Let's go back for a moment. The Homeland Security Strategy of 2002 (July 6, 2002); the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (November 23, 2002); the Homeland Security Reorganization Plan at page 15 (November 25, 2002); HSPD-5 (February 28,2003); all called for consolidation of FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS and in particular the Federal Response Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan for Oil Spills and Hazardous Materials Releases, and the CONOPLAN TERRORISM were all targeted for inclusion. Of course there are other federal response plans but for the moment let's ignore those plans. None of the above mentioned technically cover response to incidents and events on federally owned property or facilities which theoretically are the responsibility of the federal owner. But as we saw on 9/11/01 Arlington County VA did more in actual response than did the entirety of the DOD with respect to the terrorist strike on the Pentagon.
Okay so now since January 2008 we have the NRF [National Response Framework]! At some point it would be an important piece of US history to delve into the evolution of the mandate, from its inception until its failure.
So this will be a short and dirty history and probably contains some errors. What I would point out is the PLAN RECONCILIATION DOC posted on the homepage of this blog as giving some indication of the difficulty of the quest for this "holy grail"!
The inital FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN was published and I would argue formally adopted in May 1992. Unfortunately, Hurrican Andrew made landfall [twice] in the US in August. So training and implementation was not yet in effect and in fact the first Bush Administration could not decide whether the plan had acutally been implemented or not for Hurricane Andrew response. That plan was partially revised and updated in 1999.
Then of course the CONOPLAN for Domestic Terrorism was published in January 2001. This represented a long struggle to bring the DOJ/FBI TEAM? back to the table after the refusal of DOJ to formally be involved in the Federal RESPONSE Plan. I argue that CONOPLAN is still in effect and until someone shows me a formal supersession document and incorporation into some other formal document will continue to persist in that belief.
Then 9/11/01 and official reaction to that event. A so-called National Response Plan was oddly assigned not to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of DHS when its doors opened in March but to Admiral Loy's Directorate which I believe was Border and Customs Enforcement or some variation thereof. Now Admiral Loy has a sterling reputation but despite his rising to Deputy Secretary of DHS and other honors, he blew it with the assignment of the NRP. He contracted with RAND for production and the output was a document that EM types and other First Responders at the STATE and their local level just could not figure out and complained they had been left out.
By the late fall of 2004 a draft document was circulating and pretty much announced as in effect by early December 2004. Unfortunately, as the OIG/DHS has concluded it was not formally signed off final and issued until April 12, 2005. And then guess what? Hurricane Katrina!
So once again the effort was tested before it could really be implemented. Portions did not work with the result that Secretary Chertoff, and Chief Paulison, Acting head of the FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE [not Agency] worked to reconcile problems resulting in the issuance of the NRF [National Response Framework] in January 2008. Close review of that document demonstrates that it is a design concept and I would argue that no one in DHS really understands whether its various developmental tasks have been accomplished or not. For example, the original 15 National Preparedness Goals, now largely shrunk to 8 [and none involving regulated entities] are each receiving detailed work to develop SOP and CONOPLANs that will be the gold standard.
It appears that the OBAMA Administration may well have left office without producing any document that summarizes the total endproduct of the NRF and its design for response.
In the meantime we now have Admiral Thad Allen another Coastie with a sterling reputation innocently admitting that he did not understand how the totality of the federal response system worked. He has stated in an interview he did not understand how or why DOD was not involved early in the BP Catastrophe. He has stated he did not understand how or why the STATE and their local governments were confused over the response. He also has revealed that certain aspects of the National Contingency Plan, including funding arrangements, had been identified as problematic but funding to fix that plan and its implementation had not occurred as far back as 1997 under the Clinton Administration.
So here is my challenge to the 112th Congress! Hold hearings and have key witnesses describe to US the entirety of the federal response planning system and how it works and how it is funded and who will be showing up at federal, state or local level, or the for-profit sector, or the non-profit sector or whatever! Because the opaqueness of the current implementation of the NRF is a clear and present danger, if not to the national security [I would argue it is] but at least to domestic tranquillity.
Showing posts with label History National Response Framework. Show all posts
Showing posts with label History National Response Framework. Show all posts
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
VLG Technical Bulletin 2010-4-6
VLG Technical Bulletin 2010-4-6
January 24, 1991 Stickney Memorandum on FEMA’s Response Readiness
Wallace E. Stickney was FEMA’s fourth Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed Director (Executive Level II). The previous Directors had been John W. Macy (1979-1981); Louis O. Guiffrida (1981-1985), and Julius W. Becton (1985-1989). Robert Morris, a Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed Deputy Director of FEMA served as Acting Director for two substantial periods (July-November 1985 and July 1989-May 1990). In May 1990, a new Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed Deputy Director, Jerry Jennings, served as Acting Director until Wallace E. Stickney was confirmed in August 1990. That date was significant because Iraq was in the process of invading and seizing Kuwait.
