In the PUBLIC SAFETY arena there are pretty good statistics on the policing function, the FIRE SERVICE, EMT, and even PUBLIC HEALTH. But not so good on the EM field. Who should be considered a qualified Emergency Manager? I would argue that the certificates and degrees certainly help. Education is part of the three legged stool upon which an EM sits. The others of course being training and experience. But since the onset of the EM discipline in the 70's my guestimate is that fewer than 20,000 have cycled through FEMA as an organization either as PFT, DAE, or CORE or consultants. At the STATES and their local levels perhaps more and perhaps less. But on active duty so to speak and excluding retirees and other I would guestimate less than 10,000 full time EMs nationwide. This is a very very tiny proportion of the total PUBLIC SAFETY arena, and by the way IAEM in designing a new mission and logo did use the term PUBLIC SAFETY which I would have avoided doing. But perhaps they wished to encourage larger enrollment in their organization as opposed to some other categories.
It would be interesting however to have FEMA collect the statistics each year on self-identified EM that are employed full time doing the EM mission. And did you know that a statutory definition for the first time ever appeared in PKEMRA 2006? I like the statutory definition even though I have long used a different one that can be found on my website at www.vacationlanegrp.com!
So come on academics, teachers and students let's get some more accurate studies of the EM discipline and identify how they were done and what the statistics show?
Showing posts with label Emergency Management. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Emergency Management. Show all posts
Monday, November 7, 2011
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
A Heirarchy of EM needs--Parroting A. Maslow
Abraham Maslow is famous for his writings and study of the so-called heirarchy of Human Needs that underpin our humanity.
Increasinly I am supportive of the notion that Emergency Management is not a contrived subject or profession but in fact underlies much of organizational process that leads to various forms of governance. Some wit, perhaps Winston Churchill, once stated that "democracy is the worst form of government, except all others"! Well IMO [in my opinion] EM is the worst form of organizational response to crisis management and resilience (that includes elements of preparedness, planning, prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery) except all others. What alternative choices are there? Well one big one is a "military command and control" system that actually can prevent effective collaboration and cooperation, whether among individuals, NGO's, governments, or other spontaneously developing post-disaster organizations. Since over 90% of the nation-states have vested their EM function in their military-organizationally designed to inflict maximum organized violence on some other group or nation-state--I find that this approach is largely vested in a leaderships desire for control and resurrecting the status quo ante. These factors are not absent from EM but seem more likely not to dominate when the civil sector is dominate.
And always remember that I find it remarkable that the underlying good sense and American inventivness is what in reality caused EM to develop. The term of course goes back even institutionally to the FDR era when the Executive Offices of the WH had an EM section. None-the-less the term got its remarkable rebirth when the STATES in an unsuccessful effort to restructure the federal civil defense program operated from 1951-1994 under Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress as amended started to develop a new paradigm for disaster efforts. Just as the crucial failure of the STATES and their local governments had failed to see the need for civil defense and development and knowledge of radiological defense as part of their existing public safety sector, the clear and always present danger of natural hazards was driving the need for both enhanced effort and efficiency in the Public Safety arena and others. Thus it might well have been either the policing profession or the Fire Service which became the leader in EM and either or both still might given the numbers of personnel involved. But the incrased complexity of organizing for crisis management and response, and in particular recovery meant that the traditions and paradigms of those professions could not truly encompass EM adequately.
Now of course after 4 decades, given the developments both nationally and internationally in EM the increasing expertise and standards of the EM profession and its academic community indicates to me that over this century it will in fact become a wholly new field of human endeavor and likely to be adopted among many of the nation-states that now utilize a military model.
And tracking back to A. Maslov, exactly what is the pyramid or building block of EM that might be agreed upon. As always I can offer only a suggestion but others will decide and argue over its merits. I deliberately don't use the Maslow Heirarchy of needs but do recognize their relevance to this discussion.
So here is my approach.
First, underlying EM should be competence and technical knowledge and experience.
Second, should be organizational and governmental relationships that facilitate resilience (including planning, preparedness, prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery).
Third, would be public education of individuals and families to clearly give all an accurate vision of capability and systems that can be brought to bear in a crisis or disaster and what the limitations are on those capabilities and systems without further dedication of resources.
