Still substantially unrevised set forth below is a brief description of the contents of the first 10 HSPDs.
VLG Technical Note 2010-4-21
This note serves to briefly describe the original first 10 HSPDs
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES
1. HSPD 1 Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council-29 Oct 01 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-1.htm
This directive implements and clarifies authority of the Homeland Security Council established by E.O. 13228 of October 8, 2001, “Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council” 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p.796. It is interesting to note that commentary already exists that establishment of this Office was a mistake in that the National Security Council was designed to integrate domestic, military, and foreign policy to design a national security policy that protects the people and property of the United States. The National Security Council was established by statute (the National Security Act of 1947). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002) gives a statutory mandate for existence of the Council although without elaborating on EO13228 or HSPD 1.
Perhaps the policy coordinating committees established by this directive are usefully listed since they reflect the early thinking on the need for new thinking on homeland security policy that existed shortly after 9/11. Eleven HSC Policy Coordination Committees were established to be chaired by a designated Senior Director from the Office of Homeland Security. These include the following:
1. Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence;
2. Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation;
3. Law Enforcement and Investigation;
4. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Consequence Management;
5. Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security;
6. Domestic Transportation Security;
7. Research and Development;
8. Medical and Public Health Preparedness;
9. Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management;
10. Economic Consequences;
11. Public Affairs.
The current operations and staff of these committees are unknown.
2. HSPD 2 Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies 29 Oct 01 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-2.htm
This directive was designed to assist in implementing the policy of the United States to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are within the United States. This directive authorized the creation of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to accomplish the directive’s purposes.
The directive also authorizes enhanced intelligence capability by the INS and Customs Service (now part of DHS since March 1, 2003). The directive also focused on the abuse of student status and authorized new guidelines and new control mechanisms such as limited duration student status. It also authorizes exemptions from new restrictions.
The directive authorizes new efforts with Mexico and Canada to smooth efforts to resolve inconsistencies in immigration policies between the United States and those countries.
Finally, authorized development by the Director OSTP of new budget support and legislation for the use of Advanced Technology for immigration support issues, including recommendations for technology to facilitate rapid identification of aliens, and utilization of government databases can have their ability maximized to detect, identify, locate, and apprehend potential terrorists in the United States.
3. HSPD 3 Homeland Security Advisory System-11 March 02
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-3.htm
This directive was designed to provide an effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities and the American people by providing warnings in the form of a graduated set of “Threat Conditions” that change as the risk changes. Federal departments and agencies would implement their “Protective Measures” as there is a change in the status of the warnings.
Extremely controversial, the warning system has been criticized for its effectiveness. Originally designed to be publicly announced by the Attorney General, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, made the responsibility a principle one for the Secretary DHS.
Most important, the Threat Condition assignment from the beginning was designed to be based on a qualitative assessment, not quantitative calculation. Higher conditions are to reflect both probability, however, and consequences. The factors for assessment include the following:
1) To what degree is the threat information credible?
2) To what degree is the threat information corroborated?
3) To what degree is the threat specific and/or imminent?
4) How grave are the potential consequences of the threat?
The actual conditions include:
1) Low Condition (Green);
2) Guarded Condition (Blue);
3) Elevated Condition (Yellow);
4) High Condition (Orange);
5) Severe Condition (Red).
While the directive gave 45 days for public comment it is unclear whether modifications in the criteria have been changed. The conditions themselves have remained the same since the issuance of the directive in March 2002.
4. HSPD 4 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction-11 Dec 02
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd-17.html
HSPD 4 is the unclassified version of National Security Presidential Directive 17. HSPD 4 provides a discussion of the administration’s strategy for countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their proliferation. The strategy rests on three pillars.
First, Counterproliferation to Combat WMD use. This includes capabilities to combat WMD are integrated into defense transformation measures and homeland security posture. Counterproliferation will also be fully integrated into the basic doctrine, training, and equipping of all forces in order to ensure that they can sustain operations to decisively defeat WMD-armed adversaries.
Second, strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation. The United States and its allies and friends must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles. This includes diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance and export controls. It also includes ensuring compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. New methods of prevention will be pursued, including national criminalization of proliferation activities.
Third, Consequence management to respond to WMD use. The United States must be prepared to respond to the use of WMD against our citizens, our military forces, and hose of friends and allies.
All of the above must operate as seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. In many regards HSPD 4 relies on recommendations in a report submitted in 1999.
In July 1999 the so-called “Deutch” report on combating proliferation of WMD was submitted to the Congress. The Commission was established in January 1998 to perform its assessment and report to Congress on specific administrative, legislative, and other
changes it believes would improve U.S. performance in combating proliferation.