Over the course of the fall of 1990, Director Stickney had systematically received briefings from FEMA staff, and held table top exercises (no actual movement of personnel or materials) to basic learn the emergency management and response system as it then existed. Those briefings and exercises often involving both high-level political appointees and career officials, but never from outside FEMA, were filled with confusion and lack of detail. A simple reason for this confusion and lack of detail existed. Very few political appointees or career officials understood all the plans and response systems that FEMA has either promulgated or signed onto through unfunded Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or funded Memoranda of Agreement (MOA). Now, for the first time in its history, the United States was faced with Iraqi sympathizers or nationals retaliating with domestic terrorist attacks. It should be stated that no formal threat assessment or warning was issued to the civil agencies, State or local governments or the general public or the civilian response community. In fact despite general knowledge that such attacks were possible, even if not directly threatened, FEMA was instructed by the staff of the National Security Council not to even discuss possible attacks. Although the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Pub.L. 81-920) had contained authority for the Administrator to declare a “Civil Defense Emergency” that authority lapsed in 1974.
The context of planning in FEMA in 1990 must be understood as the source of the confusion and lack of clarity. First, the civil National Security community had lived and died bureaucratically by planning for contingencies that would hopefully never occur. Various kinds of exercises, usually tabletops, concerned themselves with various contingencies. In the 1980’s FEMA had participated with DOD in large-scale mobilization exercises, such as Rex-Alpha and Bravo (1982 and 1984) and paid for it bureaucratically when various organizations sued FEMA to learn the details of what was alleged to be a secret government. Second, the HAZMAT’s community pursuant to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) issued originally through agency mandates and then pursuant to E.O. 12316 of August 14, 1981 (now E.O. 12580, as amended) had undergone real life situations requiring actual deployment and response. Even as late as December 1993, however, in a report to Congress, EPA identified continued confusion and overlaps in federal hazmats planning and response. See “A Review of Federal Authorities for Hazardous Materials Accident Safety”, December 1993, EPA 550-R-93-002.
By November 23, 1988, when the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act, Pub.L. 100-707, had been signed, a Federal Response Plan for a Catastrophic Earthquake had been agreed to by all agencies in November 1987. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 had mandated the plan. This plan was the last major civil plan to contain a law-enforcement section, because after that date the Department of Justice refused to agree to inclusion of any law enforcement annex where the plan arguably did not have the Attorney General as the lead. See for example, discussion of the National System for Emergency Coordination issued by the Domestic Policy Council in January 1988.
Additionally, there was the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) promulgated pursuant to E.O. 12241 that by its own terms addressed terrorism. This plan had been published in 1985 and was last updated in 1996. It should be noted that NRC, DOE, and FEMA had signed an MOU in 1981 on radiological incident/event response that still exists, even though arguably conflicting with the FRERP.
It is interesting to note that as early as 1982, in NSD 47, the National Security Council had attempted to facilitate a single domestic response system. That this issue still persists in evidenced by language in the National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July 2002.
Trying to reconcile all this planning confusion, Director Stickney, four days before Desert Storm in a memorandum for all FEMA employees on January 24, 1991, mandating that the Federal Response Plan (for Public Law (93-288, as amended) would be used to support State and local response plans. This was the first use of the term Federal Response Plan because deep in the bureaucracy the Earthquake Response Plan had evolved into the Natural Hazards Response Plan and now was becoming the Federal Response Plan (initially issued in 1992). The formal adoption of the Federal Response Plan finally occurred in 1995. Documentation of planning and response confusion in FEMA in 1992 (even before Hurricane Andrew (August 1992)) exists in reports issued by the FEMA Inspector General.
The Homeland Security Strategy published by the White House Office of Homeland Security on July 6, 2002, had recommended combining (1) the Federal Response Plan; (2) the National Contingency Plan for Oil Spills and Hazardous Materials Releases; and (3) the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan into a National Response Plan. This recommendation was also the subject of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, issued on February 28, 2003, which added the concept of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and named the Secretary of Homeland Security as the National Incident Manager. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, had also called for plan merger and assigned the responsibility to the Director FEMA.
This statutory direction was not, however, followed by the Secretary DHS Tom Ridge who assigned it to Admiral James Loy, then Acting Head of the Transportation Security Administration.
.
Attached Documents: (1) Stickney January 24, 1991 Memo; (2) Extract from House of Representatives Report 102-60 May 13, 1991
January 24, 1991 Stickney Memorandum on FEMA’s Response Readiness
Wallace E. Stickney was FEMA’s fourth Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed Director (Executive Level II). The previous Directors had been John W. Macy (1979-1981); Louis O. Guiffrida (1981-1985), and Julius W. Becton (1985-1989). Robert Morris, a Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed Deputy Director of FEMA served as Acting Director for two substantial periods (July-November 1985 and July 1989-May 1990). In May 1990, a new Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed Deputy Director, Jerry Jennings, served as Acting Director until Wallace E. Stickney was confirmed in August 1990. That date was significant because Iraq was in the process of invading and seizing Kuwait.