Fourth, a basic mobilization structure incuding personnel and logistics and other systems that will be necessarily employed when the planning basis or basic capabilities of the existing organizations and systems are proved inadquate to the tasks necessarily expanded by the incident or event beyond the planning basis and day to day capability and system.
Fifth, a way to integrate technical and scientific and engineering knowledge into EM on both an on-going basis and in an emergency with facilitation of the expertise of various professions and those with training and experience that might be of assistance. The medical profession should not be stove-piped for example but deliberate mechanisms created and operated so that that profession can operate comfortably in the EM realm, both independently and as advisors to political decision makers so that protective action recommendations and decisions are able to prevent the larger catastrophe possible by misinformation or lack of knowledge.
In summary perhaps, the system of EM must promote collaboration and cooperation so that the system is supportive of the best rsilience and while individual brilliance will from time to time appear and needs to be utilized, systems and processes must reflect the collective wisdom of those involved with the EM process in any crisis or disaster.
It is this last concept that shows that we have a long way to go. Just as Maslov recognized a heirarchy of needs I open debate here I hope on exactly what is necessary to establish priorities and systems and processes that reflect on the reality that the crisis or disaster does not end when food, water, shelter, emergency medical assistance, and even public safety has provided a secure environment. It is the totality of the effort and judgement needed based on all factors that makes EM so exciting and worthy an endeavor.
And to focus more closely on the real goals of Homeland Security not EM it is necessary that basic civil security is the mission of Homeland Security. This is a far different mission than the EM discipline and profession and organizations I have attempted to describe above. HS reflects only one of Maslov's needs--safety--and absolutely none of the others. EM represents all his higher order needs.
Check out Wikipedia.com for a detailed discussion of Maslov and his writings and teachings.
Increasinly I am supportive of the notion that Emergency Management is not a contrived subject or profession but in fact underlies much of organizational process that leads to various forms of governance. Some wit, perhaps Winston Churchill, once stated that "democracy is the worst form of government, except all others"! Well IMO [in my opinion] EM is the worst form of organizational response to crisis management and resilience (that includes elements of preparedness, planning, prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery) except all others. What alternative choices are there? Well one big one is a "military command and control" system that actually can prevent effective collaboration and cooperation, whether among individuals, NGO's, governments, or other spontaneously developing post-disaster organizations. Since over 90% of the nation-states have vested their EM function in their military-organizationally designed to inflict maximum organized violence on some other group or nation-state--I find that this approach is largely vested in a leaderships desire for control and resurrecting the status quo ante. These factors are not absent from EM but seem more likely not to dominate when the civil sector is dominate.
And always remember that I find it remarkable that the underlying good sense and American inventivness is what in reality caused EM to develop. The term of course goes back even institutionally to the FDR era when the Executive Offices of the WH had an EM section. None-the-less the term got its remarkable rebirth when the STATES in an unsuccessful effort to restructure the federal civil defense program operated from 1951-1994 under Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress as amended started to develop a new paradigm for disaster efforts. Just as the crucial failure of the STATES and their local governments had failed to see the need for civil defense and development and knowledge of radiological defense as part of their existing public safety sector, the clear and always present danger of natural hazards was driving the need for both enhanced effort and efficiency in the Public Safety arena and others. Thus it might well have been either the policing profession or the Fire Service which became the leader in EM and either or both still might given the numbers of personnel involved. But the incrased complexity of organizing for crisis management and response, and in particular recovery meant that the traditions and paradigms of those professions could not truly encompass EM adequately.
Now of course after 4 decades, given the developments both nationally and internationally in EM the increasing expertise and standards of the EM profession and its academic community indicates to me that over this century it will in fact become a wholly new field of human endeavor and likely to be adopted among many of the nation-states that now utilize a military model.
And tracking back to A. Maslov, exactly what is the pyramid or building block of EM that might be agreed upon. As always I can offer only a suggestion but others will decide and argue over its merits. I deliberately don't use the Maslow Heirarchy of needs but do recognize their relevance to this discussion.
So here is my approach.
First, underlying EM should be competence and technical knowledge and experience.
Second, should be organizational and governmental relationships that facilitate resilience (including planning, preparedness, prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery).
Third, would be public education of individuals and families to clearly give all an accurate vision of capability and systems that can be brought to bear in a crisis or disaster and what the limitations are on those capabilities and systems without further dedication of resources.
