The Definitions of PPD-8

Several new definitions appeared in the March 30th PPD-8 issued under President Obama's signature. These follow:

Definitions
For the purposes of this directive:
(a) The term “national preparedness” refers to the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recovers from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.
(b) The term “security” refers to the protection of the Nation and its people, vital interests, and way of life.
(c) The term “resilience” refers to the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.
(d) The term “prevention” refers to those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. Prevention capabilities include, but are not limited to, information sharing and warning; domestic counterterrorism; and preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For purposes of the prevention framework called for in this directive, the term “prevention” refers to preventing imminent threats.

(e) The term “protection” refers to those capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism and manmade or natural disasters. Protection capabilities include, but are not limited to, defense against WMD threats; defense of agriculture and food; critical infrastructure protection; protection of key leadership and events; border security; maritime security; transportation security; immigration security; and Cybersecurity.
(f) The term “mitigation” refers to those capabilities necessary to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters. Mitigation capabilities include, but are not limited to, community-wide risk reduction projects; efforts to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure and key resource lifelines; risk reduction for specific vulnerabilities from natural hazards or acts of terrorism; and initiatives to reduce future risks after a disaster has occurred.
(g) The term “response” refers to those capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred.
(h) The term “recovery” refers to those capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively, including, but not limited to, rebuilding infrastructure systems; providing adequate
interim and long-term housing for survivors; restoring health, social, and community services; promoting economic development; and restoring natural and cultural resources.

It will be of great interest if these definitions become widely used and accepted. That is what the Directive mandates but many departments and agencies or even sub-units of DHS don't have a clue. I would suggest that a separate budget code be developed by OMB for each of these categories. According to the PPD-8 each definition defines program, functions, or activities that will be getting or already have their own national framework or strategy.

Each of these definitions deserve independent analysis. One basis for the analysis should be how do the definitions related to each other?

PPD-8 and the forthcoming National Preparedness Goal

Under the provisions of the PRESIDENTIAL PREPAREDNESS Directive 8 FEMA will be publishing a new National Preparedness Goal document on November 23, 2011. For once FEMA should indicate who prepared the document, what levels of review and cooridation it have, contractors involved, and level of signoff. Since that basic sign of competence is not likely again suggest perhaps the "NEW" FEMA is not yet new. Reading and thinking still in short supply in FEMA.

Also on its way to the President for signature is a bill enacted by Congress that would replenish the PRESIDENT's DRF[disaster relief fund]. Whew! Thought for a moment the governments principal ATM for STATES and their local governments had come up empty.

A wonderful CRS report on PPD-8 has been posted on my other blog at http://www.vacationlanegrp.wordpress.com

That CRS report is also available now on this blog on the home page under FEMA historical resources. Click on that heading and then the next highlighted heading and docs will come up on your screen.


Happy Thanksgiving to all readers, friends, and families. And colleagues. I include in that all EM personnel world wide.

Hey I hope the new Superintendant at EMI position now being filled is filled by someone in the Academic world with a PhD, perhaps even in EM. But since EM is a multi-disciplinary arena could be a sociologist, anthropologist, engineer, geographer, political scientists, government specialist, etc.etc. As long as they have brains and brawn. The latter needed to withstand the cozy pleasures of overeating and enjoying the bucolic life of an EMI/NFA/NETC principal. The crown jewel in the FEMA geography.

FEMA and Catastrophic Preparedness

FEMA issued it Preparedness Task Force report to Congress last fall. An advisory committee had been authorized by Congress to prepare a report informing Congress of what it could do to enhance National Preparedness. It has been suggested that PPD-8 was one outcome of the Task Force report. I argue that the TASK FORCE under leadership of FEMA and DHS did not come close to helping Congress understand the problems in the current national preparedness setup and certainly did not provide any kind of information base upon which the Congress could legislate to fill preparedness gaps. Please judge for yourself as you read over the recommendations that follow. I would argue that all could be addressed without further legislation but are more a matter of will in FEMA and DHS and the Executive Branch. Perhaps someone will be addressing this deficiency in depth at some point after the next catastrophe.

