its leadership or staff is really organized to take advantage of the opportunity to be a change agent. Part of this is because FEMA is NOT a learning organization and often when the so-called rubber meets the road its programs are operated on staffer deep and thus the underfunded understaffed FEMA has to desperately hope others will be making wise decisions post-incident or event. This rarely happens. One example I will detail. At one time FEMA relied on HHS for Certificates of Need to determine whether hospitals would be replaced or reconstructed. That changed under Director Witt who personnally directed massive aid and reconstruction for numerous old and new hospitals. The problem of course is that large consolidated hospitals like Charity Hospital in NOLA no longer make sense. Instead a system of smaller more friendly in size and location medical service outlets make sense with more skilled facilities accessible through severe trauma operations. And of cours NGO's just don't do medical care in the US disaster system. ARC pulled out of this function after the death of many doctors and nurses in the 1918 epidemic.
So here are more specific examples of what might be done!
The Director of FEMA or Secretary HHS should ask the President or Director of OMB to task all Executive Branch agencies to identify generic "resilience" issues that might well be aggravated should the most likely hazard strike the
nations cities and counties and STATES and of course the same for the vulnerablility of federal assets. The military has invested over $30 B in what they call force protection since 9/11/01 and perhaps the civil sector could learn from that effort. Critical infrastructure protection is largely left to the federal government to sort out, except for regulated industries where seldom do the regulators worry about resilience.
With this data in hand, and note that there still is a remarkable concentration of poverty, lack of education (FEMA through Dept of ED builds a lot of schools--over 400 in Northridge were repaired or replaced--and STANFORD U got new graduate housing and a new UNDERGRAD library out of that same disaster), lack of food, lack of medical care has always been faced with an aggrevated situation where this has occurred. Aggravated of course by the disaster. So is this FEMA's problem to fix or someone elses? That is why the always permanent question for FEMA is it the SAFTEY NET if all other programs, functions, and activities have failed to make the disaster zone resilient prior to the disaster? Perhaps it is time for the President and Congress to answer this question. This will make possible the redesign of FEMA's disaster programs to deal with the answer whatever it is!
Short of that it is almost impossible to do the disaster relief redesign effort imbedded in my earlier post and the wonderful comment posted to the Recovery Diva. And thanks Claire for forwading the question and hoping this starts to answer a critical inquiry that should receive a more thoughful and knowledgeable answer than mine.
As to duplication of benefits this is rarely an issue with those without medical care, housing, or food prior to the incident or event. It is a problem in that systems and processes in FEMA largely do not exist to police this waste, fraud, and abuse. Nor do those in the insurance business faciitate policing of this restriction. Why? They directly and indirectly beneift from gaming the disaster efforts of the federal government and the disaster program directly in some cases and indirectly in others subsidizes that busines. Certainly, the NFIP also a disaster and land use program must always be understood to promote the subsidy of the insurance business.
Friday, April 9, 2010
My Participation on Disaster Law List-Serve
This AM sent out the message set forth below:
I have recently again received criticism from one individual whom I respect that he really never opens my e-mails to the list. One might ask why he is on the list but I don't ask that because others do provide some very interesting items--at least interesting to me.
Despite 20 years laboring in FEMA OGC from 1979-1999 I never actually was the primary disaster lawyer although for brief intervals I did have supervisory authority over it. There were many other interesting things to do involving FEMA including keeping the agency from being abolished and of course I did run the litigation for well over a decade.
I have come to believe that I was never made fully accountable for the disaster program for two primary reasons. First, I believed that the grant of discretion to the President in the Stafford Act and its predecessor statute was broad. Each action of FEMA under the Presidential delegation did not have to have a specific authorization in the statute but in fact a generic tasking was adequate. In other words FEMA was supposed to be the EXPERT agency and would develop, implement and operate the President's disaster relief program. Again note it is the only federal grant program triggered directly by the President. Each time FEMA took the position it did NOT have the authority and the issue was reviewed by OLG of the Department of Justice, FEMA authority to act was upheld and the restrictive view overturned. This is in the documentary record between DOJ and FEMA.