Fourth, a basic mobilization structure incuding personnel and logistics and other systems that will be necessarily employed when the planning basis or basic capabilities of the existing organizations and systems are proved inadquate to the tasks necessarily expanded by the incident or event beyond the planning basis and day to day capability and system.
Fifth, a way to integrate technical and scientific and engineering knowledge into EM on both an on-going basis and in an emergency with facilitation of the expertise of various professions and those with training and experience that might be of assistance. The medical profession should not be stove-piped for example but deliberate mechanisms created and operated so that that profession can operate comfortably in the EM realm, both independently and as advisors to political decision makers so that protective action recommendations and decisions are able to prevent the larger catastrophe possible by misinformation or lack of knowledge.
In summary perhaps, the system of EM must promote collaboration and cooperation so that the system is supportive of the best rsilience and while individual brilliance will from time to time appear and needs to be utilized, systems and processes must reflect the collective wisdom of those involved with the EM process in any crisis or disaster.
It is this last concept that shows that we have a long way to go. Just as Maslov recognized a heirarchy of needs I open debate here I hope on exactly what is necessary to establish priorities and systems and processes that reflect on the reality that the crisis or disaster does not end when food, water, shelter, emergency medical assistance, and even public safety has provided a secure environment. It is the totality of the effort and judgement needed based on all factors that makes EM so exciting and worthy an endeavor.
And to focus more closely on the real goals of Homeland Security not EM it is necessary that basic civil security is the mission of Homeland Security. This is a far different mission than the EM discipline and profession and organizations I have attempted to describe above. HS reflects only one of Maslov's needs--safety--and absolutely none of the others. EM represents all his higher order needs.
Check out Wikipedia.com for a detailed discussion of Maslov and his writings and teachings.
Thursday, September 9, 2010
The EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PARADIGM
Well we always will have the four horsement of the Apocolypse to fall back on but most EM practicioners and academics know that the paradigm of preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery came primarily out of the NGA's study of EM in the 70's. Whatever the comfort level with this paradigm it certainly had longevity. The addition of the world "prevention" by PKEMA 2006 expanded this litany by mandating a new term. Now of course "resilience" is the word of the day in EM and HS. "Prevention" is also a featured term within these disciplines. In part the NGA effort was an attempt to caputure the need for organizations to focus on certain primary elements of the before and after of large-scale events and probably the result was mostly effecive. Personally, I always liked Kathleen Tierney's comprehensive editorial effort to capture the "preparedness" paradigm in the book published in the early 90's. Exactly why the other elements were not singulary analyzed is perhaps a reasonable question but hers was directive supported by the National Academy of Sciences with grants. Perhaps innovative (can you call a difficiency of over 3 decades an innovation?)researchers could better provide coverage of these terms and their importance in doctrine or operations and their utlimate utility and significiance. Recently Claire Rubin has put a major effort into focusing on the recovery (phase?) paradigm. I still not sure I get it. These elements were useful to identify which bureacrats would be battling over which issues for funding and staffing but never seemed particularly helpful in designing CEM (Comprehensive Emergency Management) which was an NGA goal and notice the emphasis on management not all-hazards coverage.
Personally, perhaps GAO or DHS/OIG could analyze all DHS programs, functions and activities by which paradigm is the primary focus and how do those programs, functions, and activities relate to other DHS and executive branch entity efforts.
Here is one important conclusion I have drawn however. To the extent the staff of a component becomes more expert in their principal paradigm almost invariably the brightest and most capable of that staff understand the mutulally supportive nature of their paradigm to others and vice versa. The end result of course is that willingness to cooperate and collaborate is driven in part by the need to explore each of the paradigms to the deepest extend possible. Hopefully, several posts over the next few months can help formulate clearer thinking on these subjects. That stated what I do know is that the vicious internal bureacratic battles fought over making one or more paradigms dominant will deter EM from accomplishing that which it can. Sounds like the PUBLIC ADMINSTRATION types need to get going. And perhaps the NGA should do a 35 year follow-up study of their 6 volume EM package issued around 1978 to see what was accomplished (or not?) by that effort.
Personally, perhaps GAO or DHS/OIG could analyze all DHS programs, functions and activities by which paradigm is the primary focus and how do those programs, functions, and activities relate to other DHS and executive branch entity efforts.