Here are the Recommendations of the TASK FORCE:

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS


Appendix A: Recommendations to Congress
Strategic Investments to Sustain and Grow Preparedness


Recommendations 1-25


#1: Include preparedness in the portfolio of strategic, futures-oriented analysis currently
conducted by the National Intelligence Council.

Desired Outcomes:

The National Intelligence Council integrates preparedness-related futures analyses into its
activities; and
.
DHS is able to use futures analyses to make authoritative judgments about future
requirements and/or capabilities, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas.

#2: The Department of Education, working with FEMA, should develop materials that school districts can use to implement a preparedness curriculum.

Desired Outcomes:
.
School districts around the country integrate preparedness principles and materials into
curricula; and Citizens entering adulthood understand the preparedness mindset and have taken basic steps to better prepare themselves individually or as a family at home, in the community, and in the workplace.

#3: Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to train and materially prepare for emergencies.

Desired Outcomes:
.
Governments at all levels increasingly consider and implement innovative financial
incentives to promote preparedness; and increasing numbers of individuals and businesses engage in preparedness planning and activities.

#4: Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the length and magnitude of disaster recovery.

Desired Outcomes:
.
Jurisdictions take steps—such as those identified in the San Francisco Success Story—to
initiate advanced recovery planning efforts; and jurisdictions are able to recover from catastrophic events more efficiently, rapidly, and effectively.

#5: Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness implications.

Desired Outcomes:
.
Cybersecurity capability enhancement is prioritized at the local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial levels; and


#4. National cybersecurity policy is expanded to include considerations for the resiliency of increasingly cyber-dependent preparedness and emergency management activities at all levels of government.

#5. Policy and Guidance

Desired Outcome:

Transform existing advisory bodies into a “networked” overarching
preparedness policy advisory system capable of influencing policy
policy from initiation to implementation.

#6: Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council.

Desired Outcome:
.
The NAC functions as an intergovernmental focal point and forum for local, State, Tribal,
and Territorial participation in all stages of the preparedness policy process.

#7: Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils.

Desired Outcome:

The RACs serve as regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that
communicates regional local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives and informs
national-level policy decisions.

#8: Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in the FEMA National Preparedness Directorate (NPD).


Desired Outcome:

.
Embedded local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials advise their Federal counterparts on emerging policy issues and serve as a conduit through which the NAC and RACs can
contribute to and keep informed of national preparedness policy.

#9: Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process.

Desired Outcome:

.
DHS establishes a clear, consistent, and efficient preparedness policy process that better
balances the Department’s need for deliberative flexibility with its need to engage broader elements of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise in collaborative policy-making.

#10: Engage non-governmental stakeholders in a collaborative policy process.

Desired Outcome:
.
Individuals and non-governmental organizations are engaged in a genuinely collaborative
preparedness policy process.

#11: Planning-related policy and guidance should ensure that basic emergency plans match community demographics.

Desired Outcome:
.
Communities better understand and account for their unique requirements and plans reflect these realities.


#12: Establish and fund a national, comprehensive mutual aid system based on NIMS.

Desired Outcome:
.
Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments efficiently coordinate mutual aid before,
during, and in the aftermath of major emergencies and events requiring national or
interstate level responses through a national, comprehensive mutual aid system.


#13: Develop a strategic policy planning process to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges.

Desired Outcome:

The NAC futures analysis workgroup performs long-range assessments and policy planning to mitigate the risk of strategic surprise and optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of preparedness investments.

Capabilities and Assessment --Overarching Prioritize development and phased implementation of a national Recommendation preparedness assessment framework

#14: Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation to justify preparedness improvements.

Desired Outcomes:
.
All levels of government are able to assess their risks using appropriate methodologies;
.
Framework for preparedness Investment Justifications is established;
.
Preparedness levels and progress are measured from year to year by evaluating the gaps
between current and targeted capability levels across all levels of government; and
Investments made to close gaps in capability levels result in a more prepared Nation and
reflect a measurable return on investment.

#15: Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List with tiered, capability-specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements.

Desired Outcomes:
.
All levels of government are able to assess their capability levels, with associated
performance objectives and resource needs;
.
FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address capability performance
gaps; and
.
FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address gaps in nationally
deployable NIMS-typed resources.


#16: Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland security and emergency management assets.

Desired Outcome:
.
Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders have greater visibility into
and access to the range of nationally deployable assets.