Secondly, I long believed that while the President did have discretion to declare a disaster or emergency or not once that declaration occurred then due process, equal protection applied fully under the Constitution and that FEMA should make every effort to comply with Constitutional mandates. Instead the actual position of FEMA was that it had complete discretion even post-declaration as to its grantees.
Well the issues still are out there. I am more than happy to withdraw from submitting comments or items for the list. Well maybe not. But I have no idea who is on the list or how it is received but do it as a matter of faith that it is of some utility.
I have recently started blogging on my own at http:vlg338.blogspot.com
That blog is largely FEMA centric and not disaster centric. There is much of importance that FEMA does that is not quite understood by those who only see it as a disaster relief agency.
I have asked Dan Farber for some input also.
I guess in this case silence deems consent. So if I hear nothing I will continue to submit items to the list. If the comments are overwhelmingly negative or even substantial negative I will be glad to keep reading the list but withdraw as a submitter.
Perhaps one further footnote. The National Security apparatus has long coveted the President's Disaster Relief Fund for its needs. That can be documented. And in fact for the first years of permanent disaster relief under Public Law 875 of the 81st Congress (1950) DOD did administer the disaster relief program. Almost 95% of the nation-states of the world have their military running ALL disaster relief. I see it as largely a civilian function but hey I am not the decider. Powerful members of Congress and very intelligent ones also have advocated that it be a DOD responsibility and in particular around the time of Hurricane Hugo in 1989.
Again, standing by!
Bill
Comments on this blog also welcome.
I have recently again received criticism from one individual whom I respect that he really never opens my e-mails to the list. One might ask why he is on the list but I don't ask that because others do provide some very interesting items--at least interesting to me.
Despite 20 years laboring in FEMA OGC from 1979-1999 I never actually was the primary disaster lawyer although for brief intervals I did have supervisory authority over it. There were many other interesting things to do involving FEMA including keeping the agency from being abolished and of course I did run the litigation for well over a decade.
I have come to believe that I was never made fully accountable for the disaster program for two primary reasons. First, I believed that the grant of discretion to the President in the Stafford Act and its predecessor statute was broad. Each action of FEMA under the Presidential delegation did not have to have a specific authorization in the statute but in fact a generic tasking was adequate. In other words FEMA was supposed to be the EXPERT agency and would develop, implement and operate the President's disaster relief program. Again note it is the only federal grant program triggered directly by the President. Each time FEMA took the position it did NOT have the authority and the issue was reviewed by OLG of the Department of Justice, FEMA authority to act was upheld and the restrictive view overturned. This is in the documentary record between DOJ and FEMA.
Secondly, I long believed that while the President did have discretion to declare a disaster or emergency or not once that declaration occurred then due process, equal protection applied fully under the Constitution and that FEMA should make every effort to comply with Constitutional mandates. Instead the actual position of FEMA was that it had complete discretion even post-declaration as to its grantees.
Well the issues still are out there. I am more than happy to withdraw from submitting comments or items for the list. Well maybe not. But I have no idea who is on the list or how it is received but do it as a matter of faith that it is of some utility.
I have recently started blogging on my own at http:vlg338.blogspot.com
That blog is largely FEMA centric and not disaster centric. There is much of importance that FEMA does that is not quite understood by those who only see it as a disaster relief agency.
I have asked Dan Farber for some input also.
I guess in this case silence deems consent. So if I hear nothing I will continue to submit items to the list. If the comments are overwhelmingly negative or even substantial negative I will be glad to keep reading the list but withdraw as a submitter.
Perhaps one further footnote. The National Security apparatus has long coveted the President's Disaster Relief Fund for its needs. That can be documented. And in fact for the first years of permanent disaster relief under Public Law 875 of the 81st Congress (1950) DOD did administer the disaster relief program. Almost 95% of the nation-states of the world have their military running ALL disaster relief. I see it as largely a civilian function but hey I am not the decider. Powerful members of Congress and very intelligent ones also have advocated that it be a DOD responsibility and in particular around the time of Hurricane Hugo in 1989.
Again, standing by!
Bill
Comments on this blog also welcome.
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