Here is one important conclusion I have drawn however. To the extent the staff of a component becomes more expert in their principal paradigm almost invariably the brightest and most capable of that staff understand the mutulally supportive nature of their paradigm to others and vice versa. The end result of course is that willingness to cooperate and collaborate is driven in part by the need to explore each of the paradigms to the deepest extend possible. Hopefully, several posts over the next few months can help formulate clearer thinking on these subjects. That stated what I do know is that the vicious internal bureacratic battles fought over making one or more paradigms dominant will deter EM from accomplishing that which it can. Sounds like the PUBLIC ADMINSTRATION types need to get going. And perhaps the NGA should do a 35 year follow-up study of their 6 volume EM package issued around 1978 to see what was accomplished (or not?) by that effort.
Monday, July 19, 2010
BASELINE DOCUMENTS
The blog has been modified to show with a click certain baseline studies, reports, and documents that provide insights into Homeland Security and Emergency Management. It does not mean that I always agree with the discussions, rationales, or conclusions of the documents, but I do think that they are of significance and matter to the evolution of homeland security and emergency management not as labels but as in the arena of human efforts to deal with what seems eternal struggle to cope with events, whether naturally occurring, or assisted by man's technology and science and the application of technology and science to malevalent purposes whether by nonfeasance, malfeasance, misfeasance or gross negligence or even criminal intent to harm the innocent. As they are posted from time to time I will try and provide some analysis of their merits and weaknesses at least in brief.
Previously, I posted similiar documents on Clinton Anderson's blog at EOCMAG@eocmag.com which apparently does not turn up on all search engines. A PhD candidate Clinton at some point I hope will be returning to active blogging. I had the good fortune to finally meet Clinton in person at the 13th FEMA Higher Ed Conference in June. Good luck Clinton.
Previously, I posted similiar documents on Clinton Anderson's blog at EOCMAG@eocmag.com which apparently does not turn up on all search engines. A PhD candidate Clinton at some point I hope will be returning to active blogging. I had the good fortune to finally meet Clinton in person at the 13th FEMA Higher Ed Conference in June. Good luck Clinton.
Sunday, June 27, 2010
The Domestic Civil Emergency Preparedness Capability of the US
Do you ever wonder what the actual state of Emergency Preparedness is today in the civil sector of the US? We do get periodic reports from DHS/OIG and GAO on slices and dices of that capability. And of course we also get periodic audits by actual events! I would include Tropical Storm Agnes (1972)Hurricane Andrew (1992), Hurricane Katrina (2005), and the current BP OIL CATASTROPHE in the Gulf of Mexico.
In 1976, the Senate Special Committee headed by Frank Church not only reviewed INTEL ops and Constitutional issues, national emergency powers, but at least set out an architecture for examing the state of Emergency Preparedness in the US. In Senate Report 94-922 they outlined that architecture but declined to give an overall or specific grade on Emergency Preparedness in the US. An extract of that report is available from this blogger. Its discussion of the merits of planning as an element of preparedness is worth the read.
As to the status of the federal efforts at Emergency Preparedness, the Joint Committee on Defense Production which had operated since the Korean War sent out a comprehensive survey instrument to all federal components in part to react to what was becoming the pressing issue of federal coordination and collaboration that led in part to the formation of FEMA under Reorganization Plan No. 3 in June 1978, implemented in 1979 by President Carter. My documentation of that effort was carefully left behind in FEMA in several places but I understand that the destruction of the FEMA library means most of that effort to "preserve the dead sea scrolls" has failed. Perhaps the CRS of Library of Congress can still find those items.
A very interesting effort was launched in 1988 by Director Julius Becton to determine FEMA's actual capability in a range of emergency situations. Led by Dr. John Powers, PhD, this produced a classified and unclassified report that IMO was the best staff effort in the 20 years I worked in FEMA. I am grateful to that effort for pulling together much of what I know about a number of the components in the first decade of FEMA's existence, a period in which my time was largely devoted to defending FEMA in litigation and administrative hearings over nuclear power issues before NRC tribunals. I am just now attempting to make some of that documentation available to researchers now.
Where is this post going? Well it is long since time when perhaps with a joint effort of GAO and DHS/OIG the actual civil capability of the federal government in emergencies be reviewed and analyzed. This is not a one-year effort and would be both expensive and time intensive. But the starting point should be a literature search of their excellent reports over the last several decades and documentation of what is and what isn't. That step should be staff intensive but gathering of the key reports and their analysis at least has the benefit of being largely a paper process and does not require field audits. Those could follow later.