Over the course of the fall of 1990, Director Stickney had systematically received briefings from FEMA staff, and held table top exercises (no actual movement of personnel or materials) to basic learn the emergency management and response system as it then existed. Those briefings and exercises often involving both high-level political appointees and career officials, but never from outside FEMA, were filled with confusion and lack of detail. A simple reason for this confusion and lack of detail existed. Very few political appointees or career officials understood all the plans and response systems that FEMA has either promulgated or signed onto through unfunded Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or funded Memoranda of Agreement (MOA). Now, for the first time in its history, the United States was faced with Iraqi sympathizers or nationals retaliating with domestic terrorist attacks. It should be stated that no formal threat assessment or warning was issued to the civil agencies, State or local governments or the general public or the civilian response community. In fact despite general knowledge that such attacks were possible, even if not directly threatened, FEMA was instructed by the staff of the National Security Council not to even discuss possible attacks. Although the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Pub.L. 81-920) had contained authority for the Administrator to declare a “Civil Defense Emergency” that authority lapsed in 1974.
The context of planning in FEMA in 1990 must be understood as the source of the confusion and lack of clarity. First, the civil National Security community had lived and died bureaucratically by planning for contingencies that would hopefully never occur. Various kinds of exercises, usually tabletops, concerned themselves with various contingencies. In the 1980’s FEMA had participated with DOD in large-scale mobilization exercises, such as Rex-Alpha and Bravo (1982 and 1984) and paid for it bureaucratically when various organizations sued FEMA to learn the details of what was alleged to be a secret government. Second, the HAZMAT’s community pursuant to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) issued originally through agency mandates and then pursuant to E.O. 12316 of August 14, 1981 (now E.O. 12580, as amended) had undergone real life situations requiring actual deployment and response. Even as late as December 1993, however, in a report to Congress, EPA identified continued confusion and overlaps in federal hazmats planning and response. See “A Review of Federal Authorities for Hazardous Materials Accident Safety”, December 1993, EPA 550-R-93-002.
By November 23, 1988, when the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act, Pub.L. 100-707, had been signed, a Federal Response Plan for a Catastrophic Earthquake had been agreed to by all agencies in November 1987. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 had mandated the plan. This plan was the last major civil plan to contain a law-enforcement section, because after that date the Department of Justice refused to agree to inclusion of any law enforcement annex where the plan arguably did not have the Attorney General as the lead. See for example, discussion of the National System for Emergency Coordination issued by the Domestic Policy Council in January 1988.
Additionally, there was the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) promulgated pursuant to E.O. 12241 that by its own terms addressed terrorism. This plan had been published in 1985 and was last updated in 1996. It should be noted that NRC, DOE, and FEMA had signed an MOU in 1981 on radiological incident/event response that still exists, even though arguably conflicting with the FRERP.
It is interesting to note that as early as 1982, in NSD 47, the National Security Council had attempted to facilitate a single domestic response system. That this issue still persists in evidenced by language in the National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July 2002.
Trying to reconcile all this planning confusion, Director Stickney, four days before Desert Storm in a memorandum for all FEMA employees on January 24, 1991, mandating that the Federal Response Plan (for Public Law (93-288, as amended) would be used to support State and local response plans. This was the first use of the term Federal Response Plan because deep in the bureaucracy the Earthquake Response Plan had evolved into the Natural Hazards Response Plan and now was becoming the Federal Response Plan (initially issued in 1992). The formal adoption of the Federal Response Plan finally occurred in 1995. Documentation of planning and response confusion in FEMA in 1992 (even before Hurricane Andrew (August 1992)) exists in reports issued by the FEMA Inspector General.
The Homeland Security Strategy published by the White House Office of Homeland Security on July 6, 2002, had recommended combining (1) the Federal Response Plan; (2) the National Contingency Plan for Oil Spills and Hazardous Materials Releases; and (3) the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan into a National Response Plan. This recommendation was also the subject of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, issued on February 28, 2003, which added the concept of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and named the Secretary of Homeland Security as the National Incident Manager. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, had also called for plan merger and assigned the responsibility to the Director FEMA.
This statutory direction was not, however, followed by the Secretary DHS Tom Ridge who assigned it to Admiral James Loy, then Acting Head of the Transportation Security Administration.
.
Attached Documents: (1) Stickney January 24, 1991 Memo; (2) Extract from House of Representatives Report 102-60 May 13, 1991
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