The full title is as follows:
Combating Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization
of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Pursuant to Public Law 293, 104 th Congress.
In accordance with the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(P.L. 104-283) and the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277), we hereby submit the report of the
Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The unclassified version of the report is available at www.mipt.org
Another report of interest on WMD consequences management is the
Report to Congress on Response to Threats
of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
This report was submitted in January 1997 by the Federal Emergency Management Agency after coordination with the Attorney General and Secretary of Defense and is available at www.mipt.org
This background is important because the WMD consequence management section of HSPD 4 is of interest to Federal, state and local officials and private persons involved in emergency response program, functions, and activities.
“Defending the American homeland is the most basic responsibility of our government . . . The National Strategy for Homeland Security discusses U.S. Government programs to deal with the consequences of the use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon in the United States. To maximize their effectiveness, these efforts need to be integrated and comprehensive. Our first responders must have the full range of protective, medical, and remediation tools to identify, assess, and respond rapidly to a WMD event on our territory.”
Finally, the HSPD elaborates on the following improvements:
1) Improved intelligence collection and analysis;
2) Research and development;
3) Strengthened international cooperation;
4) Targeted strategies against proliferants.
Another activity that should be followed in connection with WMD proliferation issues is the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, established by Executive Order 13328, February 6, 2004.
5. HSPD 5 Management of Domestic Incidents- 28 Feb 03
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.htm
Reflecting one of the key policy decisions made since 9/11, this directive mandates the adoption of incident command principles for the federal response to terrorist events and their aftermath. The directive names the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Important issues of federalism are recognized in the directive in language such as the following:
“The Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic incident management. Initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authorities. The Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State and local governments to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities. The Secretary will also provide assistance to State and local governments to develop all-hazards plans [bold and underlining added] and capabilities, including those of greatest importance to the security of the United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal plans are compatible.”
Even while recognizing the federal system mandated by the U.S. Constitution the language above continues the present confusion on exactly when and where and who from the federal government will show up in a terrorist/wmd event. “All-hazards plans” is code for the fact that most humanitarian assistance whether hurricane, tornado, or flood is provided by the same personnel and systems that would provide such assistance in a terrorist/wmd event. HSPD 5 is interpreted as mandating, along with the National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002)[Revised 2007] and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (November 25, 2002) that various federal response plans including the Federal Response Plan (Pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 100-707 codified at 42 United States Code Sections 5121-5206); the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan [FRERP] promulgated pursuant to EO 12241; the National Contingency Plan [See EO 12560, as amended]; the Con-op Plan for a Terrorist Event all be merged into a single National Response Plan that also identifies State and local linkages.
HSPD 5 has now been supplemented by HSPD 8 issued December 2003. Target dates in HSPD 5 were largely missed but see the National Incident Management System issued March 1, 2004. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-web.pdf
6. HSPD 6 Integration and Use of Screening Information- 16 Sep 03
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-6.html
This directive is designed to assist in the development and improvement in systems to screen foreign visitors and improve the flow of information about individuals to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) operated by the CIA together with the participation of the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.
The directive recognizes that as of its issuance the United States did not have a system to
1) Develop, integrate and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information about individuals know or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constitution, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism (Terrorist Information);
2) Use that information as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law to support (a0 Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, foreign-government, and private-sector screening processes, and (b) diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and protective processes.
The Secretary, DHS, is to develop Screening guidelines to assist those organizations that are involved with screen including private entities, including privacy safeguards.
7. HSPD 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection- 17 Dec 03
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-7.html
This directive specifically supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 issued May 22, 1998. That directive was an executive branch response to the issuance of the report by the so-called “Marsh Commission” actually the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1997. See also EO 13010 “Critical Infrastructure Protection” and EO 13231, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.”
The Secretary DHS is assigned a variety of missions in this directive but primarily the Secretary is to coordinate protection activities for each of the following critical infrastructure sectors:
1) Information technology and telecommunications;
2) Chemical;
3) transportation systems, including mass transit; aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems;
4) emergency services;
5) postal; shipping.
6) Focal point for cyberspace issues.
Specific agencies are charged with lead roles as Sector-Specific Agencies, including:
1) Department of Agriculture—agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products);
2) Health and Human Services—public health, healthcare, and food (other than meat, poultry, and egg products.)
3) Environmental Protection Agency—drinking water and water treatment systems;
4) Department of Energy—energy, including the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas, and electric power except for commercial nuclear power facilities;
5) Department of the Treasury—banking and finance;
6) Department of the Interior—national monuments and icons; and
7) Department of Defense—defense industrial base.