What we do know is that the big four issues of 1) response to catstrophic environmental events; 2) response to catastrophic radiological events; 3) response to catastrophic WMD events; and finally response to 4) catastrophic natural (including disease and pandemics) events all indicate currently major deficiencies even when the full assets of DOD are included. Clearly some of these items are interrelated and the permutations and combinations of events, concurrent and otherwise must be also examined.
Also what we do know from the very very limited analysis FEMA has conducted of STATE and LOCAL capability is that there are major deficiences.
I would argue that the failure to have documented in a coherent and consistent fashion the NATIONAL capability is a serious defect in the governance process for our democracy (Republic) and in particular for the world's oldest and richest democracy.
Hoping this will occur.
In 1976, the Senate Special Committee headed by Frank Church not only reviewed INTEL ops and Constitutional issues, national emergency powers, but at least set out an architecture for examing the state of Emergency Preparedness in the US. In Senate Report 94-922 they outlined that architecture but declined to give an overall or specific grade on Emergency Preparedness in the US. An extract of that report is available from this blogger. Its discussion of the merits of planning as an element of preparedness is worth the read.
As to the status of the federal efforts at Emergency Preparedness, the Joint Committee on Defense Production which had operated since the Korean War sent out a comprehensive survey instrument to all federal components in part to react to what was becoming the pressing issue of federal coordination and collaboration that led in part to the formation of FEMA under Reorganization Plan No. 3 in June 1978, implemented in 1979 by President Carter. My documentation of that effort was carefully left behind in FEMA in several places but I understand that the destruction of the FEMA library means most of that effort to "preserve the dead sea scrolls" has failed. Perhaps the CRS of Library of Congress can still find those items.
A very interesting effort was launched in 1988 by Director Julius Becton to determine FEMA's actual capability in a range of emergency situations. Led by Dr. John Powers, PhD, this produced a classified and unclassified report that IMO was the best staff effort in the 20 years I worked in FEMA. I am grateful to that effort for pulling together much of what I know about a number of the components in the first decade of FEMA's existence, a period in which my time was largely devoted to defending FEMA in litigation and administrative hearings over nuclear power issues before NRC tribunals. I am just now attempting to make some of that documentation available to researchers now.
Where is this post going? Well it is long since time when perhaps with a joint effort of GAO and DHS/OIG the actual civil capability of the federal government in emergencies be reviewed and analyzed. This is not a one-year effort and would be both expensive and time intensive. But the starting point should be a literature search of their excellent reports over the last several decades and documentation of what is and what isn't. That step should be staff intensive but gathering of the key reports and their analysis at least has the benefit of being largely a paper process and does not require field audits. Those could follow later.
What we do know is that the big four issues of 1) response to catstrophic environmental events; 2) response to catastrophic radiological events; 3) response to catastrophic WMD events; and finally response to 4) catastrophic natural (including disease and pandemics) events all indicate currently major deficiencies even when the full assets of DOD are included. Clearly some of these items are interrelated and the permutations and combinations of events, concurrent and otherwise must be also examined.
Also what we do know from the very very limited analysis FEMA has conducted of STATE and LOCAL capability is that there are major deficiences.
I would argue that the failure to have documented in a coherent and consistent fashion the NATIONAL capability is a serious defect in the governance process for our democracy (Republic) and in particular for the world's oldest and richest democracy.
Hoping this will occur.
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Defining "catastrophic" events-The BP Catastrophe
I plan to start referring to the BP spill as the BP catastrophe. It still does meet my short hand definition of what is a catastrophic event which is any unplanned incident or event in which the governmental organizations charged with disaster response and recovery are knocked out of commission for an indefinite period. Clearly the federal government is currently in operation no matter how ineffectively and now it appears the Congress and its oversight committees are going to hold hearings as early as next week on the "Chain of Command" for this catastrophic event.
I earlier posted on this blog on this subject and cited the language from Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 as set forth again below:
"Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 Extract
House Document No. 95-356
June 19, 1978
From first full paragraph on page 3:
Third, whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should be extensions of the regular missions of Federal agencies. The primary task of the Federal Emergency Management Agency will be to coordinate and plan for the emergency deployment of resources that have other routine uses. There is no need to develop a separate set of Federal skills and capabilities for those rare occasions when catastrophe occurs.