#17: Use existing, familiar, user-friendly systems, such as NIMSCAST, to collect preparedness assessment and resource inventory data from all levels of government.

Desired Outcome:
.
FEMA provides a system for data collection and subsequent reporting that is transparent,
repeatable and defendable.

#18: Implement the elements of a preparedness assessment framework over a three-year period, with an integrated set of annual milestones.

Desired Outcomes:
.
All levels of government have an understanding of their threat and hazard profiles,
associated capability needs, and documented capability shortfalls;
.
Grant investments and other preparedness activities are linked to documented capability
shortfalls; and
.
All levels of government have access to a NIMS-typed resource inventory of nationally
deployable assets.

Grants Administration

Make targeted improvements to preparedness grant-related

Overarching coordination and collaboration, business processes, and
capability assessment linkages.

#19: Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at the Federal level.

Desired Outcomes:

Federal agencies administering preparedness grants meet regularly to coordinate, as
appropriate, development of grant guidance, application/award timelines, monitoring, and
assessments;

.
Federal agencies providing preparedness grants have visibility into grantee-developed

strategic documents and use these documents to inform grant allocations and awards;
.
Preparedness grant programs reflect more consistent timelines; and
.
Preparedness grant programs employ the Grants.gov system as a common system.

#20: Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders regarding preparedness-related grant funds.

Desired Outcome:
.
SAAs for all Federal grant programs have increased visibility into grant initiatives,
resulting in more efficient and effective use of Federal grant funds.

#21: DHS should evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal preparedness assistance grants to ensure that match requirements do not disincentivize local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation and that they support capability development and sustainment.

Desired Outcome:
.
DHS conducts evidence-based evaluation to understand how match requirements influence local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation in preparedness grants.

#22: Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring functions should ensure consistent application of standards.

Desired Outcome:
.
Grant programs are administered and monitored consistently by regional offices.

#23: Allow grantees flexibility to use federal grant funds to support sustainment and maintenance costs without limitation.

Desired Outcome:
.
Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial grantees are able to use federal preparedness grants
flexibly to sustain and maintain existing capabilities.


#24: To reflect the diverse goals and objectives of Federal grant programs, grant funding should be allocated using a variety of approaches, including: 1) baseline amounts for each state and territory; 2) amounts based on risk formulas targeted to specific areas; 3) category/programs specific grants; and 4) competitive programs that encourage innovation.

Desired Outcome:
.
Grantees have access to a full range of preparedness grants to meet diverse needs.


#25: More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.

Desired Outcome:

Assessment data supports local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying
how grant funds contribute to capability improvements.

Footnotes #1 and #1a of Senate Rept. 94-922, May 28, 1976

Some might ask why such a technical post but in fact my view of this blog is as a "technical" blog meaning other researchers in the fields of EM and HS can find topics worthwhile for further study since in no way do I think I should have the final word on any of the subjects posted. Being human and subject to the normal emotional range [and perhaps subject to fits of ego and hubris also] I reserve the right to include some discussion of topics or personalities over which I feel "rightous indignation"! That stated here goes!
Concerned over activities of the Nixon Administration as revealed by Watergate and other sources, the Senate empanled several special committees. One was the Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers which issued a final report on its mission on May 28, 1976. Now as we close in on 34 years later some of that report, if not all, is still highly relevant to our democracy (Republic) IMO. An extract of that report numbering 16 pages was given by me to the NAPA team in late 1992 that helped lead to their report "Coping With Catastrophe". Also Steve Aftergood has posted that extract on the Secrecy Archive website for FEMA. Thanks Steve.

On page 27 of that Senate report however is an important recitation of its coverage and then in two important footnotes discussion that leads US to today's post and the status of EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS in the US today.
Here is that discussion quoted exactly:
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES
"In its investigations the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers has concentrated on determining the extent of the emergency power delegated [by Congress and the Constitution] and recommending procedures for the declaration, administration, and termination of emergencies. IT HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO EVALUATE THE STATE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES. [Capitalization supplied by this blogger] Only in its final days did the Committee probe this question at all, and then only briefly.