Each of the Sector-Specific Agencies are mandated to collaborate with all governmental and private entities in their sector. They are also mandated to conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector; and to encourage risk management strategies to protect and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources.
A number of assignments are given to other Departments and agencies, but most importantly the establishment of a Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating Committee will advise the Homeland Security Council on interagency policy related to physical and cyber infrastructure protection.
The directive also authorizes the Secretary DHS, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council to designate national level events, such as the political conventions, as “National Special Security Events.”
The directive mandates the Secretary DHS produce a comprehensive and integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection.
A June 2002 National Academy of Science report “Making the Nation Safer” addresses some of the technical (scientific and engineering) infrastructure protection issues this directive attempts to address.
Several of the National Strategies issued since 9/11 address critical infrastructure protection including the National Strategy to Provide Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.
A recent focus on securing control systems for critical infrastructure is discussed in GAO Report GAO-04-354, Critical Infrastructure Protection-Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems, March 2004.
8. HSPD 8, National Preparedness-17 Dec 03
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html
This Directive mandates the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, including measurable readiness priorities, targets, and metrics; standards for preparedness assessments and strategies; and a system for assessing the Nation’s overall preparedness to respond to major events. The directive reinforces and complements HSPD 5 and requires that the National Response Plan address terrorism prevention efforts. The House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations in Report 108-541 issued June 15, 2004 requires that all FY2005 DHS grants must include baseline assessment guidance, and that a complete Federal response capabilities inventory be completed by March 15, 2005.
9. HSPD 9 Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food- 30 Jan 04 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-9.html
This directive establishes a national policy to defend the agricultural and food system against terrorist attacks, major, disasters, and other emergencies. Several definitions that appear elsewhere are utilized in the directive, including “critical infrastructure” which has the meaning given to that term in section 1016 (e) of the Patriot Act of 2001 (6 U.S.C. 101(9).
The key mandate of the directive is to various departments and agencies to develop robust, comprehensive, and fully coordinated surveillance and monitoring systems, including international information for animal and plant disease, wildlife disease, and food, public health, and water quality that provides early detection and awareness of disease, pest, or poisonous agents. These organizations are also to develop and enhance intelligence operations and analysis capabilities focusing on the agriculture, food, and water sectors.
Finally the directive mandates vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, and response and recovery planning for threats to agriculture and food and in particular Bioterrorism. This is accomplished in part by mandating a National Veterinary Stockpile [NVS](vaccines and other therapeutic products) in coordination with the Strategic National Stockpile (vaccines for human use). Also mandated is a National Plant Disease Recovery System [NPDRS] capable of responding with pest control measures and use of resistant seed varieties (utilizing the U.S. National Plant Germplasm System).
A research and development mandate is also contained in the directive designed to stimulate production of new plant and animal protective countermeasures. This includes establishment of new laboratories and university based centers of excellence.
10. HSPD 10—Biodefense for the 21st Century, April 28, 2004
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-10.html
After listing accomplishments in Bioterrorism defense, the directive outlines the pillars of the U.S. Bioterrorism defense program including:
1) Threat Awareness;
2) Prevention and Protection;
3) Surveillance and Detection; and
4) Response and Recovery.
First, threat awareness focuses on biological warfare related intelligence, including so-called red-teaming. Mandated periodic assessments to assist in developing priorities and high level net-assessments that evaluate progress in identification of gaps and vulnerabilities in biodefense. The directive also mandates efforts to anticipate future threats.
Second, so-called pro-active prevention is mandated by enhancing diplomacy, arms control, law enforcement, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance.
Citing the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, released in December 2002, development of improved capability to detect and destroy any adversary’s biological weapons is emphasized. Again, the directive emphasizes the protection of critical infrastructure from Bioterrorism.
Third, early warning, detection and recognition of employment of biological weapons must be developed to permit timely response and mitigate consequences. Creation of a national bioawareness system is mandated to permit early warning and prevent unnecessary loss of life, economic losses, and social disruption. Deterrence is discussed in the context of improving capability to perform technical forensic analysis and the creation of the National Bioforensic Analysis Center of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center, both under DHS.
Finally, a biological response annex is mandated for the National Response Plan (NRP). The periodic exercise of that plan is mandated by the directive, including aspects of mass casualty care and medical countermeasures. This includes effective risk communications with the general public and the medical and public health communities.
For a recent discussion of progress on Bioterrorism preparedness, response and recovery see a briefing by the General Accountability Office to Congress transmitted February 10, 2004, subject: HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs: States Reported Progress but Fell Short of Program Goals for 2002 (GAO-04-360R)
Note that this VLG technical note is now several years old but is reproduced in order to provide a baseline on the first 10 HSPDs.