[emphasis supplied]"
It was not quite accurate however to state that this definition limited FEMA from conducting some research and analysis on the problems and definitions of catastrophic events when an independent agency. As all readers of this blog know I don't believe the language above still has any force or effect in limiting discussion or analysis by DHS or FEMA on this subject.
An organization was created even before the final issuance of the FRP (Federal Response Plan) in May 1992 [two months before Hurricane Andrew] called the CDRG (Catastrophic Disaster Response Group) which was designed to be a policy and issue analysis group focusing on those items deriving from disaster operations that might be of concern to the White House [WH] or would definitely be of concern to the WH and require WH intervention to resolve. This organization was designed to be staffed at the Assistant Secretary level from each responding agency. Its notes and issues have long been destroyed and were never properly archived so that is full impact is now hard to measure. IMO it operated well and dealt with many issues of major concern in disasters some of which are repetitive.
Two FEMA staffers, both experienced and very intelligent civil servants, Veronica Moreland and Karen Sagett [both long retired from civil service] drafted a discussion document to facilitate the discussion of catastrophic disaster issues at the April 11, 1997 of the CDRG. Some indication exists that the CDRG adopted some of the recommendations in the paper at least to the extent they identified tough issues to be further analyzed.
The next effort to conduct analysis that was formalized was the circulation of a draft paper on July 20, 2001, entitled "Catstrophic Disaster Definition and Criteria." That document referenced the earlier paper. Again there was no specific decision or decisions made except to recognize the problem. It is true however that this whole policy subject was in fact raised and attempted to be addressed by Joseph Allbaugh, Director of FEMA, under George W. Bush but then of course September 11, 2001 intervened.
I frequently comment on HLSWATCH.com and the subject of catastrophe has been explored several times on that blog. It is also true that once again DHS has started tiny steps to address this topic and resolve issues. I hope that tough analytical work produces results.
In the meantime here's to the BP Catastrophe!
I earlier posted on this blog on this subject and cited the language from Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 as set forth again below:
"Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 Extract
House Document No. 95-356
June 19, 1978
From first full paragraph on page 3:
Third, whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should be extensions of the regular missions of Federal agencies. The primary task of the Federal Emergency Management Agency will be to coordinate and plan for the emergency deployment of resources that have other routine uses. There is no need to develop a separate set of Federal skills and capabilities for those rare occasions when catastrophe occurs.
[emphasis supplied]"
It was not quite accurate however to state that this definition limited FEMA from conducting some research and analysis on the problems and definitions of catastrophic events when an independent agency. As all readers of this blog know I don't believe the language above still has any force or effect in limiting discussion or analysis by DHS or FEMA on this subject.
An organization was created even before the final issuance of the FRP (Federal Response Plan) in May 1992 [two months before Hurricane Andrew] called the CDRG (Catastrophic Disaster Response Group) which was designed to be a policy and issue analysis group focusing on those items deriving from disaster operations that might be of concern to the White House [WH] or would definitely be of concern to the WH and require WH intervention to resolve. This organization was designed to be staffed at the Assistant Secretary level from each responding agency. Its notes and issues have long been destroyed and were never properly archived so that is full impact is now hard to measure. IMO it operated well and dealt with many issues of major concern in disasters some of which are repetitive.
Two FEMA staffers, both experienced and very intelligent civil servants, Veronica Moreland and Karen Sagett [both long retired from civil service] drafted a discussion document to facilitate the discussion of catastrophic disaster issues at the April 11, 1997 of the CDRG. Some indication exists that the CDRG adopted some of the recommendations in the paper at least to the extent they identified tough issues to be further analyzed.
The next effort to conduct analysis that was formalized was the circulation of a draft paper on July 20, 2001, entitled "Catstrophic Disaster Definition and Criteria." That document referenced the earlier paper. Again there was no specific decision or decisions made except to recognize the problem. It is true however that this whole policy subject was in fact raised and attempted to be addressed by Joseph Allbaugh, Director of FEMA, under George W. Bush but then of course September 11, 2001 intervened.
I frequently comment on HLSWATCH.com and the subject of catastrophe has been explored several times on that blog. It is also true that once again DHS has started tiny steps to address this topic and resolve issues. I hope that tough analytical work produces results.
In the meantime here's to the BP Catastrophe!
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