The range and complexity of emergency issues make any evaluation extremely difficult. {Ftnte #1} Too often government units, trapped within their particular fragment of the bureaucratic puzzle, fail to examine issues in all their parameters. In its brief probing of emergency preparedness issues, the staff of the Committee attempted to cut across customary lines of fragmentation and to take a broad view. To do this, the staff solicited the views of representatives of Federal emergency agencies. Congressional staff members, and nongovernment experts.

The exploration raised serious questions, and the staff believes that it is time to assess the effects of the 1973 administrative reorganization and to evaluate the operation of the new structure with particular attention to EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, COORDINATION, PLANNING, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES QUESTIONS. [Again capitalization supplied by this blogger]

To facilitate such a study and to stimulate interest in and awareness of the many issues involved, this report will summarize the findings of the staff's brief survey. {Ftnte #1a}

Footnote #1--To evaluate planning and preparedness efforts in a comprehensive manner, it is useful to develop analytical frameworks whcih will help structure an overview. Two frameworks may be useful to later investigators. One method involves classifying the specific types of emergency that could occur:
Economic: Depression, inflation, strikes, housing, agricultural, commodity trading, municipal or corporate bankruptcies, domestic program failures, etc.
Natural Catastrophe: Drought, agricultureal pests, plagues, climatic changes, famine, floods, earthquakes, etc.
National Security: Defense, civil defense, internal security, hostilities, war, terrorism, embargoes, nuclear threats (peacetime and wartime), etc.

Another method would be to asess: (1) Organizational capabilities, (2) material resources, and (3) manpower availability.

Footnote #1a--This report represents an initial probing of preparedness issues, rather than a final statement on them. The staff was not able to conduct a thorough examination, and its findings must be viewed with caution.

--End of Extract for this post----
-----------------------------------------------------------
Okay on to my analysis! First no such comprehensive studies of EP in the US has ever been conducted which probably accounts for the confused state of EP and EM/HS in the US today.
The Presidential Reorganization Project TEAM that led to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 that created FEMA had the authority to conduct such an analysis but not the correct staffing or funding to do so. They did have the benefit of a series of brilliant hearings and surveys conducted by the staff and MEMBERS of the Joint Committee on Defense Production which should have been referenced and incorporated more fully into the recommendations of the TEAM that led to the formation of FEMA. Since then only the formation of the Department of Homeland Security was another opportunity but that effort was not based on comprehensive analysis of EP as described above but instead pre-9/11 Commission reports of various types, several of which had recommendations severely misconstrued by the 9/11 Commission and those designing DHS. One specific example of course was the mistaken notion that the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 100-707, which amended in part, revoked in part, and supplemented in part the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 Public Law 93-288, as in fact a comprehensive statute dealing with Executive Branch crisis management and catastrophic response and recovery. That statute has been clearly found wanting many times.
The issuance of the first preparedness report in Janaury 2009 by the departing administration as mandated by Congress certainly in no way purports to be the comprehensive analysis the "Church" Committee which produced the language above would have hoped for being accomplished in the future.

So isn't it about time for a comprehensive study of EP and whether by a Joint Committee of the Congress, a special committee of each house of Congress, GAO or even a Presidential Commission I think the country deserves nothing less. While I can argue both sides of the issue, EP is better off today than in the past, I come down on the side that the nation is less prepared than it was 4 decades ago. Some and perhaps many will disagree but looking forwards to that fight over histor as "they" say.

The First Report on Preparedness

On January 13, 2009, the first report required by PKEMA on the status of "Preparedness" in the US was issued by DHS, althought it bears the signature of the FEMA Administrator and was required to be produced by FEMA not DHS.* This report concluded at the very end of the Bush Administration (the report was prepared largely by contractors to DHS) that the preparedness of the US had improved specifically after analyzing and correcting mistakes and adopting lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.
It is now possible to document that this is complete fiction. The audit of events of course will allow that conclusion to be tested but in the meantime wondering where the Obama Administration's effort to comply with the statutory mandate will take place.
*PKEMA [Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006] was Title VI-NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT of Public Law 109-295, enacted October 4, 2006.

NOTE THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS NOW AVAILABLE ON THIS BLOG AT FEMA HISTORICAL MATERIALS--CLICK ON THIS AT HEAD OF BLOG AND THEN ON FEMA RESOURCES